The Jones-Martin Senatorial Camgaign of 1911

By HAROLD E. COX*

PROBABLY no other political campaign in Virginia was characterized by the bitterness and indiscriminate charges which filled the senatorial campaign of 1911. This campaign marked the climax of the struggle by the "Independent Democrats" to take the control of the party in Virginia from the hands of the machine led by Thomas Staples Martin of Scottsville, Virginia.

A brief consideration of the political events in the decades prior to 1911 is necessary to understand many of the events of that year. Martin had first been elected to the Senate in 1893 in a stunning upset by a caucus which had presumably been pledged to the election of the popular Civil War hero, Fitzhugh Lee. The unexpected election of Martin, who was an active party worker but who had never before held public office, caused a storm of protest and gave rise to charges that Martin's road to the Senate had been paved by railroad money. The situation was investigated superficially by a committee of the state legislature which proved only that the investigators were biased in favor of Martin. They concluded that there had been certain practices of which the committee could not approve but that Martin had not been directly involved. They also declared that these unfortunate practices had not been any different from those taking place in any political campaign.[1]

Opinions varied widely. While some newspapers accepted the report and declared that it was a vindication of the Martin followers, others interpreted the same report as proving the use of railroad money in the campaigns of several legislators who later supported Martin for the Senate.[2] It can still be debated what the true story was, but it is apparent that his election was not in accord with the expectations of the people.

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Martin was able to lay his hands on the party machinery and in time occupied a position as leader of what has since become known as the "dominant faction" of the party. By 1911 he had built up a group of lieutenants led by Richard E. Byrd, Jr., of Berryville, speaker of the House of Delegates, Henry D. "Hal" Flood of Appomattox, a member of the House of Representatives, and Claude A. Swanson, formerly governor and now junior Senator, having been appointed to replace John W. Daniel. This group of men was opposed by a number of the younger members of the party who called themselves "progressives" and who expressed a strong dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. The first leader of this group had been Andrew Jackson Montague, a former United States District Attorney.

Martin had been re-elected to the Senate in 1899 by an overwhelming majority in the legislature but there had been charges of corruption. As a result, Montague defeated Swanson for the governorship in 1901 on a platform which included direct primary elections for senators. The "Independents" were also able to control the machinery of the Constitutional Convention but they did not put their control to good use. This failure, combined with their inability to break Martin's control over the state machinery, placed them in an almost untenable position.[3]

When Montague finished his term as governor, he took the logical step and challenged Martin for the Senate seat. He was in an impossible position from the beginning. There had been corruption his administration and there was considerable jealousy and bickering among his followers. His weak position was not aided by this division of support and the well oiled Martin machine rolled to victory, sweeping Martin into the Senate, Swanson into the governorship and Montague into political impotence.[4]

The next leader was even less successful. Henry St. George Tucker was picked in 1909 to run for governor against William Hodges Mann and found himself opposed by both Martin and the Anti-Saloon League of James Cannon.[5] Under such conditions defeat was inevitable and it became obvious that Tucker could not be expected to defeat Martin if he could not win over one of the Senator's followers. Tucker, therefore, joined the ranks of those who had tried and failed, and William A. Jones was elevated to the leadership of the "progressives."

Jones had long been prominent in Virginia politics. He had first been elected to Congress from the first district in 1890, defeating a Republican who had been in power for more than a decade. He had first begun to oppose Martin in the early 1890's and had

managed to become a prominent figure in state politics despite this heresy. He gained recognition throughout the state for his championing of direct primary election of Senators during the Roanoke Democratic Convention of 1897 and as an active Bryanite while serving as chairman of the Virginia delegation to the Democratic National Convention in 1896.[6]

The senatorial battle between Jones and Martin which was scheduled for 1911 had an unexpected note injected by the sudden death of Senator Daniel following his re-election and the appointment of Claude Swanson to the vacancy. Among those who objected to the swiftness of the appointment was Carter Glass, representative from the sixth district, who was, like Daniel, a native of Lynchburg. He was not a full-fledged Independent and was not fully trusted by the other members of the movement. Montague asserted in a letter to a friend that Glass suffered "from vissitudes [*sic*] of opinion" and he declared, "I have no reason to think well of him." Montague finally decided to support Glass for the Senate but only because he would not vote for Swanson "under any circumstances."[7]

Consequently, in place of the one contest which had been expected in 1911, two contests appeared. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the struggle between Jones and Martin, but it is impossible to separate the two contests completely since the campaigns of the two machine candidates and the two anti-machine candidates were conducted jointly. The Glass-Swanson fight will be referred to only when relating it to the main event or when comparing the progress of the two campaigns.

The opening of the Jones-Martin campaign can be timed from the exposure of the Norfolk vote frauds in 1910.For years, Norfolk had been a center of political irregularly under the domination of Alvah Martin, county clerk of Norfolk and a Republican national committeemen. His control of the area was made possible through a coalition of Democrats and Republicans commonly known as Fusionists.

