Saltville

and

Salt Mining Operations During The Civil War

By CECIL R. GREER II*

1860—Somewhere in the hills of Virginia a family of meager income arose and proceeded to breakfast. It was winter, and they all gorged themselves on bacon, eggs and potatoes. The bacon was nearly a year old but had been cured and salted so well that it was not tainted in the least. All, as they wished, helped themselves to more salt for their other food without giving another thought to it; for to them salt was something to be taken for granted. After all, it only cost a few cents for a whole bushel.

Little did this family realize that in four short, but action-packed years there would not be enough salt to use as they pleased. How could they forsee that in 1864 they would have to pay outlandish prices for just a small amount of salt; that the price of salt would rise from $1.00 for two hundred pounds in 1860, to $1.30, and much higher, per pound in 1862?[1] Could they imagine that they would not be able to get enough salt to cure all their pork, beef, and other meats; that they would have to eat meat so poorly cured that it was rancid and tainted before a summer had passed?

This hypothetical family was not the only one to suffer from a scarcity of salt during the Civil War. As a matter of fact, theirs was the common plight. This lack of salt for civilian consumption was mirrored by the dilemma of the armed forces of the Confederacy. The Confederacy required 6 million bushels per year, or 300 million pounds of salt. This figure is computed on the reduced war basis instead of 50 pounds per capita basis of ante-bellum consumption.[2] The Confederate soldier's monthly allowance, in 1864, was one and one half pounds. In Virginia, for civilians, the allowance was one pound per person per month though the amount

*Mr. Greer was born in Marion, Virginia and graduated from the Marion High School. He received his bachelors degree from the University of Virginia in 1957 and is now a first-year student in the University's Law School. This paper was awarded second prize in the undergraduate division in 1956-1957.

for all purposes was 30 pounds per year per person.[3] Two-thirds of the enormous amount of salt needed was used for preserving. Bacon, butter, beef, and all preservable foods required salt. As examples of how much salt was required it is well to note that to cure properly pork two bushels of salt were required for every thousand pounds of pork, and one and one quarter bushels for every five hundred pounds of beef. Other than its use for preserving pork, beef, etc., salt was used to preserve butter, animals required it in their diet, and it was used in the tanning of leather. In other words salt was so important that a country could not survive without it in great quantities. An ex-Confederate soldier, an officer, in a speech at Syracuse, stated that the North had won the war due to the lack of salt in the Confederacy.[4] While this is an oversimplification of the reason for the South's being defeated, it does show the immense importance of salt in regard to the war effort.

Where was all this salt to be procured and by what methods? There were several sources of salt in the South for in nearly every state it was possible to locate salt springs or salt lakes. However, certain salines were of such outstanding value as to be of importance to the entire South. Significant examples were the following: those on the Great Kanawha River, three miles above Charleston, now in West Virginia; the Goose Creek Salt Works, five in number, all privately owned or rented, which were situated either on the main fork, or on the branches of that stream within a radius of five miles from Manchester, Kentucky; the wells on the state reservation in Alabama in Clark County, which, together with the privately owned mills in Washington and Mobile Counties, supplied the interior of Alabama, Mississippi, and George from 1862 through the rest of the war; the salines of north Louisiana; and above all the great wells in southwestern Virginia at Saltville and in Washington County, which lacked only labor to supply the whole Confederacy.[5]

It is with the last, and most important, source of salt that the author wishes to deal, for, "The resources of Alabama and of north Louisiana fade into insignificance beside those of Virginia, on which in large measure the entire Confederacy east of the Mississippi depended after the loss of the Kanawha wells."[6]

The center for the procurement of salt in this area was the town of Saltville located at the southern part of the salt beds. Once the wells had been approximately two-thirds lake and marsh. However, in 1847 Colonel Thomas L. Preston, who was owner and manager of the salt works, dug a ditch from the foot of "Sugar

Loaf Hill" to the gap leading to the river, and thus drained the entire valley.[7] The valley had access to the north fork of the Holston River by which salt was floated down on flatboats, at high water, to the Tennessee River, and hence, distributed throughout the South.

