The Southern Frontier and King George's War

By JAMES LEITCH WRIGHT*

CAPTAIN JENKINS, appearing before a tense House of Commons in 1738, exhibited a severed ear in a remarkable state of preservation to the hushed members. He maintained he had lost this ear at the hands of the barbarous Spanish in the West Indies while on a legitimate trading expedition. Whether his mission was legitimate or whether he was trying to smuggle goods into the closed preserve of the Spanish colonial empire is not known. But his appearance before the House of Commons was a dramatic climax to smouldering British-Spanish relations in the turbulent West Indies. Here the declining Spanish monarchy was trying to enforce her mercantilistic policies with swift coast guards, while British merchant ships tried to elude their vigilant eyes. Jenkins had failed. He had been captured, bound to the mast, and had his ear slashed off. He asserted to the Commons that when in this precarious condition he had "committed his soul to God and his cause to his country."[1] The British nation, thoroughly aroused and spoiling for a fight with Spain, declared war in 1739, known as the War of Jenkin's Ear. Initially only involving Spain and Britain, the conflagration would soon spread until it engulfed most of Europe. The perennial question of Austrian succession helped expand the British-Spanish conflict so that shortly Austria, Prussia, and France all had been drawn into a general war.[2]

Dynastic and imperial struggles of these European powers were vividly reflected in the hostilities in the American colonies, called here King George's War. Though Spain claimed much of North America, her only outposts were in Florida and Texas for protection of her vast Central and South American empire. France, in an amazing burst of colonization activity, had occupied the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes-Mississippi River region which was now dotted with forts and trading posts. Britain's numerous colonists were well entrenched between the Appalachian mountains and the Atlantic

*A graduate of Henry Clay High School, Ashland, Virginia, in 1946, and of Virginia Military Institute in 1950, Mr. Wright is at present working for his Ph.D. here at the University of Virginia, after obtaining his M.A. in history in 1956. This essay represents the first prize winner in the graduate division of the essay contest for 1955-56.

but were ringed by the French on the north and the Spanish on the south.

As the War of Jenkin's Ear involved only England and Spain, the initial flurry of hostilities occurred on the southern frontier of the English colonies where the newly-founded colony of Georgia was precariously close to the hostile Spanish outposts in northern Florida. Colonial friction here had not begun spontaneously with a declaration of war by the respective mother countries. Spain had bitterly opposed the English settlement at Jamestown, the southward expansion into Carolina, and, last but not least, the founding of Georgia. Though high Spanish officials had urged that force be used to obliterate the impetuous English,[3] so far most Spanish protests had been vocal.

When Georgia was settled, animosity between the Spanish and British colonials reached its highest peak. This struggling infant colony had been founded in 1733 for a dual purpose: to provide relief for victims of British debtor prisons and to act as a buffer against the Spanish. The person furnishing the major impetus for the founding of this colony was James Oglethorpe, an outstanding English philanthropist. He had gained wide-spread fame for his prison reforms, had been instrumental in getting the Georgia charter, and then personally had led the settlers to the new colony.

In addition to the hostile Spanish in Florida, there were other potential enemies—the Indians and the French. Oglethorpe was quick to realize the economic and strategic value of friendly relations with the Indians. Immediately he made an agreement with the Creeks which on the whole proved quite advantageous.[4] The French, who were entrenched along the Mississippi River, probably were not numerous enough themselves to offer a serious threat to Oglethorpe. But their highly successful relations with the Indians and their ability to supply them with arms made the French menace a real one.

Of course, Georgia's major threat was from the Spanish who were greatly incensed by this latest British encroachment. From the only partially completed but nevertheless formidable Fort San Marco at St. Augustine, they warily watched the movements of their new neighbors. Spain had occupied St. Augustine not so much to induce colonization as to provide strategic protection: situated on Florida's east coast, it commanded the return route of the Spanish plate fleet. As it was, Oglethorpe's settlement of Savannah had seriously jeopardized this route. Immediately the Spanish ambassador

had protested in London;[5] meanwhile Spain made preparations to expel the British forcibly, even though the two countries were technically still at peace.[6]

