# Socialism, Nationalism, and the First World War: The Case of Gustave Hervé

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The name Gustave Hervé is mentioned in most general histories of the French Third Republic. Yet it is a name that most often serves as a historical coat hanger, an obvious object over which are draped some of the commonplaces of modern French history. Both Hervé and the antimilitarist movement which he helped bring into prominence and indeed gave his name, Hervéism, are usually alluded to in the examination of the rise and decline of antimilitarist and antipatriotic protest in the decade before the First World War. This examination, whether it focuses upon the attitude of the Second International, the French socialists or the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), includes mention of Hervé, for he played fairly prominent roles in all three organizations. These allusions, however, are usually left as such; superficial and reflexive, they leave the reader, and sometimes the historian, bewildered when faced with Hervé's "transformation" from fervent antipatriot to equally ardent nationalist in 1914.

This transformation should in itself not be surprising: did not nearly all the socialists swear their allegiance to the *Union sacrée* and embrace the *drapeau tricolore* of France rather than the *drapeau rouge* of the International? Hervé's ringing call to arms in the pages of his paper *La Guerre sociale* was echoed not only by the socialist press and every socialist leader, but was also endorsed by the revolutionary syndicalist leadership of the CGT. It may well be that it was the particularly violent character of Hervé's antimilitarism and his shift, widely perceived as sudden and complete, to an equally violent and authoritarian nationalism that has greatly impressed and sometimes misled the historian. Thus L.O. Frossard declared that "one could see that his

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(Hervé's) rabid antipatriotism did not express his true nature, that at heart . . . he was always a petty bourgeois democrat and a chauvinistic Frenchman."[1] Max Nomad is even harsher in denying Hervé's allegiance to socialism, brushing him aside as "an irresponsible half-fanatic and half-mountebank, who enjoyed the plaudits of the ultra-radicals and was ready to suffer imprisonment for the pleasure of posing as a sincere, ultra-revolutionary 'insurrectionist'."[2] Finally, the usually cautious James Joll has described Hervé as a "hysterical schoolmaster who seems to have been taken more seriously by those who did not know him than by those who did."[3]

In light of such summary judgments, it is not astonishing that Hervé's career has largely been neglected by historians. There are but a handful of articles and two unpublished dissertations on Hervé or aspects of his career; and all of them, for varying reasons, fail to address adequately this unusual gap in twentieth century French historiography.[4] This paper will attempt at least partially to fill this gap by arguing that Hervé was neither a mere chauvinist nor insincere revolutionary, that he and his movement were taken as seriously by those who knew him as by those who did not, and that he was never an adherent of petty bourgeois democracy. Indeed, the man who thus described Hervé, L.O. Frossard, also noted that towards the end of his life Hervé considered himself to be "the spiritual father of fascism."[5] This provocative description leads us finally to an aspect of Hervé's career that may contribute to the current wave of research into the origins and evolution of French fascism. The historian Zeev Sternhell has convincingly argued that the key phenomenon of French fascism is the "passage from left to right of elements which are socially advanced, but violently opposed to the liberal order."[6] This is a phenomenon that certainly includes Gustave Hervé—indeed, it could serve as his epitaph—and thus invites the historian to reassess his career and its place among the varieties of fascism.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that Hervé's transformation was neither immediate nor illogical. This *glissement à droite* which Roland Stromberg calls "one of the most remarkable stories of the times"[7] can only be fully understood, and perhaps rendered somewhat less remarkable, by first focusing upon the Hervé who was the herald of antipatriotism and antimilitarism. Therefore, this paper will be primarily devoted to the period 1905–1912 and then shift to a more abrupt exposition of the period 1912–1914, thus seeking the logic in Hervé's political voyage between the poles of the French left and the right.

## I

Prior to 1905 the various French socialist parties, their attention claimed by domestic politics and their own, hesitant groping towards unification, were but indirectly concerned by international affairs.[8] However, from the spring of

1905—the very moment when, under the prodding of the Second International, the section française de l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) was formed—the nations of Europe gathering in Tangier and Agadir, were to be repeatedly buffeted by the winds of war, then gaining force as they swept across the Balkans. Confronted with the harsh truth of Leon Trotsky's statement, "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you," the French socialists began to consider their position on the question of war.

It was at the third annual congress of the SFIO, held at Limoges in 1906, that French socialists first decisively grappled with the prospect of war, as well as the related questions of antimilitarism and antipatriotism. The heated debate on these issues made it clear that the party's recent unification was a fragile creation, still vulnerable to the competing, centrifugal forces within it. The subjects of war and patriotism, peace and internationalism, and socialism's proper attitude towards them, were perhaps especially conducive to exposing the great knot of conflicting beliefs and interpretations of Marxism at the heart of French socialism.

Milorad Drachkovitch has emphasized the great wealth and confusion of discrete socialist currents joined under the banner of the SFIO. He has demonstrated that each of these currents, despite unification, "continued to bear its mark of birth, which gave to the unified socialist party an extreme richness in ideas and tendencies, but at the same time a certain incoherence of doctrine and action."[9] This incoherence is revealed in the three principal attitudes within the party towards the question of war: Guesdism, Hervéism and Jaurèsism. Guesdism, so called after its spokesman, the veteran Marxist Jules Guesde, unswervingly followed the rigid logic of historical change found in orthodox Marxism. Consequently, in the motion he presented at Limoges, Guesde affirmed the traditional interpretation that "war and militarism are natural and necessary effects of capitalism [and] can only disappear with it." Given these origins, he held that the only way to eradicate such blights is "the socialist campaign which is organizing the workers of the world for the destruction of capitalism."[10] Guesde concluded the motion by advocating certain measures against the danger of militarism—e.g., an international agreement on the reduction of military service, simultaneous refusal of military credits to belligerent governments, etc.—the net effect of which "subordinated the specific struggle against war to the larger effort against capitalism itself."[11]