In 1858 the two saline estates of Spencer Ackerman and Company, and George W. Palmer of Syracuse, N. Y., were leased by Colonel Preston. He was to hold and operate the salt works until 1863 when George W. Palmer and William A. Stuart, father of ex-Governor Henry C. Stuart, purchased the Preston estate. In 1864 a corporation under the name of Holston Salt and Plaster Company acquired titles to the Preston estate and the King estate. These two large estates comprised the salt deposits.[8] This company operated the salt works during the Civil War as effectively as possible. For one period of six months the works were able to produce ten thousand bushels of salt a day without showing any decrease in the quantity or quality of the brine.[9]

During the Civil War Saltville's production potential was never fully realized. The salt deposit was truly immense. At a depth of about 200 feet there was a solid bed of rock salt, 175 feet thick, which underlay about 500 acres. This salt was nearly 100% pure fossil salt. At the outbreak of the war there were five wells in operation in this valley. The cost of these wells, including labor and capital, was $83,000.00 with an annual output valued at $72,000.00. The salt industry was thriving in Saltville because of the superior quality of the product. By the method of procuring salt then used, the salt from this area was 93.8% to 99% pure as compared to 79.4% for the valuable Kanawha wells. The brine was so strong that it yielded one bushel of salt for every eighteen gallons of brine.[10]

At this time there were three methods of procuring salt: saline artesian wells, sea water, and mining rock salt. The latter is the best method, but it was not practiced at the outbreak of the war. However, the deposits of rock salt were tapped by the use of water and brine.

The method of extracting salt used at Saltville was very simple in operation. First of all, shafts were sunk to the salt beds, and after the water had risen to within forty-six feet of the surface, it was raised to the surface by pumps. It was then pumped into large tanks or reservoirs. Next they took the salt to the furnaces of the salt works. These were arched furnaces about one hundred fifty feet long, with doors at one end and the chimney at the other. On

top of the furnace and built into it were two long rows of iron kettles like shallow bowls. Wooden pipes carried the brine from the reservoir to these kettles. The furnace was kept roaring hot and the brine was evaporated to obtain the salt.

During operation of the furnaces, a white saline vapor was given off and rose above the kettles. To inhale this vapor was supposed to be good for lung and throat diseases.

During regular intervals, colored attendants passed along the rows of kettles with mammoth ladles dipping out the salt. They, in turn, put it into loosely woven split baskets which were placed in pairs over the boilers. This sped up the drying of the salt. The salt was then thrown into immense salt sheds (magazines).

To avoid overland transportation the furnaces were set up on the banks of the Holston River and the brine piped to them. After the salt had been evaporated and dried, it was packed in barrels and carried westward down the river or eastward by rail.[11]

Since the furnaces used in the process burned tremendous amounts of wood it was not unusual during the war to see the roads clogged with wagons bringing wood which would be exchanged in part for salt.

During the war, the high price of salt caused numerous companies to be formed to exploit the state under the guise of patriotism. In Saltville, in addition to the established Stuart, Buchanan Company, a Mississippi company, the Strong, Cunningham Company, was a large producer of salt. "They secured an order for 100,000 bushels for his state from Governor Pettus."[12]

As has been noted earlier, the only missing element in the salt industry at Saltville was labor. This situation was not eased at all by conscription. The clamor that arose from impressment of salt workers led to legislation for their exemption. Within five days after congress passed the first Conscrption Act of April 16, 1862, which declared every able-bodied white man between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five subject to service, it began to work out its system of exemptions, but saltmakers and their employees were not then included among the industrial classes which received exemption. However, an amendatory act of early October stated that all superintendents, managers, mechanics, and miners employed in the production of salt to the extent of twenty bushels per day were exempted from military service. In order to guard against abuses, exemptions were effective only for persons actually engaged in the industry. Affidavits concerning the employment and the indispensability of the work were also required.[13]

The Subsistence Bureau of the War Department placed large contracts with the Saltville plants in order to get the needed supplies for the armies. Exerting a virtual monopoly over the product, the Bureau promptly, in 1861, contracted for all the salt it might demand at seventy-five cents a bushel. In order to encourage the enlargement of the salt works the department made a contract with the proprietors for 10,000 bushels of salt per month for twelve months, with a clause authorizing an indefinite, intermediate demand, independent of the current monthly supply. After termination of the indefinite agreement on April 1, 1862, the government had a contract for 22,000 bushels a month for a year at the same price. The needs of the central government became the responsibility of Virginia when the state took over the works at Saltville in 1864. Hence, a contract was signed by the state on April 15, 1864, for 30,000 bushels a month at three dollars a bushel, delivered at Saltville. To look after the government salt at the works, a man living at Saltville was commissioned commissary in charge of government salt at the works, and it was he who requisitioned the railroad cars in 1864, and thus added to the friction which arose over transportation.[14]

As the demand for salt grew more serious, different states desired to have companies at the Virginia salt works. North Carolina, for example, had a plant there under N. W. Woodfin from 1862 until the end of the war. He, by July 1, 1863, had shipped 86,729 bushels and had 20,000 bushels on hand.[15] This practice of states to intrude upon the production of the Saltville works led to some strife with Virginia. Virginia, in order to get her contracted salt, resorted to impressment of some works. This, however, did not occur until the spring of 1864 and then, by legislative direction and not at the direction of the superintendent.