Oglethorpe was acutely aware of the critical situation. After protracted pleadings and maneurverings, he was able to get the Crown to send a seven hundred-man regiment of regulars to Georgia, with himself as its colonel. Arriving in the summer of 1738, they had been just in time. The Spaniards had already seized St. Georges Island and had gathered a fifteen hundred-man expedition at St. Augustine poised to strike at the weakly-defended colony. Until the arrival of Oglethorpe's regiment there had been only the local militia, but these timely reinforcements were enough to ward off temporarily the impending Spanish attack.[7]

Given a respite, Oglethorpe feverously set to work to improve his precarious position: existing forts were strengthened, new ones were built, and ties were further cemented with adjacent Indians. His food supply was greatly increased, because, since the arrival of the regiment, the militia could devote more of their time to farming, instead of mustering at each Spanish alarm.[8] The colony's main military establishment was the fortified town of Frederica on St. Simons Island, half way between Savannah and St. Augustine. There were other forts and outposts south of Frederica—Fort St. Simons on the southern tip of St. Simons Island, St. Andrews Fort and Fort William on Cumberland Island, and an outpost on Amelia Island. Forts were also located in the interior on strategic rivers. Communications were a pressing problem in this widespread area which was traversed by numerous rivers and fringed by numerous islands. Oglethorpe pleaded for more boats and horses to help tie together his scattered colony, but he met with little success.[9]

The declaration of war in 1739 following Captain Jenkin's appearance before the House of Commons did not at all surprise the Georgia settlers. Actually the northern colonies had received first word of impending hostilities; quickly they had outfitted privateers and had dispatched them to the West Indies to fall upon hapless Spanish merchantmen. Thus one Rhode Island privateer had set sail immediately after hearing the news, and when it stopped temporarily at Savannah, it gave the colony its first information about the final break with Spain.[10] At this time, Oglethorpe was negotiating with the Cherokees and the Chickasaws at Fort August, one hundred and fifty miles inland on the Savannah River. A messenger quickly was dispatched to the General, and upon

receiving the news, Oglethorpe instantly set out for Frederica[11]—a three hundred mile journey.

He had a weighty decision confronting him: whether to concentrate solely on the defense of his spread-out colony, or whether to assume the offensive against the Spaniards. He chose the latter. Of course his chief objective would be St. Augustine, a cancer in the security of British colonies since it had been built in the seventeenth century. For the time being Havana was blockaded by Admiral Vernon's men-of-war, thereby minimizing the possibility that St. Augustine would be reinforced. That this blockade might not continue or remain effective had influenced Oglethorpe's decision to attack.[12]

Oglethorpe now began to coordinate his plan: dispatches and letters poured fourth from Frederica in a steady stream to the Indians, to his scattered garrisons, to the rangers patrolling between the garrisons, to the other colonies, and to British men-of-war.[13] In addition to furnishing supplies for the expedition, the Crown agreed to provide naval support—a squadron of six twenty-gun men-of-war and two sloops. This was much of the squadron normally assigned to defend the American coastline.[14] Oglethorpe's commission provided that he would be military commander not only only of Georgia but also of South Carolina. His plan was to organize a combined force composed of his regiment, Georgia and South Carolina militia, and Indian allies. With this force he would march on St. Augustine and relieve the Spanish of their formidable outpost in northern Florida.

Frontier clashes had not been uncommon in the past, but now their tempo greatly increased. Oglethorpe's southernmost outpost at Amelia Island, only fifteen miles from the mouth of the Saint Johns River, was raided by the Spanish in November 1739. Here there was a settlement of Jacobite Scotch Highlanders guarded by sixteen men and a scout boat. A Spanish party surprised some of the Highlanders, murdered two, and then escaped before reinforcements could be brought up.[15] The Spanish also intensified their efforts to win the powerful Creek tribe away from Oglethorpe, but they were largely unsuccessful.[16] Even though the French were technically at peace at this time, there were alarming reports of mounting French pressure on western Indian tribes.[17]

The increasing number of Spanish raids and outrages inflamed the redoubtable Oglethorpe; with part of his forces he assumed the offensive. Using only Georgia troops and some Indians, he moved into Florida and captured several outlying Spanish forts—

Fort Diego, Fort Francis de Papa, and Fort Moosa. His past policy of successfully winning the Indians, particularly the Creeks, over to his side was now and would continue to pay rich dividends. In a pitched battle Indians were not normally superior to the white man. But in scouting over large areas, in annoying the enemy, in subduing hostile tribes, Oglethorpe's Indian allies rendered incalculable assistance. Harassing attacks on Spanish forts and settlements continued, gradually forcing the Spaniards to seek shelter at St. Augustine; and Oglethorpe had by no means forgotten his main mission—seizure of that overbearing fortress.