At the other extreme was the motion presented by the Hervéist wing of the party. Impatient with the pedantry and basic passivity of the Guesdists, the Hervéists forcefully advocated the use of the military strike and insurrection in case of war. The Hervéists began their theory of revolutionary praxis where the Guesdists ended theirs—with the credo that "the duty of socialists from every nation is to fight for the institution of a collectivist or communist regime."[12] The declaration of war between nations, argued the Hervéists,

would present the ideal moment for revolutionary insurrection. Although there was a difference of opinion among the Hervéists as to the most effective means for insurrection,[13] the group seemed united on the essential point: the rejection of a "governmental and bourgeois patriotism which mendaciously affirms the existence of a community of interests between all the inhabitants of a single nation."[14] Regardless of which nation might be the agressor, the Hervéists would not only refuse to march, but would seek to overthrow the existing bourgeois institutions of France in the name of international socialism. As Hervé himself declared, "When Marianne has her crisis, we will be there to administer extreme unction."[15]

Situated between the extremes of Guesdism and Hervéism, Jean Jaurès and Edouard Vaillant unceasingly sought to reconcile the two positions. Their motion at Limoges comprised two sections: on the one hand, it hewed to the Guesdist line that militarism and imperialism issued from the heightening competition between capitalist powers; on the other, it rallied to the Hervéist call for the use of every possible means, "from parliamentary demands, public agitation and mass demonstrations to the general strike and insurrection," to halt the march to war.[16]

Clearly, Jaurès' inclusion of the general strike and insurrection in the motion was partly determined by tactical considerations. Although he was himself personally committed to the doctrine, believing in its potentially profound moral effect upon the nation,[17] he was also seeking to placate the Hervéist wing of the young party. As we shall see, Jaurès' repeated attempts to compromise with Hervé and thus maintain party unity would leave both him and the party open to sharp criticism. It will here suffice to observe that the contradictory nature of the Jaurès-Vaillant motion at Limoges was but one sign that Hervéism had an impact greater than its relatively meager number of votes would seem to indicate.[18]

## II

Gustave Hervé's notoriety as a militant socialist, antimilitarist and antipatriot had been well established several years before Limoges. A professor of history at the lycée of Sens (Yonne) at the turn of the century, Hervé at the same time taught at an "open university" for workers and labored tirelessly for the local socialist party in the capacity of both organizer and journalist. In 1900, writing under a pseudonym that he would keep until 1912, *un sans-patrie*, Hervé published an article titled "L' Anniversaire de Wagram" in the local socialist paper, *Travailleur socialiste de l'Yonna*. In a style already bearing his singular pungency and scathing sarcasm, he confessed his revulsion at the local military celebration of Napoleon's victory at Wagram—this "ignoble butchery" which made the battle a "day of sorrow and shame." Rather than a celebration, Hervé concluded, it would have been more fitting if

all the dung and excrement of the barracks had been gathered into a mound in the middle of the camp and thereupon crowned with the flag.[19]

As we shall see, he was to make a belated distinction between the flag of Wagram and that of Valmy, the great, defensive victory of revolutionary France in 1792. It would, however, be a distinction lost in the explosive controversy following the article's appearance; henceforth, Hervé would be known as "the man who planted the flag in the dungheap." As Maurice Dommanget has justly pointed out, the great stir could not have displeased the unknown militant.[20] This journalistic *pétard* ultimately led to Hervé's being charged and tried by the government for slandering the reputation of the army. In response, a banquet was arranged in Hervé's honor and attended by socialist luminaries like Jaurès, Jean Allemane and Francis de Pressensé; and at the trial itself, Hervé was successfully defended by the young socialist firebrand, Aristide Briand.[21]Hervé's foot was thus inside the door of French socialism—a door that he would soon be pulling off at the hinges.

By 1905 Hervé's antimilitarism had blossomed into antipatriotism. This evolution was sparked by his growing distaste for the reformism and parliamentarianism of the socialist party. Its concern over elections and piecemeal gains, in Hervé's eyes, diverted socialism from its original, revolutionary aims: "if Socialism wants to progress and to take firm root in the hearts of the masses, it must not rest content with being exclusively (or even chiefly) an electoral and Parliamentary party."[22] Given the inner logic of antipatriotism, it cannot without difficulty be other than antiparliamentarian: the rejection of one's nation almost invariably damns its political institutions, in this case the parliamentary democracy of republican France. The contrary, however, is not necessarily the case; indeed, antiparliamentarianism was often to lend itself to the most fervent expressions of nationalism. For Gustave Hervé, certainly, antiparliamentarianism would prove far more enduring than antipatriotism.

From 1905 onwards, Hervé's antimilitarist and antipatriotic agitation increased in its violence and intransigency. Yet despite the intensification of its rhetoric, the doctrinal core of what came to be known as Hervéism remained essentially unchanged: at bottom, it was the total repudiation of patriotism. Rather than equating the good of the proletariat with that of the nation, bourgeois and capitalist, Hervéism asserted their contrareity and inherent opposition. Thus, during his trial of 1905, where he was charged with signing and disseminating an antimilitarist poster aimed at army conscripts, Hervé declared that all nations are cruel "step-mothers" to the working class, and that there is "no country so superior to any other, that its working class should get themselves killed in its defense."[23] National boundaries are irrelevant to the needs of the proletariat; indeed, they serve as a yoke to drive the workers to war at times of capitalist crises. Scorning the bourgeois cartography of national allegiances, Hervé concluded that "the world contains

but two nations; that of the favored of fortune, and that of the dispossessed, whatever may be the language which they speak, whatever the land that gave them birth."[24]

Characteristically, Hervé did not flinch before the consequences of his analysis: if and when war is declared, the worker must not only refuse to march, but must also turn his gun against the ruling class. In his first and perhaps best-known antipatriotic tract, *Leur Patrie,* Hervé pounces time and again upon a perceived inconsistency in socialism's simultaneous espousal of traditional patriotism and international proletarian solidarity. Upon the declaration of war, claims Hervé, "Bebel on one side, Jaurès on the other, each with a rifle, will die, one for the German Country, the other for the French Country. To such inconsistencies the internationalism of patriot-socialists leads."[25] Rejecting the possibility of recognizing the true aggressor at the outbreak of war, Hervé dismissed as dangerous folly the formula of the French socialist party, "We will defend our country if it is attacked." For a sincere socialist there can be but one attitude—"whoever be the aggressor, *rather insurrection than war.*"[26] Indeed, given his definition of nation—"a monstrous social inequality, the shameful exploitation of a nation by a privileged class"[27]—Hervé perforce concluded that any war other than civil war was a sham and deception of the proletariat and a betrayal of socialism.

