The Virginia Democracy In 1897

Silver-Plated Conservatism

By HARRY E. POINDEXTER*

IN 1896 the Democratic party in Virginia yielded to agrarian radicals, embracing the Bryan free-silver platform and fusing with Populists. Its reward, despite the revolt of "sound money" men, was a resounding victory in the state.[1] In the wake of this bitter campaign, the Virginia Democracy was confronted with perplexing problems growing out of the election and the economic distress of the era. Faced with a divided party, Democratic leaders sought to conciliate conservative business interests without abandoning the highly popular features of Bryan's radical platform. Their problem was made more ticklish because the movement of ex-Populists back to the party had to be cultivated without yielding completely to their insurgency. Growing demands for economic retrenchment and political reform within the state government—logical consequences of the sentiment which had brought about Bryan's nomination, but potentially dangerous to Democratic control—needed to be forestalled until their strength and direction could be gauged.

The chief architect of Bryan's victory in Virginia had been Senator John W. Daniel of Lynchburg, indisputably the most popular man in the state and long a free-silver proponent. On the eve of the state Democratic convention in 1896 he had won over to bimetallism his senatorial colleague, Thomas S. Martin, who had gained great notoriety in 1893 by defeating the highly popular Fitzhugh Lee for the United States Senate. After a bitter contest in the state legislature, Martin had surprisingly unhorsed Lee and there were charges that railroad money was Martin's secret weapon. Whether the accusation was true or not, the new Senator was known to be a spokesman for railroad interests and to have close connections with other business groups. His reluctant conversion to free silver in 1896 had been as surprising as his decision over Lee. Nevertheless, Martin's acquiescence in the popular clamor had moved the party ma-

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chinery into the Bryan camp because even before his election he had been building an organization which gradually gained control of the Democracy during the 1890's.[2] Many "silverite" Democrats, however, were to have cause to doubt the sincerity of this conservative conversion during the political battles of 1897.

The state convention of 1896 had been a "silver carnival."[3] Many sound-money Democrats who felt that the party had been hopelessly captured by Populists withdrew to help form the National Democratic party and to work in close harmony with the Republican forces of McKinley. These "gold Democrats" were drawn mostly from business and professional groups in the urban areas[4] and their strength is difficult to evaluate. Among them were some of the most prominent leaders of the Democratic party in the state, including Governor Charles T. O'Ferrall.[5]

Their chief organ was the Richmond *Times*, ably edited by William L. Royall and owned by Joseph P. Bryan, builder of the Georgia Pacific Railroad. Whether efforts should be made to win back this dissident element in 1897 remained a debated issue until the state convention in August.

The currency issue of the Bryan campaign provided the strongest shield with which the Democratic party could ward off demands for reforms within the state in 1897. Entrenched behind the silver mania, the Virginia Democracy showed signs of extensive conservatism which called into question the sincerity of radical utterances of its overseers. There were definite indications that increasingly large numbers of Virginians possessed sympathy for the spirit of progressive reform which had become so important a factor in politics. Honest elections, economy in government, and more direct democracy emerged as significant issues in the state in 1897. But the popular Senator Daniel, whose seat was to be filled that year, the sphinx-like Martin, and the machinery of the party refused to bow to popular dissatisfaction with an outdated constitution and notoriously corrupt election practices. With Republicans quarreling over patronage and Populists uncertain about a plan of action, this group managed to curb all state-wide attempts at reform without damage to the party. The maneuverings of 1897 revealed the conservative core of the Democracy despite an overlay of free silver and Bryan's militant national platform.

The first thrust for reform was aimed at the state constitution and dominated politics during the first five months of the year. From the area between Lynchburg and Richmond a cry arose for a constitutional convention to propose amendments for reforming the election machinery and to simplify the expensive judicial and

administrative systems.[6] The Underwood Constitution of 1868 under which Virginia was operating provided that every twenty years, or whenever the General Assembly so voted, there should be an election for deciding whether to assemble a convention to offer amendments to the constitution.

A popular referendum for a constitutional convention failed in 1888, and the question had fluctuated in interest for a decade.[7] As the nineties wore on, however, the depressed financial condition which had given birth to free silver also reduced state revenues. At the same time, Virginia was facing a growing interest rate on its public debt. The Century Bonds through which the debt controversy had been settled in 1891-1892 stipulated that the rate of interest on January 1, 1901, would rise from two to three percent, adding about $200,000 annually to expenditures.[8] Consequently, a reduction in expenses through a wide-spread modification of governmental agencies seemed imperative.

Because of fraudulent election practices by the Democratic party, political morality joined with financial stringency to bring the issue to another vote in 1897. Republicans had won twenty of the thirty-two predominantly white counties in Southwest Virginia in 1896. Yet, in counties where Republican Negroes outnumbered whites, the Democrats had rolled up large majorities.[9] Republicans and gold Democrats immediately claimed that Democratic election officials had so controlled the ballot boxes that Negro votes were either voided or cast for the wrong party, and there is evidence to support such charges.[10] Moreover, election machinery in the state was organized perfectly to achieve these results.

Under the constitution, the franchise was given to all males over twenty years of age who had lived in Virginia for one year and in the area of registration for three months. The mechanics of elections, however, were based on the Walton election law of 1894. Passed almost unnoticed during the furor over Martin's election, this act introduced the Australian ballot and continued the control of elections by a three-man board for each precinct. It also provided for constables, elected by this board, to aid the illiterate in marking the complicated ballot. The act was originally aimed at controlling the Negro-Republican vote. Since candidates were not listed under any sort of party banner, ignorant Negroes were almost helpless under it. In practice, however, the law was used against whites and even against Democrats. "Martin Democrats" controlled the boards and used their positions to accomplish the twofold purpose of the law: the disfranchisement of Negroes and the vigilant protection of the Democratic machine.[11] Even

before 1896 the effectiveness of this method was widely known, and Mark Hanna needed much persuasion before sending $160,000 to Virginia to aid McKinley's campaign.[12]

It is virtually impossible to estimate whether retrenchment or election reform was more important in bringing forth the demand for constitutional revision in 1897. State Senator Eugene Withers of Danville in Pittsylvania County who spearheaded the movement justified it in the interests of economy and good government,[13] a stand that was probably meant to include both factors. Actually, the issues were highly confused, and there was great disagreement as to what action the proposed convention should take. For example, the Norfolk *Landmark* and the Salem *Sentinel* both urged a favorable vote, but their reasons sharply conflicted. The *Landmark* admitted the need for economy in state government but was just as outspoken in its desire for an amendment which would restrict the suffrage—a direct threat to the Negro-Republican vote. The Salem paper, located in the Southwest where Republicanism was strong, had a reason to which eastern Virginia strongly objected. It urged that the state tax system be amended to make the Tidewater oyster industry provide the bulk of the revenue.[14]