While part of his forces were engaged in Florida, Oglethorpe was busy planning with South Carolina officials his major blow. Initially he contemplated a siege in the traditional European fashion. The town of St. Augustine including its fort would be encircled, the food supply would be cut off, the besieging lines would grow tighter and tighter until finally the famished and crushed garrison would be forced to capitulate. This plan required a large, well-equipped force. The allotment for South Carolina alone would be six hundred infantry, eight hundred Negro pioneers including their overseers, one hundred and five rangers, and two thousand Creek and Cherokee Indians.[10] South Carolina, however, was unwilling to pay for this large force. She was concerned also about denuding the colony of so many whites: the Negro population here greatly outnumbered the white, and only recently the colony had witnessed the spectacle of a savage Negro uprising. Oglethorpe continued to haggle with the South Carolinians, but in the end he was forced to modify his plan. St. Augustine would still be captured, but now by direct assault instead of by siege, thereby requiring a smaller force. How South Carolina quickly voted to supply a four hundred-man regiment and provisions—guns, hatchets, blankets, and corn—for five hundred Indians.[19]

The Spaniards were keenly aware of Oglethorpe's design and were busily strengthening their defenses. The Spanish Governor in Florida was Manuel Montiano. At his disposal were four hundred and sixty-two regulars, sixty-one militia, forty free Negroes, and fifty armed Indians. He pleaded with his superior in Havana to send him additional muskets; if this were done more militia, mulattoes, Negroes, and Indians could be armed.[20] Montiano's alliance with the Florida Indians, mainly the southern Creeks, was an extremely tenuous one, because he was not able to supply them sufficiently with muskets and other traditional presents. Oglethorpe appreciated his antagonist's dilemma and took advantage of it whenever possible.[21]

Many of the free Negroes in Florida were former residents of South Carolina. They had escaped from here, sometimes first brutally massacring their masters, and then had fled to Florida where they were welcomed with open arms by the Spaniards. Land and supplies were given to these fugitives in an attempt to help people north Florida. Montiano fully realized that a sole regular military force in Florida would have a difficult time in expelling the British permanently. There must also be a prosperous and numerous population base to solidly support the military establishment.[22]

By June 1840, Oglethorpe had captured all the outlying Spanish forts, had brought his combined force by land and sea before St. Augustine, and had finished last minute preparations with the British squadron. The stage was set for the assault. With the support of naval gunfire, the infantry would breech the walls of the town and fort. There was one serious problem, however. Montiano recently had been reinforced by six half-galleys bringing supplies from Havana. These vessels were anchored ominously at the foot of San Marco, thereby complicating a joint land-sea operation. It would be the job of the British men-of-war to neutralize these vessels.

On June 5th Oglethorpe meticulously deployed his regiment, militia, and Indians. Eagerly they awaited his command to attack. The signal was given to the British squadron to move in and reduce the half-galleys and to bombard the fort—but there was only an awful silence. As the minutes ticked slowly by, Oglethorpe sent a messenger to the fleet to ascertain the delay. An explanation was not long in forthcoming: between the fort and the men-of-war was a bar prohibiting them from moving into range of the fort. Therefore they were unable to fulfill the crucial role assigned them. Reluctantly Oglethorpe called off the attack.