As a consequence, at his 1905 trial Hervé unhesitatingly announced that "in case of an order to mobilize, we would seize the moment to attempt the revolution, to place our hands on the social wealth usurped today by a minority," giving birth to a "socialist mother-country which would be beautiful enough and good enough to warrant our taking arms to defend it whether against invasion or against bourgeois intrigue."[28] Not surprisingly, the jury of local *bien-pensants* was not as enamored as Hervé by such a vision, nor was it noticeably grateful for his expressed wish that "the Revolution, which is gathering, should seize as few victims as possible among you."[29] Hervé was found guilty, thus inaugurating a stormy seven-year period in his life, riddled with repeated trials, convictions and sentences usually abbreviated by government amnesties. It would only be after emerging from prison in 1912, after having served over two years of his final prison sentence that Hervé—despite the title of his first article upon his release, addressed to the government: "*Et je vous dis: Merde!*"[30]—would renounce the validity of a military strike, temporarily come to terms with the Third Republic and forever come to terms with nationalism.

## III

Hervé remarked at his first trial that he himself had not created the antipatriot movement, and that his role was simply "to disseminate certain

ideas and sentiments which I have seen spring up among the proletarian and peasant classes, and of which I am but the doctrinaire, the theoretician."[31] Though theoretician is probably too exalted a term for a purveyor of such a simple, visceral doctrine,[32] Hervé was right to refuse the patent to the notion of a military or general strike in case of war. In 1891, for example, the Dutch socialist Domela Nieuwenhuis had proposed a similar motion at the Second International Congress in Brussels, only to see it suffer the same rejection as would Hervé's at the Congress of Stuttgart in 1907.

The very vigor, obstinacy and polemical violence with which Hervé pursued his aims at Stuttgart, however, forced the issue of war and the International's response to it onto center stage. In his speech to the congress, the Belgian socialist leader Emile Vandervelde acknowledged that Hervé, by his unflagging agitation, "had rendered a great service to the French proletariat that was being dragged into *patriotiardisme*."[33] What Vandervelde did not explicitly acknowledge—that Hervé's clamorous antimilitarist campaign had also pushed the International itself to re-examine the issue—was not only acknowledged but scathingly criticized by August Bebel. The veteran leader of the German Socialist Party complained that Hervé's agitation had forced the unnecessary re-appearance of an issue that had justly been condemned at Brussels as utopian and impractical and took Jaurès and Vaillant to task for not having disciplined their excitable colleague.[34]

Clearly, Jaurès' long tolerance for Hervé and his refusal to expel the thorny militant from the party provided the latter with a major platform for his agitation. The principal repercussion of Hervé's continued presence within the SFIO, despite Jaurès' reasoned criticism of his extremism, was that the party itself was tainted as antipatriotic in the all-too-credulous eyes of the public. As the socialist Albert Thomas lamented in 1913, "The Socialist Party remains for everyone the party of disarmament, of insurrection and treason."[35]

This inherent ambiguity within the party was the most clearly seen, and the most piercingly criticized, by the erstwhile friend and admirer of both Jaurès and Hervé, Charles Péguy. Although his ultimate aim in *Notre Jeunesse* was to trace the tarnished, betrayed legacy of the Dreyfus Affair, Péguy lingered for several pages on Jaurès' relationship to Hervé. The "mortally dangerous" aspect to Hervé and Hervéism, he held, was not Hervé alone but Jaurès himself, without whose towering stature in the movement, the impact of Hervé would have been negligible. The former's constant capitulation "not only fills Hervé with pride, but quite genuinely clothes him with moral, political and social authority . . . without Jaurès, Hervé would be nothing. Through . . . Jaurès, he has become authorized, become as if a member, and secretly to many perhaps the most feared, of the republican government."[36]

Georges Suarez, the biographer of Aristide Briand, offers a very different view of the relationship. Standing Péguy's observations on their head, Suarez

suggests that without Hervé, Jaurès would not have had so firm a grasp on the public's imagination: "Hervé knew the crowd's tender spot. He spoke its language and transformed its yearnings into hunger. Without him, the formidable voice of Jaurès would have passed over the heads of many."[37]

Although Suarez clearly underestimates Jaurès' hold on the masses, his observation helps underscore the fact that Hervé, by his combativeness and plain speaking, won Jaurès admirers from among the peasantry and proletariat. Thus, one contemporary remarked that Hervé was "well-liked among workers for his bonhommie and his violence;"[38] and the anarchist Jean Goldsky, while lamenting Hervé's eventual "treason," reminisced that he "was our youth, an ardent youth rich in confidence, disinterest, valor and illusions . . . we loved him as a leader and as a friend . . . we believed him to be an apostle."[39]

At the level of political organization and agitation, Hervé played a significant role in broadcasting the revolutionary syndicalism of the CGT. Labor leaders like Victor Griffuelhes, Léon Jouhaux, Emile Pouget and Georges Yvetot were, of course, long committed to the tool (and *not* the Sorelian myth) of the general strike and the repudiation of bourgeois democracy. Indeed, once accepting the premise that the concept of the *patrie* was intimately bound to the ownership of private property, a syndicalist like Griffuelhes could plausibly claim that "as he owned no property, the whole moral system of the nation was meaningless for him."[40] In 1906, at its Congress of Amiens, the CGT finally institutionalized these notions in their official adoption of the principles of antimilitarism and antipatriotism as forms of propaganda. It was now a question of founding "proletarian internationalism on the negation of the national idea, [a concept] empty of content for the workers."[41]

Given the limited readership of the syndicalist newspapers, the decision by the CGT to propagandize on these themes might appear gratuitous. It is here that Hervé's direction of *La Guerre sociale* becomes markedly important: by 1908, according to Jacques Julliard, Hervé and his colleagues at the paper could be "justly considered as the *maîtres à penser* and inspirers of the Confederation."[42] Although *La Guerre sociale* never attained mass distribution, its sales were nevertheless respectable: in 1910, the year when Hervé entered prison for the last time, some 60,000 copies of the paper were distributed weekly, a circulation several times that of Pouget's *La voix du peuple* (or, for that matter, Charles Maurras's *L'Action française*).[43] Pierre Albert, in his comprehensive study of the French press during the Third Republic, states that *La Guerre sociale*'s "style and violence won for it a fairly strong general audience;"[44] and a second historian of the press, Raymond Manevy, affirms that Hervé's "clarity of style, simplicity of reasoning and scorn of conventions attracted admiring [idolâtres] partisans."[45]

In sum, Hervé's antipatriot agitation in the pages of *La Guerre sociale* as

well as from the public rostrum pushed the socialists leftwards to such a degree that Eugen Weber has spoken of "a progressive Hervéization of the Socialist party," which in turn drove many republicans and Radicals even further to the right.[46] He concludes that patriotism, thus aided by the antimilitarist and antipatriotic excesses of Hervéism, "became fashionable once more and success brought more success."[47] The gulf between Hervé and a typical republican seemed as wide as that between any two contraries; it would require a world war to bring out the hidden ambiguities and temporarily draw the two poles together.