Virginia, as the repository of the most important salines of the Confederacy, was in a delicate position: she must pursue a generous policy with this vital resource toward all her sister states, and yet she must discharge her duty to assure her own citizens a fair supply. Her first important step was taken in the winter and spring of 1861-62, when a special joint committee of the legislature considered taking over the works from the lessees by purchase or by preemption. However, they decided to leave the works in the hands of the lessees and made a provisional contract for 400,000 bushels of salt at seventy-five cents a bushel to be delivered monthly from May 1, 1862, to May 1, 1863, this being the largest amount the lessees could provide because of existing contracts. Although the assembly ap-

proved the provisional contract by resolution it failed to pass on the necessary appropriations to carry out the contract, thus releasing the lessees from any obligation. So, it must be noted that at this time Virginia declined to take over the works, preferring to rely on the honor of the lessees.

After June, 1862, Governor Letcher, who made a personal visit to the Saltville works and had been so impressed by the activities of other states in his own state – Georgia, Tennesse, North Carolina, had already begun the manufacture of salt, while Alabama was erecting works—was spurred to executive action. He summoned the legislature into special session September 15, 1862, and laid before it the proposition offered him by the Stuart, Buchanan Company. This would give Virginia the privilege of erecting furnaces and of manufacturing salt upon the grounds leased by the company. However, this proposition seemed unsatisfactory to Governor Letcher because it charged Virginia a larger price than Georgia for the water, and as much as the other states.

The legislature passed an act which gave the governor power to adopt any measures necessary to supply the state with salt. He could not purchase the Saltville works, but he could seize and control the property needed for the production of salt. This act threatened private companies and, of more consequence, those of Virginia's sister states.[16]

On March 30, 1863, the legislature of Virginia passed an act which was designed to supply the state with an adequate supply of salt, computed on the twenty pounds per capita basis then existing. The office of superintendent of the state works was created which paid the large salary of five thousand dollars a year. The office was to be filled by appointment of the assembly. This act was necessary due to the extortion charged against the Stuart, Buchanan Company and the personal greed of individuals connected with the salt works. The superintendent was prohibited from all interests, direct or indirect, in the works. He was responsible to the Board of Public Works who served as a board of supervisors. He was placed in supreme charge of one to two hundred acres, ten furnaces, and equipment, which the state had leased for one year under a contract of March 25. Also, he was empowered to lease or buy such property as was necessary to supply the needed salt to Virginia. To assure transportation for distribution of the salt he was empowered to control the railroads to the point of impressment. Although the act was passed March 30, it was not until June 7 that Virginia took possession of the works.

John N. Clarkson was the newly-appointed superintendent and when he reported to Saltville he found the works in bad condition. "Flues and kettles were out of order, and some furnaces had to be rebuilt."[17]

After finding the arrangement of working in conjunction with Stuart, Buchanan Company impracticable, due to lack of cooperation on the part of said company in furnishing their contracted amount of brine, the state was forced to impressment of the works. "Clarkson, irritated and hampered in his work by the original lessees, had suggested impressment of the Preston well. The company had, undoubtedly, interfered with the efforts of the superintendent to hire teams which had been working for them. In one such instance, when he reluctantly resorted to impressment, he found the lessees urging the parties whose teams he was impressing to litigate his right to do so and promising to stand by with their financial aid."[18] After many incidents of a similar nature the legislature felt obliged to act with more strength. Therefore, on March 8, 1864, a law was passed which directed the superintendent to impress until June 8, 1865, three double furnaces, called the Charles Scott furnaces, which were new. These were of great aid in their new condition, especially when compared to the six leased a year before, which had been worn out and delapidated. Clarkson was also directed to seize the Preston well with all lands, equipment, and appurtenances necessary for the proper working of the furnaces leased by the state, together with all the blocking water furnaces.[19] It should be noted that these preemptions still left the Stuart, Buchanan Company some wells and the means of continuing business.