The only alternative now was a siege. The town was encircled, a rigorous naval blockade was instigated, and long range guns were moved into position. As the days slowly slipped by, Oglethorpe gradually inched his way toward the Spanish-manned parapets. But Montiano's stiff defence disheartened the attackers; what was worse they grew careless! Montiano was quick to observe this. One night three hundred Spaniards stealthy slipped out of St. Augustine and surprised some of the militia, inflicting over fifty casualties. The ground thus seized from the militia partially opened land communications to St. Augustine. A few days later one of the blockading vessels vacated its post. Waiting men and supplies leaped at this opportunity and shortly were under the protective

guns of Fort San Marco. To make matters even worse, the commander of the British squadron said he would soon have to leave because the hurricance season was rapidly approaching.

With the blockade broken and the Spanish reinforced, dissatisfaction among the besieging forces became rampant; and the high rate of sickness did not help matters any. The Indians sulked, and many of the South Carolinians precipitously returned home. Oglethorpe had no choice but to call off the siege in July 1740 and to return creastfallen to Frederica. Both his high hopes and Georgia-South Carolina equanimity had been shattered in this unsuccessful expedition.[23]

Now the tables were reversed. Instead of close co-operation, Georgia and South Carolina began a feud over the responsibility of the failure, yet to be settled in many partisan minds. But what was even worse was that now the Spaniards would probably assume the offensive with a vengeance against a weakly-defended and disorganized Georgia. The settlers voiced widespread alarm over the "impending ruin" of the colony when they learned that the Spaniards had been "reinforced, the General's army harassed and weakened, and the Indians provoked and discontended."[24]

Fortunately the southern colonies were given a temporary reprieve from Spanish wrath. Though Georgia would remain on the defensive, the mother country was planning a grandiose expedition against the Spaniards in the Caribbean. In November 1739, Admiral Vernon had seized the rich Spanish port of Porto Bello in a daring attack. Hoping for a repeat performance, the government furnished him with ten thousand men and thirty ships-of-the-line. This time he was to attack Cartagena or Cuba itself. Because of widespread tropical sickness and overcautious leadership, Vernon's efforts against Cartagena and Cuba in 1741 were dismal failures. Alarming rumors from Europe that the French fleet might combine with the Spanish fleet soon forced Vernon's recall.[25]

The dormant Spanish threat againt Georgia now became active. Spain fully realized that the colonies were in a weakened condition —many of the northern and central colonies had furnished troops for the ill-fated Cartagena expedition. Now would be the ideal time to strike a blow at the encroaching southern colonies. Juan Francisco de Horcasitas, the Governor of Havana, was ordered by his home government to assemble a powerful force. The St. Augustine siege would be avenged by "sacking and burning all the towns, posts, plantations, and settlements of the enemy" up to Port Royal in the southern part of South Carolina.[26]

Horcasitas lost no time in organizing the expedition. Because of the stubborn St. Augustine defence and because of intimate knowledge of the terrain, Montiano was chosen to lead the attack. Cuba would furnish shipping, regulars, and militia, the latter consisting of whites, mulattoes, and Negroes. This force would be buttressed by the addition of shipping, regulars, and militia at St. Augustine.[27]

Montiano carefully laid his plans. He was at a disadvantage because of not having numerous Indian allies as did the British. However, in the past he had encouraged the South Carolina Negro slaves to revolt; now he redoubled his efforts. He sent out Negroes speaking the various Negro dialects who would urge the slaves to revolt, to massacre their masters, and then to flee to Florida where freedom and land would be waiting.[28]

In the early summer of 1742 the Cuban contingent arrived in St. Augustine. Last minute preparations were made and the grand amarda set sail for Georgia. Included were about thirty-six vessels, headed by a frigate, a galley, and the familiar six half-galleys. The combined military force was around four thousand, almost four times larger than any available in Georgia.[29]

Oglethorpe was well aware of the preparations and progress made by Montiano. Ever since the unsuccessful siege in 1740, friendly Indians had observed and harassed the Spanish right up to the walls of St. Augustine. Also Oglethorpe had strengthened further his chain of inland forts stretching southward from St. Simons Island. Old batteries had been repaired, new ones had been erected, and the system of interlocking communications had been greatly improved by scout boats, signals, towers, and even a canal. Contact had been made with portions of Montiano's fleet by some of the outposts, and it was no surprise when in July 1742, the large Spanish flotilla was observed off of St. Simons by a lookout in the watchtower.[30]

Montiano's plan was this: as soon as his fleet came within sight of the southernmost tip of St. Simons—easily recognizable because of the "lofty wooden tower"—the British ensign would be raised. They would try to deceive the garrison of Fort St. Simons long enough to allow the fleet to proceed up the Frederica River to Frederica.[31] But the expectant British were not deceived. Spanish passage up the Frederica River was bitterly contested, and it was only after a fierce four-hour bombardment that the batteries of the fort were silenced and the flotilla could proceed. Next Montiano landed his forces several miles below Frederica in preparation for

the grand assault. Once Frederica with its regiment of regulars was destroyed, then he would have a comparatively free hand in Georgia and South Carolina.