In 1910, the Fusionists and the Martin machine decided to eliminate Congressman H. L. Maynard of the second district and both had backed ex-Congressman William A. Young. Following the election, Maynard brought charges of fraud and an investigation disclosed evidences of irregularity on both sides. The vote, when adjusted, showed Young to be a winner by the narrow margin of 4 votes, a decision which was immediately challenged on the grounds that he had received at least 200 fraudulent votes in the second ward of Norfolk City, a hotbed of Fusionist activity. The

second ward refused to allow an investigation and Maynard was endorsed by the regular Democrats, known as Straightouts, as an independent candidate for the House.[8]

With the struggle beginning to split the machine, Martin hurried to Norfolk. He was unsuccessful as a peacemaker but did manage to connect himself in the popular mind with the political scandals which were unfolding. Perhaps this was the deciding force which finally made Jones decide to run since it was now conceivable that the Norfolk frauds would react in his favor in much the same way as the frauds of 1899 had aided Montague in 1901.[9] From this time onward, his candidacy was assumed by the newspapers.[10]

The Democratic State Central Committee was finally forced to take a hand and found 100 more votes than voters in the second ward, grossly irregular voting lists in Portsmouth and no lists at all in Norfolk County. One official suggested that in view of the returns, one of the city's larger cemeteries should be set up as a separate precinct. Popular demands for a new primary were ignored. A convention was called which declared Young not nominated and proceeded to ballot for a candidate. After 502 ballots, the Young forces were switched, apparently with Martin's approval, to F. E. Holland, another minor machine politician. The charges brought against the election judges were dropped by the court, which declared in effect that fraud was permissible in primaries since state election laws did not apply to these contests. This obviously biased decision further aroused public opinion and gave additional strength to the anti-machine forces.[11]

Jones announced for the Senate on January 13, 1911, declaring that he would have great difficulty in "opposing the aggregation which fraudulently assumes to be the regular Democratic organization." He described the machine as "selfish and unscrupulous," accused it of practicing voting fraud and office brokerage as a means of maintaining power and claimed that the machine leaders held powers which should be exercised "in the interests of all the members of the party." He deplored the condition of party politics in the state which he said had degenerated into a series of petty quarrels among the politicians for "the spoils and patronage of office." He pledged himself to work for the overthrow of the machine and the "office brokerage trust."[12]

Many liberal leaders quickly rallied to Jones' support. Former State Corporation Commissioner Henry C. Stuart, Montague, and William A. Anderson, the attorney general and long time anti-machine leader were included among those making announce-

ments.[13] Montague described Jones as being "able, fearless and incorruptible." There seems, however, to have been a lack of enthusiasm among the Jones supporters which probably reflected their own personal ambitions and jealousies. Neither Anderson nor Stuart would commit themselves to work for Jones. The two defeated ex-leaders, on the other hand, Tucker and Montague, indicated that they would speak on Jones' behalf. This perhaps showed that Anderson and Stuart were more interested in the advancement of their own political fortunes than they were in the defeat of the machine.[14]

Glass soon followed Jones' lead. Following a seemingly endless series of charges, insults and threats, he finally announced for Swanson's seat in the Senate on January 23, denouncing the machine in substantially the same terms as Jones had used and adding some choice personal remarks aimed at Swanson. He indicated in his announcement that the campaign would hinge around Swanson's record as governor and the conditions under which Swanson had been appointed to the Senate.[15]

Each side indicated a desire to take stock of its forces before the beginning of the battle. Many were concerned with the extra session of Congress which had been threatened by Taft and the effect which it would have on the campaign. Experienced observers felt that such a session would hurt the chances of Glass and Jones since their campaigns would be delayed while they discharged their duties as Representatives, a delay which would give them less time to press their charges against the machine. The Senators on the other hand could plead press of duty in order to avoid speeches and could make it appear at the same time that Glass and Jones were neglecting their own duties in the House. The effectiveness of this was amply demonstrated when the extra sssion came and both Glass and Jones found it necessary to deny repeatedly that they were missing roll call votes while on their speaking tours.[16]

The extra session forced the machine to face the problem of what to do with Swanson, a problem which they had hoped to avoid. He had been appointed to complete the unexpired term of Daniel which had ended in March, 1911—not to the new term for which Daniel had been elected. If there was an extra session, therefore, Swanson would have to be reappointed or the seat would be left vacant. Representative Hay and others had attempted to secure his reappointment before the problem of the extra session arose in order to preserve his seniority benefits, but they had been opposed by Governor Mann who would not reappoint Swanson unless absolutely necessary because he felt that it

would hurt the chances of both Swanson and Martin in the coming primary. The problem was resolved by the extra session and Swanson was given his new appointment.[17] The bad effects were counteracted to some extent by the appointment of Martin as Democratic floor leader of the Senate after a bitter fight with opposition Democrats led by William Jennings Bryan.[18]