As I have noted, the works and wells at Saltville were of the utmost importance to the Confederacy and Virginia. Hence, they were of great strategical value to the North. After the loss of the Kanawha salt works in West Virginia there could not have been a more important position. However, during the first years of the war, there was a definite lack of strategy, particularly a lack of what is now termed the modern concept of strategy. It is hard for the author to understand why such a plan did not receive more attention in the earlier years of the war.

The geography of the section played an important role in the type of operations aimed at taking the salt works. As the mountainous nature of the terrain rendered operations of a large army impracticable, numerous invasions by small forces—principally cavalry—were made to destroy the salt works and the railroad. The broken

surface made it difficult to defend and made a larger force of defense necessary than was usually available. The main approaches to the works from the west were through two gaps in the mountain ridge of southeastern Kentucky, the Pound and Louise gaps, through which dashes were possible from Kentucky and Tennessee. A further means of crippling the works was afforded by the single track of the Eastern Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. After the loss of the Kanawha works, the southerners were particularly sensitive to any threat directed at southwestern Virginia, as they fully realized that such movements jeopardized their only remainng large source of salt supply.

There were many threats made against this section by Federal officers and yet it is remarkable that it was never raided until very near the close of the war. Solicitude concerning safety of the Holston Valley seems never to have been absent from the minds of southern leaders. In late 1861, Brigadier-General Marshall was in charge of the region and he expressed his concern over the lack of defenses for this strategic point. The same officer, in February, 1862, declared he had positive information that the enemy was contemplating a movement into Virginia along the line of the mountains.[20]

During 1863, the command, and hence the anxiety for the section, transferred to General Sam Jones who was in command of the Department of West Virginia. More immediately concerned with the area was General Floyd, who was stationed at Dublin, not far from the salt works, in command of the Virginia State Line troops. General Jones was alert to warn General Floyd of projected moves and also offered constructive suggestions for strengthening the defenses. " 'It would be well,' he wrote Floyd on January 29, 1863, 'to have a few defensive works. Block-houses for artillery and infantry would be best, on commanding points near the salt works. The employees of the works could, if organized and armed, use them with good effect in defending the works. But I have no force at present to construct the works. If you will furnish the labor, I will send an engineer officer to locate and superintend the construction of the works.' "[21] Administratively, the defense was not well organized at that time, as the salt works lay directly on the boundary line between two military departments; therefore, those counties through which an attacking army would probably march were not under command of the person responsible for the defense of the works. Jones promised to send 1,200 to 1,500 men to Saltville in less than twenty-four hours, if he were given early notice of the

advance of the enemy, while artillery would be brought up from Jeffersonville in time to help with the defense. In making these plans, Jones differed from other military men in recognizing the importance of the salt works. Following this he showed a great deal of apprehension about impressing the salt hands.

In late July, 1863, Colonel Toland, aiming at the sources of salt and lead, invaded the region and reached Peery Farm near Jeffersonville (now, Tazewell). This raid invoked one of the many incidents of feminine daring and patriotism which were not infrequent during the war. An eighteen year-old girl, Motty Tynes, heard of Toland's approach, and slipping out through a back door so her plan would not be thwarted by an over-cautious family, she saddled her pony and raced off for Wytheville. To make such a journey, she had to cross five mountain ranges, traverse a wild region by night which was infested with wild animals, and make her own path when the bridle path ceased. She spread the alarm as she dashed by and reached Wytheville at dawn so that a defense guard, made up largely of old men and boys, was hastily organized to face and rout Colonel Toland a few days later.[22]

Two somewhat serious efforts were made by the Federals in early May and later in October, 1864, to take the salt works. On May 8, the Confederates learned of the simultaneous advance of two strong Federal columns, one under General Averell, threatening the location with a body of cavalry, and one under General Crook, who was threatening the communication with Richmond by destruction of the all important railroad. General Morgan hastened 400 dismounted men of his command to support Jenkins at Dublin Depot. Meanwhile, Morgan, by virtue of astutely reading his adversary's mind, was able to force Averell back from the attack on the Wytheville lead mines.