Despite these mixed motivations, newspapers were overwhelmingly behind the convention on the need for economy. The Petersburg *Index-Appeal*, the Stuanton *Daily News*, and other gold Democrat papers emphasized the need for a simpler, cheaper system of government in harmony with the existing sources of revenue.[15] Free-silver papers like the Richmond *State* and the Charlottesville *Daily Progress* joined this chorus.[16]

Proponents of economy argued that at least $200,000 annually could be saved,[17] and advanced various ideas for effecting it. Suggestions included a reduction in the number of county judges and an extension of their duties, a smaller expenditure for education and criminal expenses, decreases in state salaries, and fewer state elections.[18] Although there was much disagreement over the way economy might be obtained, it was generally agreed, even by many opposing a convention, that the state debt was soon to be a serious question. In fact, the Richmond *Dispatch*, an allegedly Democratic machine paper and the only important state paper to oppose the convention, realized this necessity.[19]

Those who wanted financial reform but opposed the convention charged that the cost of such a gathering could not be borne by the state and that the constitution already permitted the legislature to initiate amendments. While this process was time-consuming—requiring the approval of two consecutive legislatures before a

popular referendum could be held—it was the plan favored by the *Dispatch,* certain papers in northern Virginia, and the Charlotte *Gazette.*[20] Willingness to leave amendments to this slow method had significant roots which were embedded in the controversy over election reform, a revision with which a considerable number of Democrats had no sympathy.

The Populist party and gold Democrats led the fight for honest elections—the second goal of a constitutional convention. They were joined by ardent free-silver Democrats who believed that their efforts in recent years to capture the party had been defeated because of illegal election practices on the part of conservative "machine" officials. Since early in 1896 gold Democratic papers had been attacking the dishonest tactics of the controlling wing of the party.[21] In March, 1897, sixty or more of the leading Virginia Populists assembled in Lynchburg and demanded a constitutional convention which would erect a non-partisan election law toward which the party had labored for years. Free-silver Democrats joined the clamor.[22]

But, as in the case of administrative reforms, convention supporters were split over the manner in which honest elections should be achieved. One wing of the gold Democrats was convinced that the currency issue would never be honestly decided on its merits in Virginia until the white population was assured that there was no possibility of a recurrence of the Negro-Republican domination of Reconstruction days. Shortly after the 1896 campaign the Richmond *Times* insisted that "one of the main arguments used by the silverite press against the efforts of [gold] Democrats . . . was to reproach them with a purpose to 'negrofy' Virginia."[23] The Negro question aroused old fears and "caused many men to look no further than this standing source of anxiety, and to shut their eyes and vote blindly for the party that would 'down the nigger' ."[24] A convention could eliminate this political smoke-screen by restricting Negro suffrage through educational qualifications for voting.

Not all gold Democrats were willing to sacrifice the political privileges of Negroes in the interests of the gold dollar.[25] Even "gold bugs" who favored holding a constitutional convention were split over its purposes. Nor were Populists inclined to favor disfranchisement of the Negro. Their goal was an extension of democracy, not a restriction of it. They were not swayed by those who tried to give a moral tone to disfranchisement by arguing that it would do "away with the demoralizing temptation . . . of accomplishing this result by fraudulent methods."[26]

Uncertainty over the outcome of a constitutional convention

certainly dealt the reform movement a severe blow. Furthermore, Republicans and some Populists—the two political groups which had suffered most from the Walton election law—feared that the dominant faction of the Democratic party would control the election of delegates to any convention.[27] Acutely aware of their reliance on the Negro vote, Virginia Republicans in 1896 had emphatically denounced the rapid convention method of constitutional revision. The party remained officially opposed in 1897.[28]

Despite this, the regular Democracy professed concern that the split in party ranks over the currency issue made calling a convention too risky for the white population. The door might be suddenly opened to a Negro-Republican constitution and the horrors of Reconstruction. In vain, liberal Democratic papers and the "gold bug" press decried such a possibility: the Republicans and Negroes were too apathetic to be a menace.[29] The Richmond *Dispatch,* which stirred up white fears throughout the spring,[30] was accused of "carrying party loyalty to a ridiculous extreme, so ridiculous as to arouse a suspicion that in this case party fealty is a mere subterfuge."[31] The sound-money *Daily News* of Staunton lamented that the "*Dispatch* doubtless voices the machine, which is against it; Thomas S. Martin and [Congressman] Peter J. Otey are silent as the tomb on the subject [of a convention], and it will be voted down."[32] The champion of the movement, State Senator Withers despaired of success: the Negroes, Republicans and "the officeholding class of the Democratic party" were solidly against it.[33]

From the standpoint of self interest, the "bloated and gouty office holders,"[34] had every reason to be hostile. With the Walton Act effectively controlling the Negro, nothing could be gained by tampering with the franchise. Furthermore, by economizing in the number of state offices an effective means of welding a strong party organization would be weakened. Although Senators Martin and Daniel never bothered to take a position on the convention issue publicly, it appeared that the party machinery, hesitant to block the movement, was really hostile.[35] It is significant that the Lynchburg *Daily Advance,* owned and edited by Carter Glass, a strong supporter of Daniel, failed to mention the question in the weeks preceding the vote, yet Glass himself favored holding the convention.[36] Micajah Woods, Commonwealth's Attorney of Albemarle County who had been permanent chairman of the 1896 state Democratic convention, insisted that it might be dangerous to call a convention because of the "poverty and despair among the masses of our people."[37] Party leaders unquestionably felt that whatever risks

might be involved in ignoring the groundswell behind the movement were lessened by its diversity of objectives and could be overcome by relying on the free silver frenzy to rally public support. The popularity of Bryanism was more than enough to overide any hostility which the party would incur in ignoring the demands for state-wide reform.

Nevertheless, two Martin stalwarts, Congressmen Otey and Claude A. Swanson, made public their support of the convention. Otey, who had helped build the Lynchburg and Durham Railroad and who had been elected to Congress in 1894 from the Third District, based his stand on the fact that a Democratic legislature had called for the vote, conveniently forgetting that at the 1896 party convention the Resolutions Committee had allowed such a proposal to die quietly during the currency row. Swanson, of Chatham in Pittsylvania County, avoided stating why he favored the plan.[38] It should be noted that both of these men represented areas in which the support of Populists had to be courted and where fraudulent election practices were most notorious. Furthermore, in the light of the refusal of a surprising number of important Democrats to take a stand, one must conclude that here were two aberrations chargeable to local politics, especially since neither Otey nor Swanson showed more than lukewarm support.