The colonists in Frederica and the surrounding territory were petrified, as well they might be by this four-thousand-man army. Oglethorpe, displaying commendable military leadership, deployed the regulars, organized the militia, requested British and colonial men-of-war from Charleston, and secured Indian support; even so, he had only a force six hundred and fifty-two men. To defend Frederica successfully against such overwhelming odds was problematical. Instead Oglethorpe determined to ambush the Spanish in the marshy, forested area which they would have to cross before they could attack Frederica.

In this he was eminently successful. In a muddled, confused battle, known as Bloody Marsh, the Spaniards finally were forced to retreat. Through the artifice of a forged dispatch, Oglethorpe was able to convince Montiano that he was greatly outnumbered; and, leaving guns, supplies, and booty, the Spanish hastily reembarked.[32] Crestfallen Montiano now returned to St. Augustine, berating "the All Powerful" who had "brought to naught the plan I had in mind."[33]

Shortly after the Spanish fleet had so hurriedly left St. Simons, the men-of-war, headed by two British frigates, belatedly arrived from Charleston. They were derisively greeted by the exultant Georgians whose friendship for the South Carolinians had not increased when they furnished no troops for the recent campaign. These vessels cruised the Georgia-Florida coast in pursuit of straggling Spanish ships but with little success. Then, at least according to Georgia authorities, they returned to Charleston where they received resounding huzzas for their brilliant victory over the Spanish.[34] Although Oglethorpe and his Georgians deserve full credit for the victory, it was not a solidly-united colony that inflicted the defeat. In fact, fear of the Spanish had been so great, that the rapid flight of the militia had threatened to depopulate some areas.[35]

After Montiano had retreated to St. Augustine, the Spanish threat temporarily abated, but it had by no means disappeared, and Oglethorpe redoubled his defensive efforts: damage incurred during the raid was repaired, some reinforcements were received from Virginia, and Indians were still kept harassing the Spanish in Florida. Montiano made a hostile overland demonstration the next year toward the St. Johns River; Oglethorpe rushed southward

with part of his troops, and the Spanish retreated. "The usual terror took them and they retired within the walls of St. Augustine." He tried to lure them into the open from their secure sanctuary but had no success.[36] Therefore he was soon forced to return to Frederica.

Neither the Spanish in Florida nor the British in Georgia realized that the major fighting was over for them in King George's war. Yet plotting with the Indians, agitating or suppressing the Negroes, and waging running fights with privateers would now play the major role for the rest of the war.

Privateering had been quite prevalent on both sides. As soon as it became known that war was going to be declared against Spain, colonial governors had issued letters of marque to privateers. New England, hearing the news first, dotted the Florida coast and the Caribbean with armed vessels.[36] Other coolnies were quick to follow suit. The chief bases for the southern colonies were the ports of Charleston, Savannah, and Frederica. For example, in December 1739, Captain Davis outfitted a twenty-gun snow at Savannah. He continued to prey on Spanish vessels throughout the war, with each voyage bringing in or destroying one or more enemy ships.[38] Likewise Oglethorpe himself outfitted vessels to swoop down upon Spanish commerce.[39]

But all privateers dotting the Georgia-Florida coast did not fly the British flag: using St. Augustine as a base, Montiano outfitted vessels which were highly annoying and destructive to the southern colonies. In one year alone he was reported to have taken thirty prizes into St. Augustine harbor.[40] Spanish depredations induced loud appeals to the Royal Navy for protection, and the southern colonists were caustic in their denunciations when British frigates apparently paid them little heed.[41] Yet the American coastline was an extended one; for a limited number of frigates to guard it effectively was a difficult and quite often thankless task.