The Virginia Democratic League was formed to work for the election of Jones and Glass and established campaign headquarters in Richmond.[19] Jones' friends and supporters began to compare ideas and suggestions with the candidate and among themselves. J. C. Parker, an attorney for the Camp Lumber Company of Franklin, exemplified the amateur politicians who gave advice to Jones. He unsuccessfully tried to convert Jones to the support of a high tariff on lumber but the candidate, who was unconvinced by Parker's arguments, declared that the price of lumber was due to the depletion of our forests rather than to the existing tariff and that lumber imports should be encouraged rather than discouraged in order to preserve our resources.[20]

This stand showed the true progressive spirit but Jones' sincerity became questionable following the next letter. Parker stated that he would continue to support Jones but that he would probably lose many votes in the area which were connected with the lumber interests.[21] Jones then altered his position and informed Parker that he believed in free lumber but that he was not a "vigorous advocate." He stated that he had voted in favor of free lumber but that he had not spoken for it. Furthermore he felt that he could win more votes on this issue than he would lose, a statement which sounded more like a professional politician than a true liberal.[22]

At first, Martin's friends seem to have taken the opposition lightly and felt that Martin could safely ignore them. This is shown in his refusal to comment on Jones' early charges and his failure to open campaign headquarters anywhere in the state. It was also shown in the confidence of some of his supporters such as G. H. Taylor, clerk of Madison County, who wrote, "Martin will get all of the vote [in Madison] except a few sore heads."[23]

Martin henchmen such as Hay and Flood contacted the faithful throughout the state and received glowing reports of the prospects in their home districts and affirmations of support.[24] Most of those contacted were willing to give active support and almost all felt that their counties were safe. Some pessimistic reports were received, but they seemed to arise out of opposition to some of Martin's close allies rather than to Martin himself.[25]

A number of nationally known liberals flocked to the support of Jones. Among the most noted of these was William Jennings Bryan who attacked Martin almost continuously after his appointment to party leadership in the Senate.[26] William E. Dodd, a former resident of Virginia, was brought from the University of Chicago to speak on Jones' behalf but the influence of this outside help is debatable. Later in the campaign the machine made much of this "outside interference" and conceivably was able to attract the votes of many who felt that Jones was being dominated by "foreign" influences.

Glass was the first of the candidates to enter the battle. Following several preliminary skirmishes, he began a full attack on certain newspapers which he said had been bought by the machine. He stated that one newspaper which had been favorable to his candidacy in November would not even print his announcement of candidacy as advertising.[27] The newspaper, the *South Boston News,* quickly made itself known through its editor who declared that he did not print liquor ads or political announcements, a comparison which did little to improve his relations with the violently prohibitionist Glass.[28]

Letters are on record which substantiate the Glass accusations. At various times during the campaign both Flood and Hay attempted to dictate the policies of certain newspapers. One paper, the Madison *Exponent,* remained neutral through the early part of the campaign even though a one-third interest was owned by Hay. The editor and part owner, J. J. Fray, had no desire to get mixed in a contest as bitter as the Martin-Jones struggle promised to become. Hay attempted to pressure Fray into rejecting Glass speeches but, to his credit, Fray refused to be coerced into partisan action, nor would he print pro-machine editorials as suggested by his partner.[29]

Jones' first important speech was made at Norfolk where he found himself on the defensive. For some years, the machine had attacked him in one of his weakest spots—his alleged support of the so-called "ship subsidy" bill. In 1902, he had voted in favor of a bill which provided subsidies for ship owners who carried the mails, but he had voted against another subsidy bill which would have granted financial incentives to the builders and owners of new ships. The machine, which even at that early date was busily seeking a way to rid itself of Jones, immediately moved to shift the city of Newport News, the only ship building center in the state, into Jones' district in the hope that enough opposition could be raised to defeat him. When the shift was finally made in 1906,

the bill became an important item in the campaign against Jones; but he successfully defended himself and carried Newport News and the district.[30]

The introduction of the ship subsidy into every session of Congress was as inevitable as the procession of the equinoxes and the measure again came up for consideration in 1907. All of the Democrats, including Jones, voted against it in the House and its passage was finally blocked in the Senate. The introduction of Newport News in the district apparently had not affected his vote. But in 1908, on its annual tour through Congress, Jones voted for the bill, one of only four Democrats who did so. He was attacked by the newspapers and lost considerable popularity among the other Democratic members of the House. The machine, which never missed an opportunity, shifted its attack to the grounds that Jones had joined the Republicans on a crucial vote and was a traitor to his party.[31]

Jones found it necessary to defend his ship subsidy vote in his first speech and counter-attacked with an accusation that Martin had avoided voting on the subsidy. Jones attempted to ingratiate himself with the Norfolk voters by pointing out his activities in behalf of additional appropriations for the improvement of Norfolk harbor and the James River in contrast to Martin who had done nothing to add to the bill when it reached the Senate.[32] Jones stated that Martin had voted more times with Nelson W. Aldrich (a supreme insult among Democrats) than any other member of the party with the exception of the two violently protectionist "sugar senators" from Louisiana. He revived the ancient charge that the state was dominated by Martin and that Martin was dominated by the railroads. In addition, he challenged Martin to meet him in a public debate to discuss the ship subsidy and other public matters.[33]

This speech contains the clearest view of Jones' progressive ideals which can be obtained in a study of the campaign, since issues other than the influence of the railroads in state politics and corruption in government were obscured by the sensational charges which were hurled as the campaign progressed. There was little need for Jones to sound a call for constructive legislative action in a campaign which was built around a systematic character assassination. Nevertheless, he declared himself to be in favor of popular election of senators and advocated the ratification of the constitutional amendment which would put this in effect. This was a truly progressive plank and was consistent with his previous championing of a direct senatorial primary in Virginia. He also advocated passage of the income tax amendment.