It is impossible to explain away opposition toward a convention within Democratic ranks as merely machine hostility, however. In view of developments later in the year, the opinion of Congressman William A. Jones of Warsaw in the First District is interesting. Jones was rapidly becoming Martin's chief opponent within the party through his leadership of liberal elements returning to the Democratic fold as Populism declined. He might have been expected to support a convention in order to entice Populist votes and perhaps to destroy machine control of elections in order to fight Martin successfully. Many people were no doubt amazed when Jones, in an interview on April 5, insisted that party schisms and a great disagreement as to goals made calling a convention a mistake. Admitting that county government and the judiciary system could be improved, he contended that legislative amendments would be more efficient and economical. More surprising was his attitude toward a possible educational requirement for voting. With shrewd reasoning, he asserted that such a system would not only be of temporary effectiveness but might eventually bring disaster to the Democratic party. He noted that most young Negroes, who made up the "most disorderly, improvident, and objectionable element," would not be eliminated by this qualification. Instead, the older

ones, constituting "the most law-abiding and conservative" members of their race, were generally ignorant and would be disfranchised. Even worse, many prominent whites, among them Confederate veterans, would likewise suffer because of inadequate education.[39] It should be noted that Jones' area was safely Democratic with no Negro problem similar to that of the Southside, and that the papers of northern Virginia were strongly opposed to the convention.[40] Nevertheless, Jones' conservative attitude toward the liberal reform movement was unexpected. For one who was shortly to be fighting for an extension of democracy in the state, it was also unbecoming.

Unwilling to acquiesce in these liberal undercurrents of the nineties, Daniel, Martin, and nearly all other leaders of Virginia's Democratic party displayed the deep-rooted conservatism toward state problems which characterized the organization's policy makers in 1897. Rudderless, Democrats either lost interest in or viewed askance the conflicting aims of a constitutional convention.

Without the support of either of the two major parties,[41] the question evoked small interest on election day, May 27. The total vote of 121,779 was very light, being nearly thirty percent less than Bryan alone had received the preceding year. Only 38,000 people supported the convention movement.[42] Yet, in the face of party apathy, reform sentiment was great enough to carry thirteen of the 100 counties for the convention and to come within at least twenty votes of victory in six more. If, as one paper asserted, promoters of the plan looked to urban areas to carry it, they were sorely disappointed. Only seven of the eighteen cities voted in the affirmative.[43] Even areas having the most Populists failed to rally behind the movement, but Campbell, Halifax, and Pittsylvania counties fell by very small margins. The most noticeable support occurred in the Black Belt,[44] where the eagerness to disfranchise the Negroes and the failure of that race to vote contributed to the result.

There is no evidence to show that fear of Populistic economic planks being written into the constitution played a significant part in the defeat of the plan.[45] The result must be attributed to a conflicting set of objectives, open hostility of Republicans, and, most of all, to the unwillingness of the complacent Democratic party to give direction or support to badly needed reforms.

For the losers, however, there was some consolation. The question had gained in popularity since 1888 when the vote had been lighter and the margin of defeat greater. Furthermore, the problems behind the movement remained, and they spilled over into the campaign for state offices during the rest of the year. Carter

Glass' Lynchburg *News* contended that the negative vote did not mean that most Virginians were satisfied with the constitution.[46] Although at first believing the whole question no longer a political issue, the Richmond *Dispatch* was soon hoping that time would be given in the coming Democratic state convention to state problems, especially to a reduction of expenses.[47] Reference to election reform was conspicuously absent.

To gold Democrats, the issues behind the convention movement offered a common ground on which they could rejoin the Democracy in the state campaign if only the currency issue were forgotten a while. In replying to a telegram from the New York *Journal,* Governor O'Ferrall asserted that Populistic currency policies and attacks on the Supreme Court would have to be dropped by Democrats if national reunion were to achieved behind such fundamental Democratic principles as opposition to monopolies and protective tariffs. Local issues, he said, must be the keynote of 1897.[48] The Richmond *Times* hammered hard on this theme throughout the spring and early summer, proclaiming that national issues had no place in state politics. That paper seemed blissfully unaware that if its contention were true it should not oppose state candidates because of questions on which state officers could not act.

In trying to limit politics to state problems, Virginia bolters were merely following the national pattern of gold Democrats.[49] But several factors precluded success in Virginia. Republicans, split wide open over patronage in the state and saddled with the unpopular Dingley tariff, offered "goldbugs" no effective alliance. Moreover, in 1897 national issues were necessarily highlighted because the General Assembly to be elected that year would be called upon to fill Daniel's Senate seat. Many members would still be in office in 1899 when Senator Martin's term expired. Thus the Richmond *Dispatch* had a valid argument in claiming that the national issues of 1896 could not be ignored.[50] And when a gold paper clamored that it would be folly to reaffirm the platform adopted by the Democratic National Convention at Chicago, the Richmond *State,* in a blast obviously aimed at Governor O'Ferrall, declared that the party could not again take a chance on having "enemies to its principles in disguise in charge of the party machinery in any office. . . ."[51]

From the first there seemed little doubt that the 1896 Chicago platform would be endorsed at the coming state convention, despite the furor raised by gold papers. The Virginia Democracy was looking beyond local elections and girding for the coming fight which Bryan had promised shortly after his defeat.[52] "We must so work

as to keep our silver forces together for the grand struggle of 1900," proclaimed one influential Democrat[53] after silver forces had made large gains in Ohio, Michigan, Chicago, and New England in April. By early May, Martin, Swanson, and several other prominent Democrats had expressed a desire to remain wedded to the radical national platform.[54]

Several weeks later from Washington came the opinion of the most popular Democrat in Virginia, Senator Daniel. Feeling that the whole Chicago platform would be adopted at the state convention, he said that if trouble developed "we will simply reaffirm the platform and single out for special attention the four principal planks —silver, tariff, income-tax, and trusts. Those are the dominant issues, and upon them we will make our fight."[55] The Washington reporter interviewing Daniel threw light on this statement by observing that some Democrats believed the national platform's endorsement of government ownership of railroads and condemnation of the Supreme Court might be dangerous. Party policy in Virginia was further foreshadowed when every member of the State Central Committee at its meeting in Richmond on May 20 voiced approbation of the Chicago platform.[56] The avidity with which Democratic leaders asserted themselves on the national platform stands in striking contrast to their dilatoriness and evasion on state issues. Their success in deflecting popular unrest from state to national questions was soon apparent. By July, nearly all areas which had selected delegates to the state Democratic convention had endorsed the 1896 planks while neglecting retrenchment and reform in the state administration.[57]

Meanwhile, opportunities for returning to the party were offered gold Democrats. Congressman Otey's hopes[58] that disaffected Democrats would not be ignored completely was realized as Democrats in several cities and counties voted to allow bolters to participate in their primaries.[59] Although the Richmond *Times* on June 3 announced the withdrawal from the party of its owner, Joseph Bryan, and urged "goldbugs" to keep out of Democratic primaries,[60] there was a tendency among gold papers to return to the fold. Whatever "buncombe about national affairs" the silverites might use to heal the sores left by the 1896 campaign, many gold Democrats felt uncomfortable outside the Democratic fold.[61]