Late in September, 1864, Major-General Stephen Burbridge in command of about 5,000 Federal troops entered Virginia by way of Pikeville, Kentucky, proceeded up the Big Sandy, and crossed the mountains into Tazewell County at Richlands. At the same time General Gillem, at the head of a considerable force of troops, was making every effort to enter Virginia from East Tennessee, but the progress of Gillem was greatly retarded by the efforts of General Vaughan, who was in command of a large body of Confederate troops in that section.[23]

It was known that the destination of General Burbridge and General Gillem was the salt works, and the reserves of the surrounding counties (being boys under seventeen and men over forty-five

years of age) were called upon to organize for the purpose of defending their homes. At the same time, General Vaughan with his forces was ordered to Saltville from East Tennessee, where he had, until this time, successfully opposed the advances of General Gillem's Brigade. Four companies were organized from Washington County under the command of Colonel James T. Preston. In addition to these, about seven hundred reserves had gathered at Saltville under the command of Colonel Robert Smith, of Tazewell, Colonel Robert Preston, of Montgomery, and Colonel Kent, of Wythe. Colonel Robert Trigg, of the fifty-fourth Virginia Regiment, being at Saltville at the time, took charge of this force and was actively engaged in organizing it when General A. E. Jackson arrived and took command. He then began to plan the defenses of the place.[24]

General Burbridge had followed the state road from Kentucky into Tazewell County and from Richlands directed his course by Cedar Bluff toward the salt works.

Giltner's Brigade met Burbridge at Cedar Bluff and from that point disputed his advance at every opportunity from the 30th day of September until he had passed Laurel Gap in Clinch Mountain on Saturday, October 1, 1864. This brigade of Confederate troops was composed of probably the best soldiers in the Confederate army and numbered about twelve hundred men. Their Kentucky-born leader was a very adept and able officer, and this combination presented a very stern front to the numerically superior Federal army.

They not only assailed Burbridge's army at every opportunity, but cut trees across the road and placed every obstruction in the way that would retard the Federal advance. It was only owing to far superior numbers that Giltner's Brigade was forced back to let Burbridge pass through the Laurel Gap in the Clinch Mountains. After Laurel Gap the brigade split into two sections and proceeded to Saltville.

Colonel Giltner expected Burbridge's army to march to the salt works that night, and if he had, the capture of the works would have been inevitable. However, Burbridge's army went into camp in the bottom on the south of Laurel Gap and remained until the following morning, Sunday, October 2, 1864.

The Federal forces began their march to Saltville and arrived on the north side of the river between nine and ten a.m. that day. In the meantime, on the morning of the same day, General John S. Williams, of Wheeler's Cavalry, arrived at Saltville with his divsion.

Therefore, the Confederate forces at Saltville were as follows: Colonel H. L. Giltner's Brigade, composed of the Fourth Kentucky, commanded by Colonel Pryor; Tenth Kentucky, commanded by Colonel Edwn Trimble; Johnson's Battalion, Kentucky troops; Clay's Battalion, Kentucky troops; Jenkin's Battalion, Kentucky troops; the sixty-fourth Virginia Regiment, commanded by Colonel A. L. Pridemore; Brigadier-General John S. Williams' Brigade, composed of Robertson's Brigade, commanded by Robertson; Dibrell's Brigade, commanded by General George Dibrell; Ninth Kentucky Cavalry, commanded by Colonel William C. P. Breckenridge; First Kentucky, commanded by Colonel Griffith; the Thirteenth Battalion of Virginia Reserves, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Smith; and Kent's Battalion, commanded by Colonel Kent and Major Hounshell, of Wythe.[25]

The forces at Saltville were under command of General A. E. Jackson until about 9 o'clock on the morning of the day of the battle, when he was succeeded by General Williams, who arrived at that time, and took command of all the forces then at Saltville.

General Williams began his preparations for the battle and arranged his forces as follows: Colonel James T. Preston, with one hundred and twenty reserves, was directed to form a skirmish line along the river and to defend the ford one-half a mile above the lower works.

The line of battle was formed from right to left on the south side of the river, the right wing of the army fronting the residence of Governor Saunders, the forces being arranged in the following order:

To the north of the road and on the extreme left the First Kentucky, Colonel Griffith, and in the order named, to the right, the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel William C. P. Breckenridge, Giltner's Brigade, as follows: Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Pryor; Johnson's Battalion, Colonel Kent, Robertson's Brigade, General Robertson, and Dibrell's Brigade, General George Dibrell—this last brigade forming the extreme right of the army, while the artillery under the command of Captain John W. Barr, was placed on Church Hill, north of the public road near the position occupied by the First Kentucky and in a position that commanded the advance of the enemy.[26]

The Federal forces were partly on the north side of the river and east of Dibrell's Brigade. Such was the position of the opposing forces when an overwhelming force of Federal troops, colored soldiers, assaulted Dibrell's Brigade. This brigade retired to the

west side of Cedar Creek and had every advantage of the attacking forces. A part of Kent's Battalion of Reserves, thinking Dibrell's men were being cowardly, refused to leave their positions and for some time maintained the battle against overwhelming numbers. After some time this force retired to the west side of Cedar Creek, and at this point the battle began in earnest, and in a few moments the colored regiment was repulsed with great numbers killed.