These manifestations of progressivism must be considered, however, in the light of his other attitudes. The ship subsidy question, his advocacy of pork barrel for the Hampton Roads area, and the letters on the tariff leave one with the feeling that Jones may have supported reforms not for reform's sake but for the sake of votes. It is also interesting to note that he appealed to sectional prejudices in his Norfolk speech, informing his listeners that the eastern section of the state should have at least one senator and pointing out the long hold which the uplands had on this office.[34]

Martin was deeply involved in the political intrigues which habitually precede the selection of a party leader in the Senate and he refused to debate with Jones or even to comment on his opponent's initial speech.[35] This did not cause Jones to cease his attack and, on April 10, he charged Martin with voting to raise the appropriation bill for Washington's Union Station from $2,000,000 to $3,000,000, even though this was no more pork barrel in nature than the rivers and harbors legislation which Jones favored.[36] Jones also claimed that he had been offered a pass on the B & O on the day that the bill had been voted upon but that he had refused it.[37]

Jones also amplified his charges concerning the tariff issue. He informed his audience that Martin had voted with Aldrich eighteen times on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. The machine newspapers quickly showed that this was a tender point by vigorously defending Martin's votes in this case. They pointed out that Martin had voted with LaFollette 77 times during the tariff fight and had voted against Aldrich on 8 occasions. What was more important, Martin had cast a negative vote on the tariff bill in its final form. Every Martin vote had been in good company and none had been for the so-called interests. Judge F. W. Sims of Louisa, a staunch machine man, climaxed these replies with a pamphlet which summarized Martin's tariff votes and came to about the same conclusions as the loyal newspapers.[38]

It would seem that both sides were indulging in half truths in this exchange. Jones deliberately tried to make Martin's vote look as protectionist as possible. On the other hand, some of Martin's votes could hardly be defended as not being favorable to the so-called interests, especially the vote which he cast in favor of a high tariff on white pine. Jones denied the accuracy of the newspaper reports and the Sims pamphlet and cited other cases where Martin, in his opinion, had supported the interests. He made an excellent point when he noted that Martin had voted against the final tariff but that he had known full well that the Republicans could muster

enough votes to pass the measure without his aid. Therefore, after doing his bit to add to the protectionist levels, he could cast a negative vote which could be used later for campaign purposes.[39]

Jones next moved to attack the corruption of the lesser figures in the machine, apparently in the hope that the public would connect their misdeeds with Martin and vote accordingly. On May 6, at Richmond, Jones, practically ignoring the previous issues, suddenly charged that a member of the legislature had introduced a bill injurious in nature to an important business interest in the state and had done so in order that one of the machine politicians could get a job as a lobbyist to defeat the measure. The charge was vague and anonymous but the reaction was sudden and violent. Captain John A. Curtis, harbor master of Richmond, a Confederate veteran and ranking member of the legislature from the standpoint of service, denied ever having introduced a bill for another member even though his name had not been mentioned at any time during the course of the speech. He declared that he had introduced a bill prohibiting the catching of fish in the Chesapeake Bay for commercial purposes but the bill had been his own idea and the only connection which W. D. Cardwell, an attorney and speaker of the House of Delegates in the 1880's, had had with the move was to draw it up in its final form at Curtis' request.

Cardwell had not been named either but he announced that there had been two bills affecting the menhaden fishing industry. The other one, known as the Wellford Bill, proposed to prohibit the dumping or refuse into the Bay by the fish factories. This, he claimed, was the bill he had been hired by the menhaden interests to oppose. Finally, he denied that anyone had hired him to lobby against the Curtis Bill.

Jones now secured sworn statements from two Northern Neck politicians, T. A. Jett and R. Carter Wellford, author of the anti-dumping bill, alleging that Curtis had told them he was working for a lobbyist who making a "little something extra" out of the menhaden interests. According to Wellford's statement, Curtis had pointed out Cardwell as the lobbyist in question. The dispute was climaxed by a declaration of James Fisher, president of the Morris Fisher Company, one of the largest of the menhaden fisheries, that he believed that both the Wellford and the Carter Bills had been attempts to blackmail the menhaden industry.[40]

The controversy dragged on without being directly connected with Martin, and Jones continued to explore new fields and expand and embellish old attacks. The purpose of the menhaden question may well have been to blacken the name of Cardwell

prior to the launching of the main attack connecting Martin and Cardwell in charges of lobbying for the railroads.