With smoke from the 1896 battle still obstructing from view the real state issues of retrenchment and reform, the party went through the motions of choosing its nominees for governor, lieutenant-governor, attorney general, and members of the General Assembly. Long before the state convention met in Roanoke in

August, the race for governor had been decided. There were only two major contenders: J. Hoge Tyler of Radford, a gentleman farmer and ardent silverite who offered great appeal to agrarian elements and to people in the Republican Southwest; and J. Taylor Ellyson, president of a Richmond loan company. Ellyson had been mayor of Richmond, state senator, and chairman of the Democratic state committee almost continuously since 1890. Although a gold man at Chicago he had acquiesced in the silver plank and had won acclaim for his work as state chairman in 1896.[62] Tyler was the more popular candidate, for Ellyson, accused of being a "goldbug" at heart and a machine politician, suffered also from the popular prejudice against making a Richmond man governor.[63] Ellyson was charged with reversing "an opinion [on the currency issue] today with the hope of obtaining a benefit tomorrow," and warned about "riding two fiery steeds going in opposite directions, with the inevitable fate of being dropped between."[64] Without a doubt Ellyson was in an uncomfortable position: if he had repudiated the party in 1896 he would have been labelled a traitor; since he had not, he was called a political acrobat. To counter this sentiment Ellyson wrote on May 21 an open letter in which he set forth his advocacy of free silver and stated that if elected governor he would fill any vacancy in the United States Senate with a man "thoroughly in accord with the [state] platform. . . ."[65]

Ellyson, in spite of his party position, was not the hand-picked candidate of the Democratic organization. A trip to Washington in April did not succeed in getting for him the endorsement of either Virginia Senator or any Congressman, none of whom openly supported either Tyler or Ellyson prior to the state convention. Furthermore, he was even unable to block the efforts of Tyler forces to nominate delegates from Richmond to the state convention on a pro-rata basis instead of by the method existing elsewhere of giving all the delegates to the candidate who won the local primary. As a result, Tyler got thirty of the seventy-eight delegates from Richmond. "Slaughtered in the house of his friends," Ellyson quickly fell behind in the pre-convention race and received real support only in the Southside and eastern Virginia.[66] Tyler rapidly built up almost a four to one majority as the Valley, Southwest, Piedmont, and even parts of Ellyson's area rallied behind him. By August 1, his nomination was virtually assured.[67]

Tyler was a gentleman "farmer in politics," owning nearly 2,000 acres near Radford in Southwest Virginia. Born in 1846 of Presbyterian Scotch ancestry, he neither smoked nor drank. His friends chided him that a journey across Virginia at the age of

two weeks accounted for his earnest advocacy of internal improvements. This interest was a part of his active promotion of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing ventures in his section. Besides participating prominently in nearly all agricultural organizations, he had a long political career which included the state senate, one term as lieutenant governor, and defeats in 1889 and 1893 for the gubernatorial nomination. In 1893 he had embraced the free silver doctrine and had campaigned actively. Although Tyler was not a member of the Martin wing of the party, his selection in 1897 was not surprising in view of the free-silver mania.[68]

With the major candidacy and the party platform practically settled beforehand and with no opposition in view against the endorsement of Senator Daniel for reelection, the state convention which assembled at Roanoke in the humid summer heat on August 11 promised to be unexciting. Only the nomination for lieutenant governor and attorney general were in doubt. The latter was most open to question because death had a few days before removed the strongest candidate, incumbent Robert Taylor Scott.[69]

As soon as the convention convened it was obvious that national issues would dominate the meeting. Keynote speeches lauded free silver, extolled a federal income tax, and praised economy in government. Attacks were launched against big business and "rapacious trusts." Gold Democrats who threatened to bolt the state ticket were severely castigated but the door was left ajar for those who wished to return to the fold. Every mention of free silver, Senator Daniel, and the Chicago convention of 1896 brought thunderous cheers. Except for economic retrenchment, the state issues that had been under fire during the year were relegated to second place.[70]

The nomination of Tyler for governor was accomplished smoothly. Ellyson apparently had decided a short time before the convention to drop out of the race. Tyler's lead presented too great an obstacle and Ellyson refrained from needlessly engaging in a bitter fight. Connected as he was with the party machinery, a victory for him at that point would have raised the ghost of Martin's election in 1893. Ellyson's consideration for party harmony was highly popular and he was immediately reelected state Democratic chairman.[71]

Speaking to the convention, Tyler made it plain that his major interest was in the principles of the Bryan platform. National rather than state reforms occupied the limelight. He asked for economy in the state government to meet increasing administrative and debt charges, but he ignored the election law. "State affairs," he claimed,

"have been handled with clean hands, free from jobbery and peculations of all kinds."[72] Obviously, reform in the direction of honest elections had been throttled.

In choosing Tyler there had been no trouble. The nomination of a running mate proved almost as easy. Despite the fact that he had made no effort to become lieutenant governor, only two ballots were needed to nominate ex-State Senator Edward Echols of Staunton whose currency record possessed the same element of expediency as Ellyson's.[73] The gratuitous insult which Echols' nomination gave to the party's Populist allies of the previous year was further proof of the self-confidence of the Democracy in 1897.

The Populists at their state convention in July had demonstrated their willingness to support the Democratic ticket.[74] To this end they had made only one nomination, that for lieutenant governor. For this position they chose Edmund S. Cocke, a native of Cumberland County and in 1893 Populist candidate for governor. A committee of five, headed by the famed James G. Field of Albemarle, was named to present Cocke's name to the Democrats and it received authority to name a full ticket if the attempt at fusion failed. The Populists then proceeded to adopt a platform calling for a new election law. "We cannot," the party declared, "co-operate with any party that does not pledge itself to this reform."[75] And so, desiring fusion but not absorption, fighting for principles rather than offices, the Populists appeared at the Roanoke convention, were seated, and in due time had Cocke's name placed before that body.[76] Although great protests from Democrats arose, the extent of fusion sentiment was considerable. In the field of seven candidates on the first ballot, Echols led with 399½, but surprisingly Cocke was second with 298—more than sixty ahead of the next man. After this show of strength, however, Cocke fell to fifty-two on the next ballot which nominated Echols.

Primarily, the election law issue blocked the proposed fusion. Unwillingness to antagonize further conservative elements and the knowledge that Republicans could offer no effective opposition in that year must also have played a part. Therefore, the Populists' proffer of friendship was rebuffed by the choice of a man known to favor the gold standard at heart.[77]

On the second day, the selection of a nominee for attorney general produced a fight lasting five hours, but it quickly narrowed down to two men: Andrew Jackson Montague, a federal District Attorney from Danville and an ardent Daniel supporter who was endorsed by Swanson; and Francis S. Lassiter of Petersburg, also a free-silver man and former federal District Attorney, as well as

party chairman in the Fourth District. Montague led from the first, and on the third ballot he was nominated. Personal popularity seemed to be the decisive factor.