## IV

As has often been pointed out, the underlying tension that courses through the history of French socialism derives from the "double heritage" of the French Revolution. On the one hand, the Revolution bequeathed the sentiment of cosmopolitanism, the belief in the universality of values and man's nature, and the notion that there ultimately is but one nation, humanity. On the other hand, from the nation endangered and the victory of Valmy in 1792 sprang the torrent of revolutionary patriotism—the belief in France as the unique fount of liberty, freedom and civilization. For French socialism, the legacy of the Revolution is the confluence of these two currents; as Drachkovitch states, "the defense of France was not only that of a geographical entity, but at the same time the defense of the cradle of liberty, the home of the *lumières* and the land of 'immortal principles'."[48] Love of the *patrie,* in short, had become fused to an abiding revolutionary faith in progress and universal freedom.

This faith in the popular basis to the Republic and the consequent belief in the people's need to defend it against attack—"The French people," declared Robespierre, "must support the weight of the world; they must be among the nations as Hercules was among the heroes"[49]—found perhaps its most striking expression in Auguste Blanqui and his role in the Paris Commune. This great revolutionary, incarcerated for the better part of his life for subversive activity, founded his newspaper *La Patrie en danger* just three days after the fall of Sedan and the collapse of the Second Empire. In articles aflame with revolutionary patriotic ardor, Blanqui sought to spur on the nation against the invader and excoriated those "republicans" who would welcome surrender. In one characteristic passage, Blanqui declared that "our fathers of 1792 . . . were heroic. They saved the Fatherland, crushed the coalition of monarchs. Shall we, with resources they never had, perish under the Prussian jackboot. . . ?"[50]

Nevertheless, the simpler view of Blanqui as the arch internationalist and intransigent revolutionary still prevailed among the French socialists. It

was with some irony and unwitting foresight, therefore, that in 1912 (while Hervé was still serving his final jail sentence for antimilitarist activity) the *Encyclopédie socialiste* published a full-page photograph of the antipatriot (not even Jaurès received such an honor) and referred to him as "the Blanqui of the Third Republic."[51] In 1912, the one obvious parallel between the two men was that neither was much given to political theorizing: men of action, *enragés* who did not flinch before the power of the state, Blanqui and Hervé gained their renown through their deeds and revolutionary theater. For the editors of the *Encyclopédie,* the resemblance between the two men resided in their revolutionary ardor and martyrdom, their personal austerity and unwavering sense of socialist mission. The resemblance, however, seems to end where the revolutionary patriotism of the old Blanqui begins. Henri Lefebvre's assertion that "outside of any political program, Blanqui and his disciples distinguish themselves by a burning, brilliant patriotism,"[52] ill fits the Gustave Hervé of this period. It would only be upon his release from prison and his subsequent *rectification de tir* that he would prove, in a quite unanticipated way, the appositeness of the *Encyclopédie*'s claim and push his way into the first row of Blanqui's disciples.

## V

In the preface to his collection of articles written during the first months of the war, and given the title of Blanqui's Communard newspaper, *La Patrie en danger,* Hervé states: "I would be happy if, in the pages that follow, they [the old Communards] found something of the patriotic, republican and socialist flame of their old Blanqui."[53] Rather than viewing this declaration as a mere *volte-face* or the betrayal of a mountebank, it would be more profitable to consider it the product of crucial ambiguities not only in the French revolutionary tradition, but also in the notions of antimilitarism and antipatriotism—ambiguities embodied no less in the person of Hervé than that of the French proletariat.

The polemical violence of antipatriotism, as well as its frequent confusion with antimilitarism, has perhaps blinded both contemporaries and subsequent historians to their internal inconsistencies and weaknesses.[54] First, we noted that the CGT had, in 1906, officially embraced the tenets of antimilitarism and antipatriotism. This embrace, however, was neither totally disinterested nor based upon abstract principles; rather, it was the product of the tragic experience of striking workers. In an era before the deployment of significant police forces, it was the army that republican governments wielded as the bludgeon to shatter strikes. The rationale for the CGT's antimilitarism was rooted in this experience *vécue:* it sought to parry the blows of the

government by trying to convince an army of conscripts that their guns were aimed at their own brethren.

Far less clear-cut, however, was the rank-and-file's attitude towards the doctrine of antipatriotism. F.F. Ridley suggests that a "vociferous minority" only, led by Georges Yvetot and Hervé, truly adhered to the revolutionary import of such a doctrine, whereas the great majority did not necessarily equate antipatriotism with hatred for republican France.[55] In this context, antipatriotism was but a weak corollary to antimilitarism, itself being primarily the reaction to the bloody clashes between striking workers and soldiers. Jean-Jacques Becker echoes this view, observing that in "the complex pair formed by antimilitarism and antipatriotism, the former was deeply felt whereas the latter was much more artificial."[56]

At first glance, nothing seems less ambiguous than Hervé's stance. Labeled the "Déroulède of antipatriotism"[57] by his opponents, considered an apostle by his supporters, sentenced to a total of twelve years of prison for his antipatriot and antimilitarist agitation, Gustave Hervé's words and deeds seem bereft of shading or inner tension. Nevertheless, contradictions did exist behind this seemingly smooth façade. For example, the flame of Blanquist patriotism briefly flared during his speech to the 1902 congress of the *Parti socialiste français* at Tours. Accepting the crucial distinction between the imperialist "patriotism" of the government and the defensive nationalism of the socialists (thus paralleling the earlier distinction between the flags of Valmy and Wagram), Hervé declared that "in case of aggression from any country the socialists would participate in the defense of the Republic."[58] More significantly, at Stuttgart in 1907, after he had already entered his period of antipatriotism, he once again revealed the spirit of Blanquism. Angered by the conservatism of the German socialists, and provoked by their evasiveness on the subject of an international military strike and insurrection in case of war, Hervé exclaimed impatiently,