Jones' activities were obviously beginning to annoy the opposition. Some of the leaders feared that he was becoming dangerous. On May 3, the Martin-controlled State Central Committee met and immediately decided to make a $3,000 assessment against every man in the senatorial race, the highest amount ever levied up to that time. Jones immediately charged that the machine was trying to price him out of the race and promised to raise the money in some manner so that he could continue his fight against the "corrupt, vile, selfish and miserable machine."[41]

J. M. Curtis, a Jones supporter who was a committeeman from the first district, introduced a resolution which called for a strict party vote in the primary and demanded that the primary be limited to those who could swear not only that they would vote for the candidates of the party in the next election as proposed by the machine but also that they had supported the party candidates in the last general election. But machine supporters pointed out that this would keep out the Republicans who had experienced an honest change of heart and the proposal received only one vote.[42]

The Democratic League promptly accepted this as proof that the machine was trying to attract Republican votes and raised a new demand that the Norfolk Fusion movement be fully investigated.[43] Congressman Bascomb Slemp of the ninth district, Virginia's only Republican representative, warned Republicans not to participate. The machine newspapers showed a considerable variety of opinion. The *Roanoke Evening News* said they were in favor of Republican participation since it would help Martin. The Charlottesville *Daily Progress*, which was more temperate, opposed any situation giving the Republicans the balance of power. Charges were made that the Floyd County Republicans were voting *en masse* for the machine and that Richard Byrd had been re-elected with the aid of the Republicans of Frederick and Winchester.[44]

Popular opinion forced the machine to retreat. First, the State Supreme Court reversed the decision that primaries were not covered by the election laws. Then Martin, on June 21, found it necessary to repudiate publicly the Fusionists and advocated the election of Straightouts in the Norfolk primary.[45] This was the signal for the machine newspapers to begin an attack on fusion which was couched in substantially the same terms that Jones and Glass had been using for eight months. A mixed ticket was elected

in Norfolk and both sides charged fraud. The Central Committee was forced to undertake another investigation, the completion of which was delayed, intentionally or otherwise, until after the senatorial primary.[46] Some indiscreet leaders, such as those in Nottoway, made known their intentions of allowing Republicans to vote, much to the dismay of Lieutenant Governor J. Taylor Ellyson who threatened to throw out the entire vote of the county if such a practice was followed.[47]

Jones had been unsuccessful in goading Martin into an exchange. The revival of the railroad charges had not been sufficient, even when amplified by the Union Station allegations and charges that Martin had fought against the institution of a universal free transfer system on the Washington street railways. Jones noted that some of the senators held stock in the street railway companies and inquired if this was the reason for Martin's opposition.[48] Martin held his peace and repeatedly refused to debate with Jones. He offered the excuse that he had not spoken to Jones for twelve years and would not enter into a public debate with a person whom he disliked so intensely.[49]

On July 4, William E. Dodd spoke on Jones' behalf, charging Martin with being a personal agent of Thomas Fortune Ryan.[50] He asserted that Ryan dominated much of the Southern press and that the railroads controlled the Virginia legislature.[51] Hal Flood replied the following day. He denied that either Ryan or the railroads had any influence on Virginia politics and asked how Dodd could lower himself to accept the money of John D. Rockefeller at the University of Chicago.[52]

It appeared that Dodd's speech was the opening blow of a new attack. Jones followed it up at Lynchburg, July 7. Dodd had accused Martin of working with Senator Lorimer of Illinois to further the aims of the lumber interests. Jones amplified the charge and stated that Martin had proposed a committee for the investigation of the Lorimer case which was known to be in favor of that Senator.[53] He also called Martin a railroad agent and a disbursing agent for a "yellow dog" fund designed to influence members of the legislature. These assaults Martin denounced as "false and slanderous" in an open letter to the Roanoke *Times*.[54]

Jones' answer was startling. He announced that his veracity had been questioned and presented five letters which he claimed proved his contentions concerning Martin's activities.[55] All five were signed by J. S. Barbour Thompson, nephew of Martin's predecessor in the Senate, an official of the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and "chief distributor in Virginia of railroad money for railroad

good."[56] They were addressed to Decatur Axtell, the vice-president of the C & O, J. H. Bogart, a Southampton attorney, General T. M. Logan of the former Richmond and Allegheny Railroad, and the late Leonard Marbury of Alexandria, a prominent attorney. Jones claimed that they showed Martin had raised and distributed funds for the purpose of influencing railroad legislation in the legislature of 1891.[57]

Nowhere in the letters was the subject of influencing legislation directly referred to but all mentioned the name of Martin prominently as a man who should be "contacted" by the railroad men in Richmond on the day before the opening of the General Assembly. The letter to Martin included a check which was to be be applied to "the purpose stated." Cardwell and James C. Hill, who had been appointed railroad commissioner in 1885 and who had been quite friendly toward the railroad, were also mentioned as men who could be safely contacted in the capital.