Along with the hostilities on the high seas there were continual raids on the mainland, usually by Indians. Both sides tried to win over as many natives as possible, and, having achieved this, tried to maintain amicable relations. To accomplish either of these ends it was necessary to supply the various tribes with the traditional presents of guns, powder, blankets, etc. The major Indian tribes in the southern region were the Creeks in Georgia and northern Florida, the Cherokees in the Carolinas and Georgia, the Chickasaws in the Yazoo River section, and the Choctaws in the lower Mississippi-Gulf region.[42]

Spain's Indian policy had been conspicuous for its failure. Montiano frequently had been hard pressed to retain the allegiance of even the Creeks adjacent to St. Augustine. His difficulty had been in getting enough presents to win them permanently away from the Georgians. Men-of-war of the Royal Navy and privateers had frequently interrupted his supplies, thereby forcing him to trade with the French in Louisiana—quite humiliating to the Spanish Crown who resented the French in Louisiana almost as much as the English in Georgia. Before the outbreak of war there had been limited trade, but after war had been declared Spain officially authorized this trade, deeming it a necessary evil. In spite of the fact that France and Spain became allies in the European war, their American colonies never became enthusiastic co-belligerents.[43]

When France entered the war in 1744 there was considerable alarm in the southern colonies that the French would incite the Indians against the colonies. The French, strongly intrenched at New Orleans, had secured the allegiance of the powerful and warlike Choctaw tribe. In addition, French agents were uncomfortably active with the Creeks and the Chickasaws. However, the French were plagued with the perennial Spanish problem, lack of presents. This caused a Choctaw revolt which, though soon quelled, nevertheless put a damper on French aggressive designs.[44]

Indian support of the southern colonies had come mainly from the Creeks and Cherokees, and many a Spaniard could easily testify to their effectiveness. Along the entire western frontier the Indians acted as a buffer against the French, and Oglethorpe worked closely with other governors so as to present a united front.[45] Toward the end of the war, however, relations with the Creeks began to deteriorate rapidly. Widespread dissatisfaction inspired by the limited quantity of presents and their method of distribution caused a large portion of the Creeks to defect temporarily to the French.[46]

Had any one of the three combatants in King George's War been able to unite permanently most of the factious, warlike tribes against one of the other combatants, then the results of the war on the southern frontier could have been quite decisive. As it turned out there was only scattered, insignificant fighting after the Spanish attack in 1742. Major fighting in the colonial arena next was focused in the north where New England had been able to wrest Louisburg from the French in 1745.

On the continent the European nations were finally becoming weary of the strains and burdens caused by the protracted struggle:

in 1748 a peace treaty was at last signed at Aix-La-Chapelle. For them it was an indecisive treaty and was merely an armed truce; likewise this was the case on the southern frontier. The British colonists had not been able to drive the Spanish out of Florida, nor had the Spanish been able to drive the British out of Georgia and South Carolina. The British had not been able to organize the Indians effectively against the French, nor the French against the British. The treaty here too was only a truce, and each side prepared itself for future struggles.

Oglethorpe's outstanding victory over the Spanish at Bloody Marsh has been compared to the later-day colonial seizure of Quebec in 1759. There are striking similarities: both were stunning defeats inflicted on colonial competitors, one in the north and the other in the south. But here the similarity stops. The loss of Quebec practically threw the French out of the New World; the defeat at Bloody Marsh merely buttressed Britain's claim on Georgia, the Spanish threat had by no means been obliterated.