In the selection of candidates, it was apparent that original free-silver elements rather than the organization associated with Martin and conservative business interests dominated the convention. Of the nominees, only Echols represented the latter group. It is quite probable, however, that the machine could have defeated either Tyler or Montague if it had so desired.[78] Anxious to placate Democrats still bitter over Fitzhugh Lee's defeat in 1893 and realizing that free silver was king, the conservatives for the moment let the party's left wing element run the show.[79]

But in the adoption of a platform the organization bluntly showed that it intended to check the liberal tendencies of this group. The Committee on Resolutions which drafted the platform had little trouble agreeing on most of the planks.[80] Except for one, Daniel apparently constructed the platform and he personally read it to the convention, hot and tired after the long fight over Montague's nomination.[81] As expected, it reaffirmed the Chicago platform and emphasized free silver, a revenue tariff, the vigorous use of Congressional authority over taxation and foreign commerce to regulate trusts, and a federal income tax, including if necessary a constitutional amendment to permit it. Repeal of the ten percent federal tax on state bank notes was demanded to ease the currency shortage.

On local issues, the platform recalled Democratic achievements in setting up a good educational system, settling the long-standing debt controversy, and establishing a state Department of Agriculture. The goal of the school system was proclaimed to be the opportunity for every child to receive an education. Eleemosynary institutions were promised "tender and generous consideration" and disabled Confederate veterans the best support which expenditures could permit. Taking cognizance of the defeat of the movement to revise the constitution, one plank called on the General Assembly to consider and submit to the people "such . . . amendments as may conduce to the utmost economy of the government consistent with efficiency."

In this form, with an unprecedented resolution[82] committing all Democratic candidates for state offices to the reelection of Daniel, the platform was quickly adopted. On national issues, especially financial, the party thus displayed all the radical sentiments of 1896. In fact, in calling for "wild cat" money issued by state banks, the platform went beyond Chicago.[83] But real state problems were

either ignored or received only lip-service. There was no mention of the need for honest elections. Indeed, from the platform, one could not tell that there had ever been a controversy raging over it during the year. In urging economy in state government, no solid program was proposed; instead, the plank was already warped and weakened by the phrase "consistent with efficiency." Thus the platform became a curious mixture of radicalism on national issues and conservatism on important state questions. On national issues, remote and standing little chance of success, the party did not hesitate to yield to popular sentiment. On state problems, immediate and threatening to undermine not only the dominant conservative wing of the Democracy but the party itself, the Virginia Democracy drifted and hedged.

The conservative spirit behind the party was made even more obvious in the fight over a plank which did not appear in the platform. Less than a month before the convention, the Warsaw *Northern Neck News* began an earnest campaign to have approved by the party some sort of plan whereby a Democratic primary would be held to make known the popular choice in electing United States Senators. It was proposed that Democrats in the General Assembly would be morally bound to vote for the man endorsed by the people, and that as a result the greatest degree of democracy could be gained consistent with the federal Constitution. Furthermore, machine methods in politics would receive a blow. Since Daniel's reelection would be highly popular anyway and because time was too short to use the plan in 1897, the paper asked only that the Democratic state committee be instructed to draw up details for use in 1899.[84]

The question of senatorial primaries was not new. Congress had previously killed two attempts at amending the Constitution to allow direct election of senators. South Carolina already had one senator elected by the method suggested for Virginia. Furthermore, in Virginia the question had been aggravated by Martin's election in direct opposition to the will of the people. Since 1895 the Democracy itself was proving a more fertile ground for the idea as many Populists returned to the party still eager for greater popular sovereignty.[85]

It soon became apparent that William A. Jones was the author of the plan championed by the Warsaw paper. In the short interval before the convention, the proposal stirred up considerable debate. Several newspaper rallied behind the idea, although few with the enthusiasm of the *Northern Neck News*.[86] "The senatorial primary question is looming up boldly," said the *Dispatch* on August 8. It

believed that "after one or two good, strong, rousing speeches are made for a primary . . . . there will be a scramble of delegates to 'get into the bandwagon.' . . . The project itself is sound and popular; all that is needed to ensure its successful execution is a carefully-drawn plan, legalized by law. And this the Roanoke convention may and should provide for." But with the Negro vote in mind, the paper urged that "the safety of the Democratic party" be especially protected by a "practical plan."[87] The idea of a party senatorial primary gained ground so rapidly that many expected the Roanoke convention to act favorably on it. Prominent Democrats throughout the state liked it,[88] and as late as August 7, the *Dispatch,* supposedly the machine organ, was saying, "We have heard of no public man who is opposed to the proposition."

Nevertheless, powerful opposition was developing. It came into view when Jones presented his plan on August 11 to the Resolutions Committee of which he was a member and Daniel chairman. There a long, bitter battle was waged over it.[89] After much debate, the Jones group offered to accept merely a declaration committing the party to the primary principle, leaving details for future consideration. But even this conciliatory approach brought unexpected opposition from Senator Daniel on the ground that the plan contemplated an evasion of the Constitution. Such friends of Senator Martin as Congressman James Hay of the Eighth District and state Senators George Morris of Charlottesville and R. E. Boykin of Isle of Wight fought the proposed change baldly on its democratic principle. They made no effort to disguise their belief that it was a stab at Martin. Jones contended heatedly that he had personally explained the whole idea to Martin and had assured him that it was not aimed at his reelection. In return, according to Jones, Senator Martin had indicated that he would raise no personal objections. These statements were quickly challenged when James Hay claimed that he was authorized by Martin to deny that the latter had ever told anyone he had no objections.

This animated debate lasted four hours, and Martin supporters nearly defeated the plan in the committee. A few of them, denying that it would endanger Martin politically, helped pass the resolution by the narrow margin of 15-14.[90] But Jones lost his attempt to have it considered with the remainder of the platform which had previously been unanimously accepted by the committee.

As presented to the whole convention, the plan called for the first such party primary to be held on the day of the General Assembly elections in 1899. In the event that no candidate received a majority, the two with the most votes would participate in a

second primary within thirty days. Details and methods of procedure were to be left for the state committee of the party to work out.

In the convention[91] the Jones faction lost a motion to limit debate to one hour for each side: obviously the Martin Democrats were going to fight the plan to the bitter end.