> When war breaks out, go! Flock to your emperor's flag! But wait! If you march against France you will be received with gunfire by our insurrectionary communes over which you will see waving the red flag of our International that you will have betrayed.[59]

Hervé's uneasy position astride the double heritage of the French Revolution is further manifested in his views on colonial policy. The position of *La Guerre sociale* was, at least until 1912, passionately anticolonialist; unlike many socialists, Hervé and his newspaper staff rejected out of hand the validity of the *mission civilatrice* of France. Indeed, from 1906 to 1912, his anticolonialism was unique on the French left: it was deeply arabophile and maintained a proletarian internationalism and solidarity with the colonized peoples of North Africa.[60] Yet in his very advocacy of the victims of French

colonialism, Hervé ran afoul of the contradictions within the doctrine of antipatriotism. Thus, in his violent critique of France's imperialist venture in Morocco, he justified the Moroccans' defense of their land by pointing out that they "have done what the French Republic, in its schools, teaches its children to do, if the necessity should arise, *if the sacred ground of the nation were invaded* [emphasis mine]."[61] In a word, Hervé defended in Morocco what he considered indefensible in France by employing the same logic that he had previously condemned as illogical when asserted by patriotic socialists. (And the paradox becomes greater when one notices that he signed the above article with his pseudonym, *un sanspatrie.*) In attempting to resolve this dilemma, Hervé argued that the idea of the nation was a "necessary stage" in the evolution of humanity—a stage that France had already passed, but one that Morocco had yet to reach.[62] Clearly, Hervé here is guilty of the same Marxist casuistry employed by the German socialists and Guesdists that Hervé himself never tired of belaboring.

Soon after his release from prison in 1912, Hervé delivered a speech at the Salle Wagram in Paris. Before a large audience of anarchists, syndicalists and militant socialists, Hervé not only renounced the feasibility of the military strike, but also disowned the titles of antipatriot and *sanspatrie.* Hervé declared to his stunned listeners that it is the socialists, and not the jingoists (*patriotards*) "who are the real patriots, in the sense in which our fathers of '93 understood that word."[63] This apparent renunciation of the good fight against the Republic sparked a minor riot among Hervé's legion of erstwhile admirers, and the following day's issue of *La Guerre sociale* carried the headline "General Hervé at the Battle of Wagram."[64] Hervé had clearly kept his sense of humor; but had he also kept his sense of principles?

## VI

Soon after his Salle Wagram speech, Hervé wrote "when I reach down into my soul and when I compare what I thought in 1901 as compared to what I think today about all the important questions, I am convinced that it is not I who have changed but the circumstances."[65] There is a good deal more truth to this statement than many of Hervé's contemporaries or subsequent historians have tended to believe. In the critical years 1912–1914, Hervé came to the recognition that internationalism, ostensibly based upon the class bonds of the European proletariat, was more fictitious than real. He perceived what the socialist and union leaders did not, or, for fear of alarming the rank-and-file, would not: the fatal fragility of organized international socialism when struck by the winds of nationalism and war. According to Hervé, it was while he was serving his final prison sentence and followed the events of the Agadir crisis that "he understood that war was inevitable, that it would

explode before the German socialists could react . . . that it was imperative to disown the 'struggle of the classes' socialism of the Germans and return to the revolutionary patriotism of old French socialism."[66]

For Hervé, the force of circumstances demanded a reorientation, the famous *rectification de tir* which, during the final several months before the outbreak of war, led to the faintly ironic situation where the socialist leadership clung ever more tenaciously to the threat of a general strike in case of the declaration of hostilities, while Hervé argued ever more urgently that such a threat had become as dangerous as it was hollow. Disabused by the inability of the French and German socialists to agree on a specific plan or response to a general mobilization for war by either government, Hervé asserted that proletarian internationalism was a chimera, pungently observing that "there was no greater a will to insurrection than there was hair on Caillaux's skull."[67] It was thus with a clear conscience that Hervé wrote that the French socialists, true guardians of the revolutionary flame who had done their best to prevent the cataclysm, nevertheless remained "the last resort and the ultimate safeguard of the endangered nation."[68] On the eve of the war (July 31), Hervé published an article titled "La Patrie en danger." He notes that the socialists, who had long struggled against the awful eventuality of war, were nevertheless now thrown "at the head of runaway horses dragging all of Europe towards the vortex; we have been trampled under foot as the chariot of war pursues its mad journey to the abyss." Convinced that the choice is no longer in the hands of the socialists, Hervé concluded with the clarion call: "Socialist, syndicalist, anarchist friends: you who are not only the idealist *avant-garde* of humanity, but who are also the nerves and conscience of the French army, *la patrie est en danger.*"[69]

## VII

In 1916, the French psychologist Gustave Le Bon wrote that "among the pacifist illusions the most rapidly exposed by the blinding light of the war [was] the conception dear to all socialists since Karl Marx that it is not the *patrie,* but sameness of condition that constitutes the bond between men."[70] It is, of course, hazardous to generalize about a subject as mined with exceptions and lack of evidence as the French public's response, or responses, to the call to arms in August, 1914. Still, patriotic fervor seemed the order of the day and most historians have chosen to emphasize that the successful mobilizations of the belligerent countries represent the ascendancy of the idea of the nation over that of class in the mind of the worker.