1. Basil Williams, *The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760* (Oxford, 1939), 198.
2. *Ibid.*, 220-255. This general war was the War of Austrian Succession.
3. deValasco to King of Spain, June 14, 1610, in Alexander Brown, *The Genesis of the United States* (Boston and New York, 1890), 392.
4. Amos A. Ettinger, *James Edward Oglethorpe, Imperial Idealist* (Oxford, 1936), 216-217.
5. *Ibid.*, 190-191.
6. Montiano to Horcasitas, May 13, 1738, in Manuel Montiano, *Letters of Montiano, Siege of St. Augustine*, translated by Major C. DeWitt Willcox (*Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, VII, part 1), 16.
7. Oglethorpe to Joseph Jekyll, September 19, 1738, in *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia* (Atlanta, 1910), XXII, 251-252.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Oglethorpe to Trustees, November 16, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, XXII, part 2, 267-268.
10. Stephen's journal, September, 8, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, IV, 407.
11. Egmont journal, September(?) 12, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, V, 229.
12. Oglethorpe to Lt. Governor Bull, December 29, 1739, in *The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740, A Report to the South Carolina General Assembly, reprinted from the Colonial Records of South Carolina* (Columbia, 1954), 94.
13. Oglethorpe to Trustees, October 11, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, XXII, part 2, 242.
14. Herbert W. Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48* (Cambridge, 1920), I, 31, 50.
15. Stephen's journal, November 22, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, IV, 457.
16. Benjamin Martyn, "An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia in America from its First Settlement," *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, II (1842), 304.
17. Stephen's journal, April 30, 1740, *Ga. Colonial Records*, IV, 563.
18. *St. Augustine Expedition*, 95-97.
19. Oglethorpe's plan for a sudden attack on Augustine, March 29, 1740, *St. Augustine Expedition*, 107.
20. Montiano to Horcasitas, March 25, 1740, *Letters of Montiano*, 48.
21. *Ibid.*, May 13, 1740, 52.
22. *Ibid.*, January 31, 1740, 41. (Slaves came only from South Carolina, because at this time slavery was illegal in Georgia.)
23. *St. Augustine Expedition*, 1ff.; Walter G. Cooper, *The Story of Georgia* (New York, 1938), I, 231-239.
24. Douglass Stirling to Trustees, August 10, 1740, in P. Tailfer, H. Anderson, and D. A. Douglas, "A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America," *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, II (1842), 246-247.
25. Williams, *Whig Supremacy*, 223-224.
26. unsigned to Horcasitas, October 31, 1741, in *The Spanish Official Account of the Attack on the Colony of Georgia in America and of its Defeat on St. Simons Island by General James Oglethorpe* (*Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, VII, part 3), 21-22.
27. Horcasitas to Montiano, May 14, and June 2, 1742, *Spanish Official Account*, 28-33.

28. *Ibid.*, June 2, 1742, 34.
29. *Ibid.*, 33; Oglethorpe's report after engagement, July 30, 1742, in Cooper, *Story of Georia*, I, 243-249.
30. Oglethorpe's report, 243-249.
31. Orders to the commanding officer of the fleet, *Spanish Official Account*, 46.
32. Oglethorpe's report, 243-249.
33. Montiano to King, August 3, 1742, *Spanish Official Account*, 96.
34. Stephens to Verelst, August 13, 1742, *Ga. Colonial Records*, XXIII, 284.
35. Causton to Verelst, November 16, 1742, *ibid.*, 428.
36. Oglethorpe to Lt. Governor Clarke, April 22, 1743, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, VI, 242.
37. Howard M. Chapin, *Rhode Island Privateers in King George's War, 1739-1748* (Providence, 1926), 5 ff.
38. Stephen's journal, December 10, 1739, *Ga. Colonial Records*, IV, 467; Heron to Verelst, January 2, 1747, *Ga. Colonial Records*, XXV, 251.
39. Stephen's journal, September 23, 1741, *Ga. Colonial Records*, IV (Suppliment), 247.
40. *Ibid.*, August 21, 1741, 224.
41. *Ibid.*, August 25, 1741, 228.
42. Norman W. Caldwell, "The French in the Mississippi Valley," *Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, XXVI, No. 3, 82-83.
43. Charles W. Hackett, "Policy of the Spanish Crown Regarding French Encroachments from Louisiana, 1721-1762," *New Spain and the Anglo-American West, Historical Contributions*, I, 119, 130.
44. Norman W. Caldwell,,, The Southern Frontier During King George's War," *Journal of Southern History*, VII, No. 1, 37ff.
45. Oglethorpe to Lt. Gov. Clarke, July 12, 1741, *New York Colonial Documents*, VI, 211.
46. Caldwell, "Southern Frontier," 48-50.