In presenting his plan, Jones emphasized the advantages of direct democracy and the success experienced in South Carolina and Georgia with similar primaries. He scored heavily by claiming that his proposition would give whites in the Black Belt a voice in choosing their senators, a privilege they lost whenever Negroes elected Republicans to the General Assembly. Effectively, he challenged his opponents to suggest a better plan if they disliked the details of his, and he brought forth the name of Bryan in listing those people known to favor senatorial primaries. Jones' logical, closely-knit argument received great approbation, and applause lasted for several minutes after he sat down.

Not Jones but those who disliked the plan brought up the question of Martin before the convention. Speaking after Jones, Senator Daniel indicated his wish that the whole matter had not been raised and then boldly asserted:

> I am aware that my modest and honorable colleague [Martin] was the subject of censorious reports some years ago, but the Assembly of Virginia declared his record untainted. If you wish to smirk it now, state your facts and let the world know upon what the allegation rests.

A dramatic pause brought only silence. Insisting that no perfect scheme was being offered, Daniel asked Jones, "Where does your plan come from?" To Jones' reply that it was the South Carolina method, Daniel provoked laughter by exclaiming, "No wonder they have hell there." This dialogue typified the way by which Daniel tried to obscure the issue in the debates. A few moments later he asked Jones when Senator Martin had ever voted in Congress in opposition to either of them. Hopping to his feet and looking Daniel squarely in the face, Jones pointed to Martin's vote against free silver and to his support of a tariff duty on white pine as two such cases. Then, as Daniel tried to dodge this line of attack by launching upon a diatribe against Georgia senators with whom Martin had voted on the tariff, Jones won great applause by forcing Daniel to admit that the charges were true. Somewhat vexed, the Senator added, "The trouble is that my friend [Jones] is after Martin more than he is interested in the bleeding people."

Shrewdly, Daniel advised Jones to try his plan in his own race

for reelection to Congress and if it proved satisfactory to bring it to the next convention. "I have no feelings about this question," he said, "except to say this, that it is a serious innovation upon the long-established policy of the Democratic party—the conservative party of the country."[92] It was plain that the popular Senator would not agree to use the party for further progressive experiments.

During this exchange the two men stood closely face to face, firing questions and answers to the great delight of the delegates, who seemed about equally divided for each. Martin, sitting just behind Daniel, showed no trace of the emotion he must have felt.

The convention was composed of but half of its delegates by the time a vote was taken on the resolution. The rest had departed during an earlier recess, thinking the important matters had already been dealt with.[93] Many votes, therefore, were cast by proxy. Proponents of the plan later charged that these votes helped defeat it and that a full convention would have endorsed the method.[94] As it was, the Jones supporters showed amazing strength. The resolution was lost by only 850 to 609 in the face of determined maneuvering by Daniel and Martin.[95] Forty-four counties voted against the plan, but thirty-nine followed Jones and seven were evenly split. Eight counties had no delegates left to cast a vote.[96]

Rural elements were most strongly behind this movement to provide more direct democracy in politics, casting 540 of their 1196 votes for the plan. The eighteen cities, on the other hand, gave only sixty-nine out of 263 votes for this reform measure, and only five cities were in the Jones column. The Northern Neck, the Valley, and the Southside demonstrated the greatest enthusiasm. Although there were signs of approval in the Southwest, too many counties in that area had no delegates remaining to make a complete picture.

It was generally agreed that Daniel's opposition had been the most important factor behind the defeat,[97] more important even than the lack of adequate time for a thorough discussion before the convention. Why Daniel had acted as he did became a topic of speculation. "The 'still' small voice and fine Italian hand of shrewd Senator Martin"[98] were easy to explain, but not so Daniel's role. One paper suggested that the latter had given his "popularity the hardest strain it has ever received" out of a sense of chivalry toward his colleague, Martin.[99] But more realistically, Daniel's action must be taken to indicate the degree to which he had reached a working agreement with the conservative Martin wing of the party. Daniel had favored the election of Lee in 1893,[100] but the silver question in 1896 had given evidence that the two men were drawing together. Perhaps even the significance of that union has been misconstrued.

Daniel apparently never thought that Bryan would be elected,[101] and he probably brought Martin to the same view. The acceptance of Bryanism in 1896 by the Martin wing might well be viewed not as an honest adherence to Populistic doctrines but as a subterfuge for riding out the storm. The sincerity of Daniel's acts and utterances in support of the Chicago platform is thereby called into question. Perhaps in 1896, certainly in 1897, Daniel was essentially a conservative who had no intention of allowing his party to become an *effective* vehicle for Populistic reforms. Populism was already declining; the Democracy would do well to give the movement its head a little longer on national issues. Reforming the state election law was another matter, but conservatives were able quietly to let conflicting pressures defeat it. The direct primary plan, however, presented a sudden threat that forced Daniel and Martin into the open to fight it vigorously.

Nevertheless, the episode was a moral victory for reform elements. Jones' reputation soared, and he was spoken of as a successor to Martin in 1899.[102] A host of state papers began agitation in behalf of his proposal.[103] Of the prominent papers, only the Norfolk *Landmark* and the Lynchburg *News* approved the action taken at Roanoke.[104] Several county conventions soon adopted the primary idea for committing their legislative candidates on the choice of judges to be elected by the coming General Assembly. Daniel managed to recover some ground by presiding over a Campbell County meeting which took such action.[105] And following a declaration of Shenandoah County Democrats favorable to the plan, Congressman Hay found it expedient to try to claim that he had opposed it only because there was no provision for subjecting the primary to state election laws.[106]

The effect on Martin was noticeable, also. In little more than a week he announced that he would make a thorough stump for the party in the fall elections. This was an unexpected turn in Martin's political tactics. Until 1896 he had never made a stump speech, and in that year he had made only half a dozen near Culpeper and Charlottesville. Yet, in this year of certain Democratic victory, he entered on an extensive canvass. The primary fight was only one reason for his attempt to remove the disability of being relatively unknown to the people of the state. His own political fortunes were at stake since twenty-one state Senators would be selected who would vote on his reelection two years hence. Showing such symptoms of insecurity, Martin must have been glad of his decision to "stir the stumps" when in October Fitzhugh Lee publicly stated his intention to leave Cuba and run for the Senate in 1899.[107]

Martin's speeches were hardly needed for party success. The only Republican ticket was that run by a small faction who nominated Patrick H. McCaull of Culpeper for governor, O. B. Roller of Rockingham as his running mate, and James Lyons of Richmond for attorney general. Many Republicans refused to support this spurious ticket, and the party ran only two candidates for the state Senate and six for the House of Delegates. In some areas Republican factions fought each other harder than they did the Democrats.[108]

For their part, Populists did not add to their ticket. Cocke remained the only name on their ballot, but in Franklin, Henry, Mecklenburg, Patrick, and Pittsylvania counties Populists ran for the legislature.[109] Many prominent members of the party returned to the Democracy,[110] following in the path of gold Democrats.[111]

The campaign, fought mainly on national issues, was mostly shadow-boxing for the Democrats. Tyler won handily over McCaull, receiving 109,655 votes to the latter's 56,840.[112] Echols ran behind Tyler with 105,030 to Roller's 46,162. But Echols won four of the eight counties lost by Tyler and carried every county where Tyler led. Apparently what happened was that the 7,429 Populists who voted for Cocke tended to cast their ballots for the Republican McCaull in protest of their treatment by the Democracy, since Roller trailed his running mate by some 10,000. Even so, McCaull carried only eight counties, mostly in the Southwest, and he failed to win a single city.