The evidence was suspicious but not conclusive. It was sufficiently damning, however, to get a denial from Martin. He explained that he had been in the habit of helping J. Taylor Ellyson, then State Democratic Chairman, in the conduct of fund raising campaigns for the needs of the party.He denied that he had any connection with the railroads and declared that he had solicited funds from them in the same manner that he had solicited from other sources which were interested "in the welfare and good order of the state."[58] Ellyson concurred and said that the money had been used to keep the state safe for white rule.[59]

Jones was not satisfied. He replied that the $800 given to Martin by Thompson should have been sent directly to Ellyson if it was to be used for the party. He also noted that an additional $500 had been passed to Ellyson on November 23, several weeks after the election was over. If this indicated that the railroads were meeting the deficits of the party, it showed an unusual interest on their part in the health and welfare of the organization. If it was not for this purpose, it must have been to buy someone off. Jones told his audience that Martin was to meet with the railroad men at some ideal time to try to organize the legislature. Montague backed up Jones and declared that the railroads had increased their contributions, supervised the expenditures, and sent out representatives to make sure the legislators would be favorable to their interests. He cited Martin as one of the agents and noted that the roads had raised a "yellow dog" fund, presumably controlled by Martin, which was to be used to buy off legislators and to insure the election of those favorable to the railroads.[60]

Ellyson claimed that the money had been used to make the state safe for the Democrats and that Jones had made specific requests for funds for his own district.[61] Hal Flood set out to marshal the machine papers to the defence of Martin. In a letter to the editor of the Staunton *Leader*, he told him "to give a good explanation of the Barbour Thompson letters and the course of the party since 1888."[62] George Denny, president of Washington and Lee University, entered the battle, presumably to counter the influence of Dodd. In a speech before the Virginia Press Association, he defended the newspapers and denied that they were dominated by Ryan or subsidized by the machine.[63]

The machine politicians declared that the letters must have been stolen from Thompson's private files. This was the best counter-charge that they were able to muster on such short notice. After considerable clouding of the issues on both sides, it was determined that the letters had been taken from Thompson's private letter book but that Jones had had nothing to do with it. The letters had been sent first to Montague who had returned them to the sender. They had then been forwarded to Jones who had kept them until the opportune moment for release.[64]

Ellyson announced that the $500 which had been paid late had been promised before the election but had not been received until later. This was, he explained, a common occurrence in campaign finance.[65] Jones countered by declaring that Ellyson could not have been saving the state from the Negroes and Republicans since the Democrats needed to elect only one senator to maintain their majority and only 14 out of 63 contested seats to maintain control of the House. This was not a supreme effort which would require the railroad money unless there was some other motive.[66]

The campaign was now little more than charge and counter charge. But Jones pointed out that the Richmond *News-Leader* had changed sides since his exposure of the Thompson letters. This, he claimed, was a sign that the people of the state were heeding his cries of corruption in high places.[67]

Jones kept up interest in the scandal by reading additional letters to his audiences from time to time. On July 18, at Charlottesville, he read a letter sent by Thompson to James Moore of Orange, another railroad lawyer. It suggested that Moore go to Richmond just before the opening of the legislature and consult with Martin "who is likely to be found by inquiry of General Hill." He was to render Martin any assistance needed "in the matters which will be up at that time," and if Martin were absent, he was to work with Hill and Cardwell.[68]

The fight now quieted somewhat. Various faithful newspapers published long involved editorial analyses of the letters and concluded that Martin had not been proven a railroad agent.[69] Thompson, who had been vacationing in Europe when his name was first introduced into the primary, returned in early August and announced that the letters referred to campaign funds only. He informed his interviewer that he was now a citizen of Georgia and felt that he should not interfere in a Virginia election. Such a statement was obviously a slam at the interference of the Bryanites in the campaign.[70] Several old Fitzhugh Lee supporters who had switched to Martin during the intervening years loudly denied that there had ever been either a political machine or a railroad lobby in Virginia. S. T. Ellis and T. B. Wright both of whom sat in the Assembly of 1891 said that they had never heard of a "yellow dog fund" and denied that Martin had been a lobbyist.[71] Leonidas Yarrell of Emporia, who had been a member of the Senate in 1891, disclosed that he himself had been active for the Kent Bill but that Martin had never approached him about it.[72] He said that he supported Martin in 1893 because of his long party service.[73] It should be noted that Martin's men would have gained nothing by initiating Yarrell into the secrets of the railroad lobby if he was as strong a supporter of the Kent Bill as he claimed.

Two more letters were produced the first week in August. One showed that the treasurer of the B & O Railroad had given Thompson a check for $2,000 on November 23, 1891, but there was nothing connecting the money to Martin. The other, however, was a long document written by Thompson to C. G. Holland in which $1,000 was forwarded to be used in the campaigns of two state legislators. Holland was told that "if either of these men require further assistance and you are satisfied as to their position, we will have to arrange to help them further."[74] In a discussion such as this between two railroad men, it seems inconceivable that they could have been discussing anything other than the candidates' attitudes towards the railroads.

During the next few weeks, a spectacular murder trial in Chesterfield occupied much more space than the political news in the state newspapers while much of the remainder was occupied by the Glass campaign.