The great groundswell of patriotism during this period lent credence to Hervé's warning in *Leur Patrie* that, as long as the proletarian "persists in cherishing a sentimental preference for the country where chance caused him

to be born . . . so long will it be impossible to obtain from the proletariat the revolutionary resolutions which alone can put an end to international wars."[71] Given the clarity and realism of this assessment, differing from the conservative Le Bon's only in its hope for the re-education of the proletariat, Hervé's "transformation" begins to appear in a new light. Hervé had recognized, by the summer of 1914, that his "cure" of antipatriotism had clearly failed to prevent a European war and advance socialism. There was now no choice but to pursue the latter goal by the active prosecution of the former. In other words, the future of a socialist and unified Europe now depended upon republican France. As Hervé declared, the international socialists were now duty-bound to "defend the home of liberty that our fathers, the revolutionaries of 1789, 1792, 1848, and of 1870 and the Commune, created at the price of such great effort and so much blood."[72]

In the accounts of Hervé's rallying to the *drapeau tricolore,* the perspective is generally so foreshortened that the change from militant international socialist to equally militant chauvinist appears instantaneous and total. This, however, was not the case. The examination of his editorials written in *La Guerre sociale* during the first several months of the war reveals that, far from jettisoning his socialist ideals, Hervé flaunted them in support of his rallying to the war and the *Union sacrée.* Indeed, it is essential to emphasize along with Jean-Jacques Becker and Annie Kriegel that the sole and imperative *raison d'être* of the *Union sacrée* was national defense.[73] Beyond this common ground, the union and the war became all things to all Frenchmen; what they meant for the present and held for the future were subject to as many interpretations as there were hues of political opinion. Thus, whereas the conservative Catholic Albert de Mun saw the hand of a francophile God in the unfolding of events and Charles Maurras interpreted the conflict as the forces of Order (classical France) pitted against those of Chaos (romantic Germany), Hervé viewed the war as the unfortunate continuation by other means of a quest for a more just and egalitarian Europe. Clearly, his vision was no less messianistic than de Mun's or apocalyptic than Maurras's—but it nonetheless remained a socialist, egalitarian and humane vision.

Hervé's abiding and sincere commitment to socialism during the early days of the war appears in many different contexts. It fueled a chronic sniping, for example, between Hervé and the Catholic right. While the former willingly accepted the right to pray and invoke divine intercession on behalf of France, he heatedly rejected the suggestion that freethinkers are consequently less patriotic: "What you call God, why do you forbid us to call Right and Justice?"[74] Similarly, Hervé finds a moral in the story of a wounded *poilu* who, upon his release from a hospital under the care of nuns, laughingly remarked to an inquiring friend "They put religious trinkets everywhere, up to my fly."[75] Hervé's warning that de Mun and Barrès should not exploit the war by doing

the same, in a figurative sense, to the entire nation brought a tart response from the latter in the *Echo de Paris*. In his reply, Hervé not only mocked Barrès's academic prose, tauntingly reaffirmed his miscreant ways and identified himself with the fellow Breton and freethinker, Ernest Renan, but concluded with the vow that the present "wave of republican idealism and patriotism will be followed, after the war, by a wave of social justice."[76]

Equally sharp battles occurred between Hervé and the nationalist right, most noticeably over the nature of the German enemy. Hervé time and again drew a clear distinction between the German people and the ruling class (*le Kaiser, son kronprinz de fils et les junkers*) when apportioning blame for the war. To Paul Bourget's claim that it was not merely Prussian militarism that France struggles against, but "an entire race whose appetite is irreconcilable with our existence," Hervé mockingly assented: "For the love of the good God, exterminate them!"[77] More significantly, he published an article on September 13 titled "On the Death of a German Friend." Having received the "sad news" that the German socialist deputy Franck had been killed on the battlefield, Hervé affirmed that "the French nationalistic passion has not blackened (*souillé*) our hearts with an imbecilic hatred against the German people who have so many solid virtues, despite all their faults."[78] Although—or, perhaps, because—he concluded with his belief in the inevitability of French victory, Hervé proudly unfurled the red flag of the International, which he would like to drape over Franck's grave as proof that "despite the storm, [the flag] remains for us the symbol of all our hopes for humanity and the emblem of tomorrow's universal fraternity."[79]

These professions of universal fraternity made Hervé a stalwart defender of minorities living in France, be they foreigners caught behind the lines by the sudden onset of war or French citizens of foreign extraction. During this period of rabid French nationalism, Hervé courageously lashed out at the looting of supposedly German-owned stores, the tendency to consider every individual of German or East European extraction a spy, and the forced removal of Polish and German nationals to the far corners of France in the name of security. Indeed, Hervé's unwavering defense of foreigners on French soil soon prompted a characteristic retort in the pages of *L'Action française*, accusing him of being

> inopportune when he devotes his journal to pleading the cause of foreigners living here. Certainly, we hardly intend to harass these aliens [*métèques*], from whom the danger that we had proclaimed has been recognized rather late. . . . But we must not push this sentiment to the point where we forget the vital precautions which are presently imposed upon France.[80]

The men of *L'Action française* undoubtedly found this "sentiment" especially repugnant when applied to French and foreign Jews. Yet Hervé was unique on the French left in his celebration and respect for Jewish history,

beliefs and ideals. He repeatedly demanded justice for the Russian Jewish community waiting for the tsar's bestowal of civil and political rights, cited passages from "the holy books of the admirable Jewish people, so great despite its misfortunes and faults"[81] and ridiculed the *bouffeur de Juifs* by invoking the sight of five thousand foreign Jews enrolling as volunteers in the French army: although "scorned, spurned by the antisemitic rabble . . . they know that France is the land which proclaimed the Rights of Man and they have come to fight for her!"[82]

Hervé goes so far as to publicly lecture the Grand Rabbin of Paris for the neglect and scorn shown towards the Syrian and Palestinian Jews on French soil not only by the French administration, but also by the native French Jewish community:

> It does not escape me, *monsieur le grand rabbin,* that many French Jews, from fear of annoying M. Edouard Drumont, are almost ashamed to display their Jewish origin. . . . Because they are safe from persecutions and programs, they jeer at the Jews who wish to build in Palestine a Jewish fatherland where they would be secure from harassment and massacres.[83]

Some weeks later, Hervé registered his wish that those Jews who were not yet assimilated in the great democratic nations "realize, with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Zionist dream and that the Jewish nation, remaining so hardy [*vivace*] despite twenty centuries of persecution, be resurrected on the land of its forefathers!"[84]

## VIII

Even such a hasty examination as this of Hervé's early war writings has amply revealed a spirit of independence and combative humanitarianism, as well as a continuing, if fading, vision of a socialist future. In a profession where truth is almost always the first casualty, Hervé's wartime journalism distinguished itself by a sense of realism and humaneness that merits more than Jean-Jacques Becker's faint praise that *La Guerre sociale* was one of the only papers to show some reservations on its colleagues' excesses.[85]