In the legislature, Democrats elected all the state Senators and ninety-four of the 100 Delegates. It was the largest party legislative majority in the state's history, and not one vote was cast against the reelection of Daniel to the United States Senate.[113]

Radicalism on national issues and a policy of hedging on state problems had brought handsome returns. The silver issue had been skillfully used to cover up the innate conservatism of the Virginia Democracy in matters close at home which vitally affected its supremacy. As expected, free silver was to prove an ill-fated pretender to the dominion of the gold standard. In three years bimetallism would be dead, while those state issues which the party had avoided under the silver banner would have to be faced again. Four years later the battle over the senatorial primary would be renewed and won by "anti-machine" Democrats led by the man just elected attorney general, A. J. Montague.[114] And free silver would scarcely be safely interred before the party would be forced to confront once more the problems of a constitutional convention.

Unless otherwise noted, all newspaper citations are for the year 1897.

1. Allen Moger, "The Rift in Virginia Democracy in 1896," *Journal of Southern History*, IV (August, 1938), 310-311; Richmond *Weekly Times*, November 19, 1896.
2. Moger, "Rift," 297-299; James Adam Bear, Jr., "Thomas Staples Martin: A Study in Virginia Politics, 1883-1896," (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1952), 172-181 ff; Richard B. Doss, "The Public Career of John Warwick Daniel, Spokesman of the New Conservatism," (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1952) 107.
3. William DuBose Sheldon, *Populism in the Old Dominion: Virginia Farm Politics, 1885-1900* (Princeton, 1935), 124.
4. Sheldon, *Populism*, 132.
5. Allen Moger, *The Rebuilding of the Old Dominion: A Study in Economic, Social, and Political Transition from 1880 to 1902* (Ann Arbor, 1940), 109.
6. Warsaw *Northern Neck News*, June 4.
7. For a brief survey of the movement from 1888 to 1902, see Herman L. Horn, "The Growth and Development of the Democratic Party in Virginia since 1890," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1949) 35 ff.
8. Richmond *State*, February 5; Staunton *Daily News*, January 26.
9. William L. Royall, *Some Reminiscences* (New York and Washington, 1909), 203; William C. Pendleton, *Political History of Appalachian Virginia, 1776-1927* (Dayton, Virginia, 1927), 394. For the Black Belt see Sheldon, *Populism*, 3, 50.
10. Moger, *Old Dominion*, 114 ff.
11. Richard L. Morton, *The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1865-1902* (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1919), 133-134. The same material is in his *Virginia Since 1861*, volume three of *History of Virginia* (Chicago and New York, 1924), chapter XIII. Moger, "Rift," 310 and note 73; Bear, "Martin," 172-175.
12. Royall, *Reminiscences*, 203.
13. *State*, February 5, 13.
14. *Northern Neck News*, April 23. The *Landmark* was a gold Democrat paper.
15. *State*, February 12; Staunton *Daily News*, January 26. Other gold papers included the Suffolk *Herald*, Danville *Register*, and Eastville *Eastern Shore Herald*. See Richmond *State*, February 5; Staunton *Daily News*, January 26.
16. Richmond *State*, February 5; *Dispatch*, July 14.
17. *State*, February 5; Staunton *Daily News*, January 26.
18. Staunton *Daily News*, May 30; Berryville *Clarke Courier*, July 14; Lynchburg *News* quoted in the *Dispatch*, August 8; *Ibid.*, May 23; *Northern Neck News*, March 5.
19. May 29; *Clarke Courier*, August 18.
20. *Dispatch, passim; Clarke Courier*, March 24; *Northern Neck News*, March 5; *State*, February 12.
21. Bear, "Martin," 176.
22. Pendleton, *Appalachian Virginia*, 395; Bear, "Martin," 176.
23. Richmond *Weekly Times*, November 16, 1896.
24. *Ibid.*, November 30, 1896.
25. See the Staunton *Daily News*, January 26.
26. R. T. Barton to the Editor, January 30, 1897, in the *State*, February 6.
27. See the *State*, February 6, for the view of J. Haskins Hobson, a prominent Populist from Southside Virginia. The same issue also quotes the view of D. Sheffey Lewis, editor of the Harrisonburg *Spirit of the Valley*, one of the few Republican papers in Virginia.
28. *Clarke Courier*, May 26; Staunton *Daily News*, May 30; *Northern Neck News*, February 19.
29. *State*, February 15.
30. For example, see issue for May 25, and the *State*, February 15.
31. Danville Register, a gold Democratic paper quoted in the *State*, February 6.
32. *State*, February 5.
33. *State*, February 5.
34. Eastville *Eastern Shore Herald* quoted in the *State*, February 16.
35. Less than a week before the vote Martin broke his silence by telling a reporter that he could see no serious desire for such a convention. At the same time, Martin stalwart Henry D. Flood, State Senator from Appomattox, avoided the issue completely. *Dispatch*, May 23.
36. *Dispatch*, May 25.
37. Letter from Woods to the Editor of the *State*, March 24, 1897, in March 26 issue and in Charlottesville *Daily Progress*, March 31, 1897. Numerous newspaper clippings about this letter can be found in Woods' personal scrapbook, Micajah Woods Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
38. Otey to Editor of the *State*, January 27, 1897; Swanson to *ibid.*, February 4, 1897. See the *State*, February 6. On the 1896 state convention, see Bear, "Martin," 190-191. The *Northern Neck News* noted on February 19 that "no Convention of Democrats has ever declared in favor of a Constitutional Convention," and felt that the action in 1896 showed "a silence too significant to be mistaken."
39. *Dispatch*, April 6, 11.
40. The First District gave nearly one-fourth of Bryan's entire plurality in 1896. *Northern Neck News*, March 12. Papers opposing a convention included the *Northern Neck News* (March 19), *Clarke Courier* (March 24), and Fredericksburg *Star* (*Northern Neck News*, April 16.) The Alexandria *Gazette* was for it, however. Richmond *State*, February 13.
41. Only the Populist party was committed in favor of a convention.