Meanwhile, Martin finally opened campaign headquarters in Richmond on August 15 and made his first speech there on August 28. He declared that he had never been a lobbyist and challenged Jones to produce one witness who could show that he had. He said that if any railroad could show that they had ever hired him as

their representative, he would resign from the Senate. The Union Station and Lorimer charges he dismissed as lies, and he claimed that his vote on the lumber tariff was a form of protection for a Southern interest. He did not make it clear how the South could be interested in a type of tree which grew in the North.[75]

Jones replied with three more letters. Of these, the most important was one written by Martin to Hal Flood, November 23, 1895. Martin called Flood's opponent in the Congressional race a Populist and accused another man running for the legislature from the Goochland, Powhatan, Chesterfield district, of "having demagogued against the railroads for ten years." He told Flood that if such men were elected to the legislature "they would start measures . . . and demagogue them to such an extent as to demoralize the Democrats who desire to be conservative and just to corporate interests." Jones also attacked Hal Flood for sending out post cards to voters on which was written, "Jones and Glass have about as much chance for the Senate as a celluloid dog has of catching an asbestos cat in hell."[76] Martin defended his opposition to certain candidates by saying that he had been motivated by a desire "to keep the Democratic party in power and to maintain Anglo-Saxon supremacy."[77]

This introduced the Negro question into the campaign and the machine continued to emphasize it. On September 2, Flood accused Jones of trying in 1893 to buy the support of a Negro political leader named Oscar Morris and of soliciting campaign funds from Thompson at about the same time.[78] Jones replied that he had visited Thompson at the latter's request and that campaign funds had not been mentioned.[79] It is interesting to note that the machine seemed to be far more interested in trying to connect the anti-machine men with the machine politicians than they were in trying to clear their own names.

The Martin-Flood letter caused many who had been unconvinced by the earlier letters to revise their stand. The *Times-Dispatch* on August 28 took the position that Swanson was unfit for office because of his stock transactions but the paper felt that Martin had satisfactorily explained the Thompson letters.[80] Following publication of the Flood letter, however, the *Times-Dispatch* concluded that it appeared to be the letter of a railroad lobbyist trying to buy the election of friendly legislators and stated that Martin was no more fit than Swanson to hold a Senate seat.[81]

Many other prominent newspapers reversed their stands but the smaller rural papers, for the most part, adhered to the machine. Martin declared that he would lose the first district by a

narrow margin but would carry the remainder and win the election by about 25,000 votes. The accuracy of this prediction is remarkable when compared with the final returns.[82] The Democratic League, which proved to be unduly optimistic, predicted that Jones and Glass would both be elected by margins of about 15,000.[83]

Despite the influence of William Jennings Bryan and the last minute allies in the newspaper field, Jones and Glass both went down to overwhelming defeat. They had been unable to raise the percentage of participating voters from the normal low level and it appeared that the voters did not care particularly whether or not they were dominated by the railroads and the American Tobacco Company. The election was complex, with many local and personal issues. In Lynchburg, the drys supported Glass, even though the Anti-Saloon League and Cannon's newspaper, the Richmond *Virginian,* supported Swanson and Martin. The influence of the Norfolk vote frauds and the issue of white supremacy would require a detailed study on the local level as would the validity of charges that the Republicans voted for Martin.

Election returns throw light on this last question, however. Almost every county in which Martin received over 90% of the vote was located in strongly Republican territory and most of these counties had much larger turnouts for the primary than any opponent of Bascomb Slemp could ever hope to muster.

It seems a foregone conclusion that Martin had been a lieutenant of the railroad interests. The letters which Jones read during the campaign do much to substantiate this view. Swanson was by his own admission engaged in stock manipulation but this does not mean that Glass' and Jones' charges were all true. On several occasions, Jones made errors of fact, deliberately or otherwise, in his accusations and on other points, as we have already noted, he seems to have been guilty of garbling and misrepresentation.

The failure of the Democratic League in 1911 ended threats to the machine for a time and Glass, living up to the opinion which Montague had of him, later found it more advantageous to join the machine than to fight it. The next dispute between progressives and conservatives in the state revolved around a national issue—the nomination of Wilson for the presidency. That fight, however, does not fall within the scope of this paper. Probably the most constructive change to come out of the campaign was the beginning of the end for Fusionism. Outside of this, the machine went on as before.