About the time of the attack on Dibrell's Brigade the Federal troops attempted to force the ford at the position occupied by the Tenth Kentucky, and the right wing of General Giltner's Brigade. In this hotly contested area the Federals were able to push the Confederates back a short distance. This was done by a Colonel Hanson,[27] and every field officer of the Tenth Kentucky was killed or wounded at this time.

Colonel Trigg, seeing the situation of Giltner's Brigade, detached two companies from Kent's Battalion, Wythe and Carroll companies, and sent them forward under the command of Colonel Kent to reinforce Colonel Giltner.

The force commanded by Colonel James T. Preston was attacked at about two o'clock by a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under Colonel Charles Hanson, but held their position from two o'clock in the afternoon until dark, with the assistance of about one hundred men from the Tenth Kentucky Regiment. About one-half hour before dark, Colonel Hanson, who commanded the Federal forces, was wounded and thereupon withdrew. The battle lasted from ten o'clock in the morning till sundown of the same day, and resulted in the precipitate retreat that night of General Burbridge by the road he had come, hotly pursued by the Confederate forces.

The forces engaged in this battle were, according to the official report of General Burbridge, four thousand eight hundred picked troops on the Federal side, while not more than three thousand men, including the reserves, were on the Confederate side. Of these the Federal loss in killed and wounded was about three hundred and fifty, the number of prisoners captured is variously estimated at from three to twelve hundred. The Federals left dead upon the field one hundred and four white and one hundred fifty-six Negro. The Confederate loss was eight killed and fifty-one wounded.[28]

Thus, for a time, the hard-fighting reserves and regulars had managed to avert the loss and destruction of Saltville. However, the victory was to be short-lived, for shortly after General Burbridge had returned to Kentucky he united his forces with those of Gen-

erals Stoneman and Gillem. This made an army of at least ten thousand men, and again the march for Southwest Virginia began. Once again the people of the area were warned of the Federal approach, but, this time they were so reduced by the poverty and want that surrounded them and the almost total absence of men able to bear arms, that the march of the Federal forces met with but little resistance. Therefore, on Dec. 24, 1864, the salt works at Saltville were lost and destroyed.

Since, at this time, the fortunes of the Confederacy were on the wane, the importance to the South of the loss of their largest supply of salt is incalculable. Whether retention of this strategically important location would have helped save the faltering Confederacy is doubtful, but had such a loss occurred to a healthy, thriving country, it could have well been a definite step in its fall.

1. Lonn, Ella, *Salt As A Factor In the Confederacy.* (Walter Nealie, New York, 1933), 219.
2. *Ibid.*, 13-14.
3. *Ibid.*, 14.
4. *Ibid.*, 217.
5. *Ibid.*, 19.
6. *Ibid.*, 25.
7. Wilson, Goodridge, *Smyth County History and Traditions,* (Kingsport Press, Inc., Kingsport, Tennessee, 1932), 195.
8. *Ibid.*, 195.
9. *Ibid.*, 335.
10. Lonn, E., 28.
11. *Harpers Weekly,* "Burbridge's Raid On Saltville, Virginia", Jan. 14, 1865, 21.
12. Lonn, E., 56.
13. *Ibid.*, 62.
14. *Ibid.*, 68.
15. *Ibid.*, 78.
16. *Ibid.*, 140.
17. *Ibid.*, 144.
18. *Ibid.*, 144.
19. Author. Blocking was the practice of using the residue left over from normal salt production and making an inferior salt with it.
20. Lonn, E., 195.
21. *Ibid.*, 186.
22. *Ibid.*, 197.
23. Summers, Lewis P., *History of Southwest Virginia, 1746-1786, Washington County, 1777-1870,* (J. L. Hill Printing Co., Richmond, Virginia, 1903), 534.
24. *Ibid.*, 535.
25. *Ibid.*, 537.
26. *Ibid.*, 538.
27. *Ibid.*, 539.
28. *Ibid.*, 540.

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