These excesses, one might add, did not include bravery. The wave of panic that broke over Paris in September during the German army's advance, carried most of the journalists south to Bordeaux. But Hervé held fast: "Do I need to say that *La Guerre sociale* remains at its combat post? That other papers are moving is their business." After giving his assurance to the military and political officials of all the support the "reds" can muster, Hervé concluded with a flourish worthy of a disciple of Blanqui: "As long as the tricolored flag floats over Paris—excuse this unfaithfulness, o red flag of the

International—*La Guerre sociale* will remain at its combat post to toll, 'We've only just begun to fight!'"[86]

Yet the analogy to 1870 and Blanqui can be taken only so far. The events of 1914 laid bare the insufficiency of an ideology that, half a century before, was still in its promising and magnificent infancy. The clash of symbols in Hervé's articles—the *drapeau rouge* vs. the *drapeau tricolore,* the *Marseillaise* vs. the *Internationale*—betrays a decided ambivalence, in the late summer light of 1914, between the demands of international socialism and nationalism. In this context, Hervé's advocacy of a Jewish homeland is perhaps a sign of the growing ascendancy in his thought of nationalism over socialism, of the nation over the class. Implicit in his support of Zionism is the realization that social justice can be accomplished only within the body of the nation and not through supranational, class-based organizations. In short, the progressive vision that had once inspired Hervé's belief that "internationalism is nothing other than the instinctive or conscious aspiration of the modern world towards political forms superior to the contemporary nation"[87] became obsolete in the trenches and barbed wire of the very modern First World War.

For Gustave Hervé, in the inherently unstable coexistence of socialism and nationalism, it was the latter that would ultimately take precedence. In 1919 he called for the creation of a National Socialist Party which would shed the hollow proletarian internationalism of "imported" German socialism and insist that French workers

> before loving the German workers who, as one man invaded and bathed Belgium and France in blood in August, 1914, must love Frenchmen of all classes and conditions . . . as of now, the words of Karl Marx: 'The proletarians have no fatherland' . . . has [*sic*] become a ridiculous anachronism.[88]

Such words, in the context of all that we have recorded in this study, prove that Hervé's transformation was neither illogical nor whimsical nor a betrayal, but instead a course of action dictated by the logic of events and the limits of his own socialist past. And as for his own "fascist" future, the next task is to study the consequences of this change, its similarities and differences from fellow "transfuges" of the left and if one can, as Zeev Sternhell asserts, "write the history of fascism as an unceasing attempt at Marxist revisionism."[89]

## ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Harvey Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaurès* (Madison, 1962), p. 564, n.2.

2. Max Nomad, "The Anarchist Tradition," in Milorad Drachkovitch, ed., *The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943* (Stanford, 1966), p. 82.

3. James Joll, *The Second International* (New York, 1966), p. 113.

4. Maurice Rotstein, "The Public Life of Gustave Hervé" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York Univ., 1956); Michael Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot: A Study of the Young Gustave Hervé, 1871-1905" (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1972); Maurice Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et l'affaire du drapeau dans le fumier," *Revolution prolètarienne* (1955), pp. 22-24; Michel Baumont, "Gustave Hervé et la *Guerre sociale* pendant l'été 1914," *Information historique* (1968), pp. 155-63.

The work of Rotstein is dated and vague on the actual import of Hervé's authoritarian years and its role among the varieties of French fascisms. Scher's dissertation fills the gaps left (and acknowledged) by Rotstein. However, the work sins through excess: it is doubtful whether the first third of Hervé's life merits over 700 pages. More importantly, the dissertation ends at the very point where Hervé's political and journalistic career begins. The article by Dommanget is a brief but incisive look at the notorious affair of "the flag in the dungheap." Baumont's examination of Hervé's articles from July 1 to November 1, 1914, is a sympathetic corrective to the stereotype of Hervé as a chauvinistic drumbeater. There is also a succint entry on Hervé (by Jean Raymond and Madeleine Rebérioux) in the *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français* (Paris, 1975), Jean Maitron, ed. The article, however, does not follow Hervé beyond W.W.I and his estrangement from the Socialist party.

5. Quoted in Milorad Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre 1870-1914* (Geneva, 1953), p. 92.

6. Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire: Les origines françaises du fascisme 1895-1914* (Paris, 1978), p. 405.

7. Roland Stromberg, *Redemption by War* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1982), p. 125.

8. Jack D. Ellis, *The French Socialists and the Problem of the Peace, 1904-1914* (Chicago, 1967), p. 6.

9. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes*, p. 28.

10. Quoted in Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste* (tome 1 of the *Encyclopédie socialiste*, A. Compère-Morel, ed. Paris, 1912), p. 263.

11. Goldberg, *Jaurès*, p. 379.

12. Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste*, p. 264.

13. Hervé favored immediate seizure of the army camps, and once armed, undertaking the revolution. The peasants of Yonne instead favored the simple refusal to mobilize, and once the regular army was occupied at the front line, starting the revolution. See Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes*, p. 90.

14. Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste*, p. 264.

15. Quoted in Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*, p. 327.

16. Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste*, pp. 261-2.

17. Goldberg, *Jaurès*, p. 383.

18. The Hervéist motion gained only 31 votes, as compared to 98 for Guesde's and 153 for the Jaurès-Vaillant motion. For the full texts of each motion, see Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste*, pp. 261-72.

19. For large extracts of article, see Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et l'affaire du drapeau," pp. 22-24.

20. Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et l'affaire du drapeau," p. 23.

21. Georges Suarez, in his biography of Briand, sketches a patronizing portrait of Hervé explaining the article to Briand: "One can imagine the subtle, ironic expression that Briand's features must have reflected. . . . This thankless and haphazard association with the Sans-Patrie, imposed by party discipline, was neither in his line nor his style. . . . Nevertheless, there was something of the innocent . . . in his client that attracted him." *Briand: sa vie, son oeuvre* (Paris, 1938), tome 1, pp. 357-8.

22. Gustave Hervé, *My Country, Right or Wrong*, trans. Guy Bowman (London, 1910), p.

22. The original French edition *Leur Patrie* cannot be obtained in the United States; the sole listing is at the University of Virginia, but the copy has for all intents and purposes disappeared in the bowels of the university library. The English translation, however, is noteworthy for its preface by E. Belfort Bax, the co-founder with William Morris of the Socialist League and a hagiographic introduction by the translator, which concludes with the suggestion that an anti-patriotic paper similar to Hervé's be established in England.