1. Robert Camillus Glass and Carter Glass, Jr., *Virginia Democracy: A History of the Achievements of the Party and Its Leaders in the Mother of Commonwealths, the Old Dominion* (3 vols., Springfield, Illinois, 1937), I, 264.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Herman L. Horn, "The Growth and Development of the Democratic Party in Virginia since 1890" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1949), 360-369.
4. *Ibid.*, 370.
5. Virginius Dabney, *Dry Messiah* (New York, 1949), 54-56.
6. Harold Gordon Wheatley, "The Political Career of William Atkinson Jones" (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1953), 23, 28, 50, 55, 83.
7. A. J. Montague to J. C. Parker, December 31, 1910, Parker Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
8. Horn, "Growth," 247-249.
9. *Ibid.*, 248-249.
10. See, for example, *Bedford Bulletin,* November 17, 1910.
11. Horn, "Growth," 249-250.
12. Charlottesville *Daily Progress,* January 14, 1911; Richmond *Times-Dispatch,* January 14, 1911.
13. *Progress,* January 16.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.;* January 23; Richmond *News-Leader,* January 23.
16. *Progress,* February 10.
17. Gov. William Hodges Mann to James Hay, Personal, January 30, 1911, Hay Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
18. *The Commoner* (Lincoln, Nebraska), XI (April 28, 1911), 3.
19. *Progress,* March 2.
20. Jones to J. C. Parker, February 3, 1911, Parker Papers.
21. Parker to Jones, February 2, 1911, Parker Papers.
22. Jones to Parker, January 28, 1911, Parker Papers.
23. H. G. Taylor to James Hay, April 24, July 22, 1911, Hay Papers.
24. Numerous letters in the Hay papers are obviously answers to letters of solicitation by Hay. The two Taylor letters are good examples.
25. J. M. Bauserman to Hay, August 17, June 24, 1911, Hay Papers.
26. *The Commoner,* XI (April 28, May 5, July 21, July 28, August 11, August 25, September 1, 1911), *passim.*
27. *Times-Dispatch,* April 1.
28. *Ibid.,* April 18.
29. J. J. Fray to Hay, July 31, August 7, 1911, Hay Papers.
30. Wheatley, "Jones," 89-91, 94.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 96.
32. *Times-Dispatch,* March 30.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Progress,* March 30.
35. *Times-Dispatch,* March 31, April 1.
36. *Ibid.,* April 11.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Progress,* May 1.
39. *Times-Dispatch,* May 1.
40. *Ibid.,* May 7, 10, 11, 13, 30.
41. *Ibid.,* May 15.
42. *Ibid.,* May 5.
43. *Progress,* May 5.
44. Roanoke *Evening News,* May 15; *Progress,* May 17; *Times-Dispatch,* June 17, April 26.
45. *Times-Dispatch,* January 24, June 22.
46. *Progress,* July 3.
47. *Time-Dispatch,* August 11.
48. *Ibid.,* May 15.
49. *Ibid.,* June 29.
50. Ryan, a native of Virginia, was one of the shrewdest and most adroit of America's financers and promoters in the post-Civil War era. By questionable methods he made his fortune first in New York City traction companies and later in railroad, banking and insurance investments. With William C. Whitney he founded the American Tobacco Company. Ryan was connected with Tammany Hall and influential in Democratic circles. In 1912 he went to the Democratic National Convention as a delegate from Virginia. See the excellent sketch by Max Lerner in the *Dictionary of American Biography,* Dumas Malone, editor (20 vols, New York 1926-1938), XVI, 265-268.
51. *Times-Dispatch,* July 5.
52. *Ibid.,* July 6.
53. *Ibid.,* July 8.
54. Roanoke *Times,* July 8.
55. *Times-Dispatch,* July 11.
56. Allen W. Moger, *Rebuilding of the Old Dominion: A Study in Economic, Social and Political Transition from 1880-1902* (Ann Arbor, 1940), 72.
57. *Times-Dispatch,* July 11. All of the letters in the series were printed in full.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*

60. *Progress,* July 13.
61. *Ibid.,* July 17.
62. Wheatley, "Jones," 109.
63. *Times-Dispatch,* July 12.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.,* July 13.
66. *The Commoner,* XI (August 25, 1911), 6-7.
67. *Times-Dispatch,* July 18.
68. *Ibid.,* July 19. contains the full text.
69. *Progress,* July 31; Gordonsville *Gazette,* July 27; Richmond *Virginian,* August 2.
70. *Progress,* August 7.
71. *Ibid.,* August 22.
72. This measure, introduced in the Assembly in January, 1892, would have provided a three-man commission, appointed by the governor and confirmed by majority vote in the legislature, to fix passenger and freight rates on railroads. Popular in rural areas, it had been defeated by opposition adroitly directed by Martin. James Adam Bear, Jr., "Thomas Staples Martin: A Study in Virginia Politics, 1883-1896" (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1952), 107ff, 117.
73. *Progress,* August 23.
74. *Times-Dispatch,* August 8, contains the full text.
75. *Ibid.,* August 29; *Progress,* August 29.
76. The full texts appear in *Times-Dispatch,* August 30.
77. *Ibid.,* September 2.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.,* August 28; September 5. Earlier Glass had accused Swanson of speculating in stock of the American Tobacco Company at a time he was boasting of being an enemy of tobacco trusts. Swanson answered that his purchases were for honest speculative purposes. Glass immediately charged that this made the situation even worse, the implication being that Swanson would aid the company in any manner possible to enhance the value of its stock. *Times-Dispatch,* August 16, 17, 18, 20.
81. *Ibid.,* September 5, 7.
82. See editorials of the *Times-Dispatch, News-Leader,* Lynchburg *Daily Advance,* Lynchburg *News, Bedford Bulletin,* Roanoke *Times, Progress,* and *Virginian* for the various editorial attitudes and viewpoints on last minute disclosures.
83. *Times-Dispatch,* September 7.