42. *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia* (Richmond, 1897), 77.
43. Bristol, Charlottesville, Danville, Portsmouth, Radford, Roanoke, and Staunton.
44. Counties favoring a convention were Franklin, Henry, Appomattox, Charlotte, Lunenburg, Brunswick, Dinwiddie, Surry, Southampton, Isle of Wight, Nansemond, and Culpeper.
45. *Cf.* Horn, "Democratic Party in Virginia," 56.
46. Quoted in *Clarke Courier*, August 18.
47. *Dispatch*, May 29, August 8.
48. Quoted in *Dispatch*, May 15.
49. Richmond *Weekly Times*, July 1.
50. For example, see issues of May 7, 16.
51. April 27.
52. Richmond *Weekly Times*, November 19, 1896.
53. W. H. Mann to the Editor of the *Dispatch*, June 29, 1897, in the *Dispatch*, July 3.
54. *Dispatch*, May 8.
55. *Dispatch*, May 22.
56. *Dispatch*, May 23.
57. *Dispatch*, July 7; Petersburg *Index-Appeal* in *ibid.*, July 10.
58. *Clarke Courier*, February 24.
59. Democrats in Alexandria, Accomac, Henrico, Richmond, and Norfolk had so voted. *Dispatch*, April 7, 30, June 5; Staunton *Daily News*, March 9; *Clarke Courier*, April 21.
60. *State*, June 3; *Dispatch*, June 4.
61. Danville *Register* quoted in the *Dispatch*, May 23. In June the Petersburg *Index-Appeal* announced its return to the party. See the *Dispatch*, June 19.
62. For sketches of Ellyson see Richmond *Weekly Times*, July 15; *State*, August 1; *Dispatch*, August 12.
63. Roanoke *Times* in Richmond *Weekly Times*, July 15; *Dispatch*, April 15, May 30.
64. Richmond *Weekly Times*, July 15, quoting from the Roanoke *Times;* Staunton *Daily News*, March 9.
65. Letter printed in Lynchburg *Daily Advance*, May 24.
66. *Dispatch*, June 24.
67. *Dispatch*, April 15, June 24; Richmond *Weekly Times*, June 3; *State*, August 1; *Clarke Courier*, July 21. *Cf.* Horn, "Democratic Party in Virginia," 134, 359. An interesting rumor of early August speculated that Martin, facing defeat in 1899, was pushing Ellyson for lieutenant governor in order that he could get Ellyson's position of state chairman. Staunton *Daily News*, August 12. On August 5, the *State* carried another rumor that Ellyson would take second place on the ticket with Tyler. In 1899, if Tyler successfully opposed Martin for the Senate, Ellyson then would become governor.
68. *Dispatch*, August 12, 15.
69. Moger seems to have missed this event. In his *Old Dominion*, 118, he states that Scott was defeated by Montague. Actually, it was Scott's son who lost the nomination to Montague in 1897.
70. *Dispatch*, August 11, 12; Richmond *Weekly Times*, August 12.
71. *Dispatch*, August 12. Ellyson subsequently refused to be considered for lieutenant governor.
72. *Dispatch*, August 12.
73. Staunton *Daily News*, August 4; *Dispatch*, July 28, August 14.
74. Local fusion had already occurred in several areas. *Dispatch*, July 11; Richmond *Weekly Times*, July 1.
75. *Dispatch*, July 30.
76. Sheldon, *Populism*, 141; *State*, July 30.
77. Henry Flood had publicly stated late in July that, since the Republicans were going to be no threat, "we have got a walkover . . . . The Populists are going to vote with us." *Dispatch*, July 28.
78. Horn, "Democratic Party in Virginia," 134, 359.
79. The *Dispatch*, August 13, noted that "all the contests were conducted upon such a friendly plan that there is not left one pang of bitterness."
80. For a list of the members see the *Dispatch*, August 12.
81. The full text appeared in the *Dispatch*, August 12.
82. *Dispatch*, December 3.
83. Pendleton, *Appalachian Virginia*, 398.
84. July 23.
85. *State*, August 31, September 16; Harold Gordon Wheatley, "The Political Career of William Atkinson Jones," (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1952) 47-48; Doss, "Daniel," 122.
86. *Dispatch*, July 31 and *passim;* Norfolk *Ledger* in *ibid.*, August 8; Lynchburg *Daily Advance*, August 10; Cf. Wheatley, "Jones," 56.
87. August 5.
88. Lynchburg *Daily Advance*, August 9; *Dispatch*, August 7, 10.
89. For this debate see the *Dispatch*, August 12.
90. It was said that the one absent member would have caused a tie by voting against it. *Dispatch*, August 12.
91. The debate which follows is from the *Northern Neck News*, August 20, unless otherwise noted. Much of it can be found also in the *Dispatch*, August 13.
92. *Dispatch*, August 13.
93. *Dispatch*, August 13.

94. On October 1, the *Northern Neck News* asserted that the proxy votes were cast in the ratio of ten to one against the plan, and that of Richmond's seventy-eight possible votes, fifty-eight were voted by proxy. Richmond helped defeat the proposal. See also Roanoke *World* quoted in *ibid.*, September 3.
95. The vote by city and county appeared in the *Dispatch*, August 15.
96. Lee County, which had not sent any delegates, made a ninth county for which no vote was recorded.
97. *Dispatch*, August 15, October 16; Staunton *Daily News*, August 14; *Northern Neck News*, August 20, September 3; Salem *Times-Register*, August 20.
98. Salem *Times-Register*, August 20.
99. Staunton *Daily News*, August 14.
100. Doss, "Daniel," 89.
101. Daniel to Camm Patteson, January 7, 1897, Camm Patteson Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
102. Staunton *Daily News*, August 14.
103. See the *Northern Neck News*, September 3, for a list of these papers.
104. Richmond *Times* in the Salem *Times-Register*, August 20.
105. *State*, September 16; *Northern Neck News*, September 24. Soon the Lynchburg *News* was saying, "Senator Daniel is not determinely opposed to a Senatorial primary." In *ibid.*, October 1.
106. *Northern Neck News*, October 22.
107. *Dispatch*, August 24, October 16.
108. Horn, "Democratic Party in Virginia," 43.
109. Sheldon, *Populism*, 142.
110. Sheldon, *Populism*, 142.
111. This was the general impression in the papers. William E. Cameron was among the gold leaders who announced support of the party ticket. *State*, September 17.
112. *Senate Journal*, 57-63, gives the returns. It is ironic that the election law cost the Democrats the loss of much of the Danville area. Apparently Negroes there asked for help from the election officials while whites were too proud to do so and thereby often ruined their ballots. N. H. Massie to J. Taylor Ellyson, November 4, 1897. Ellyson Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
113. *Dispatch*, November 4; Sheldon, *Populism*, 143.
114. Robert Camillus Glass and Carter Glass, Jr., *Virginia Democracy: A History of the Achievements of the Party and Its Leaders in the Mother of Commonwealths, the Old Dominion*, 3 vols. Springfield, 1937). I, 266.