23. "Antipatriotism: Address of Gustave Hervé at the Close of his Trial for Anti-Militarist Activity," Solon De Leon, trans., in *European Socialism and the Problems of War and Militarism*, Mark Weitz, ed. (New York, 1972), p. IV.

24. Hervé, "Antipatriotism," pp. 16-17.

25. Hervé, *My Country*, pp. 130-1.

26. Hervé, *My Country*, p. 134.

27. Hervé, *My Country*, p. 30.

28. Hervé, "Antipatriotism," p. 21.

29. Hervé, "Antipatriotism," p. 27.

30. Rotstein, *Public Life of Hervé*, p. 103.

31. Hervé, "Antipatriotism," p. 8.

32. Hervé had elsewhere described Hervéism as simply "the brutal, violent, deliberately cutting protest against the criminals who, in the name of patriotism, risked sparking a European war." Quoted in Annie Kriegel and J.-J. Becker, *1914: La Guerre et le mouvement ouvrier français* (Paris, 1964), p. 9.

33. Quoted in Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes*, p. 327. In his *Souvenirs d'un militant socialiste* (Paris, 1939), Vandervelde acknowledges that the dominant topic at Stuttgart was "the problem of peace and war," yet diminished the role played by Hervé, describing him as "totally isolated from everyone else," p. 163.

34. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes*, pp. 324-5.

35. Quoted in Jean-Jacques Becker, *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre* (Paris, 1977), p. 102.

36. Charles Péguy, "Notre Jeunesse," in *Oeuvres en prose 1909-1914* (Paris, 1961), pp. 605-6. See also his *Par ce demiclair matin* (Paris, 1952), pp. 261-285.

37. Suarez, *Briand*, p. 351.

38. J.-J. Becker, *1914: Comment les Français*, p. 91.

39. Ibid., p. 406.

40. Quoted in F.F. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 137.

41. Jacques Julliard, "La CGT devant la guerre (1900-1914)," *Le Mouvement social* (1964), p. 49.

42. Julliard, "Le CGT," p. 51.

43. The circulation of *La voix du peuple* was 8,500: *L'Action française*, 4,000. See Pierre Albert, "La Presse française de 1871 à 1940," in Claude Bellanger, *et al., Histoire générale de la presse française* (Paris, 1972), tome III, p. 296.

44. Bellanger, *et al., Histoire générale*, p. 378.

45. Raymond Manevy, *Histoire de la presse, 1914-1939* (Paris, 1945), p. 52. In an anecdote, Manevy relates how Hervé, upon finishing an editorial, would call over the office boy to read it. If the boy stumbled over a word or phrase, Hervé would immediately alter it until the boy could read it through without halting.

46. Eugen Weber, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905-1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), p. 38.

47. Weber, *Nationalist Revival*, p. 156.

48. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes*, pp. 33-4.

49. Quoted in Marc Bouloiseau, *La République jacobine* (Paris, 1972), p. 47.

50. Quoted in Roger D. Thomas, "The Debate on the National Question in the Paris Commune," in Eric Cahm and Vladimir Fisera, eds., *Socialism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (Nottingham, 1979), p. 17.

51. Hubert-Rouger, *La France socialiste,* pp. 152-3.

52. Henri Lefebvre, *La Proclamation de la Commune* (Paris, 1965), pp. 58-9.

53. Gustave Hervé, *La Patrie en danger* (Paris, 1915), p. 7.

54. Georges Dumoulin, a syndicalist and contemporary of Hervé, reminisced that "our antimilitarist propaganda, more blustering than real, deceived us. . . . We were deluded while nourishing our egos at boisterous congresses with puffed up and conceited motions. We believed that the masses behind us were as revolutionary as Yvetot." Quoted in Becker, *1914: Comment les Français,* p. 87.

55. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism,* p. 135.

56. Becker, *1914: Comment les Français,* p. 98.

57. Suarez, *Briand,* p. 355.

58. Quoted in Rotstein, *Public Life of Hervé,* p. 26.

59. Rotstein, *Public Life of Hervé,* p. 66.

60. Madeleine Rebérioux, "La Guerre sociale et *Le Mouvement Socialiste* faca au problème colonial," *Le Mouvement Social* (1964), p. 96.

61. Quoted in John Schwarzmantel, "Nationalism and the French Working Class Movement, 1905-1914," in Cahm and Fisera, *Socialism and Nationalism,* p. 73.

62. Rebérioux, "La Guerre sociale," p. 74.

63. Quoted in Schwarzmantel, "Nationalism and French Working Class," p. 74.

64. Quoted in Rotstein, *Public Life of Hervé,* p. 109.

65. Quoted in Scher, *Antipatriot as Patriot,* p. 572.

66. Gustave Hervé, *La Grande Guerre au jour le jour,* (Paris, 1917) tome 1, pp. IV-V.

67. Quoted in Becker, *1914: Comment les Français,* p. 92.

68. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger* (Paris, 1915), p. 35.

69. Ibid., pp. 36-7.

70. Gustave Le Bon, *Premières conséquences de la guerre* (Paris, 1916), p. 15.

71. Hervé, *My Country,* p. 135.

72. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 26.

73. Kriegel and Becker, *1914,* p. 145 ff.

74. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 165.

75. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 227.

76. Hervé, *La Grande guerre,* p. 156.

77. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 226.

78. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 173.

79. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 174.

80. Quoted in Kriegel and Becker, *1914,* p. 165.

81. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* pp. 70-1.

82. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 111.

83. Hervé, *La Grande guerre,* p. 250.

84. Hervé, *La Grande guerre,* p. 346.

85. Jean-Jacques Becker, *Les Français dans la grande guerre* (Paris, 1980), p. 43.

86. Hervé, *La Patrie en danger,* p. 147.

87. Gustave Hervé, *L'Internationalisme* (Paris, 1910), p. 5.

88. Quoted in Rotstein, *Public Life of Hervé,* p. 150.

89. Zeev Sternhell, *Ni Droite, ni Gauche: L'Idéologie fasciste en France* (Paris, 1983), p. 34.