

The Messenger to Garibaldi: Henry S. Sanford and the Offer of a Union Command to Giuseppe Garibaldi

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As the last echoes of McDowell's troops fleeing the field at Bull Run resounded in Washington, President Lincoln made the decision to offer a command in the Union army to Giuseppe Garibaldi. The President and Secretary of State William H. Seward chose Henry Shelton Sanford, the United States Minister Resident to Belgium, as their envoy to the old Italian hero. Rumors were rife regarding Garibaldi's possible recruitment even before Sanford was dispatched, but the furor that arose concerning the Belgian Minister's activities in Italy served to embarrass the United States greatly in the important theater of European public opinion. Interpreting the United States' offer as an admission of the lack of native military leadership, many Europeans reinforced their initial impressions that the North could not force reunion. The resultant clamor proved very disconcerting to the ambitious young Sanford and also served as another lesson for Seward in his rocky first year as Secretary of State.¹

J. W. Quiggle, an obscure American Consul at Antwerp, initiated the proceedings which Charles Francis Adams later described as a "strange medley of blunders."² Henry T. Tuckerman had published an appreciation of Garibaldi in *The North American Review* in January, 1861. In writing to thank Tuckerman, Augusto Vecchi, a trusted comrade of the General, suggested that the conqueror of the Two Sicilies might be induced to aid the Union efforts.³ Rumors to this effect, which soon began to circulate in both United States and European newspapers, prompted Quiggle to write Garibaldi to inquire of their validity. Quiggle assured Garibaldi that if he traveled to America, his name would surpass that of Lafayette and tens of thousands of Americans would rush to

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join his command. Garibaldi replied that if the United States Government deemed his services useful, he would go to America, provided that his presence was not required in Italy. Significantly, Garibaldi closed by asking if "this agitation" were aimed at "the emancipation of the Negroes or not?" Quiggle promptly forwarded his correspondence with Garibaldi to Secretary of State Seward on June 8, 1861.⁴

Lincoln and Seward quickly grasped the opportunity of luring the famed Italian to America. The President and his Secretary of State no doubt acted with an eye toward the recent disaster at Bull Run, but they were probably motivated more by the impact that Garibaldi's presence in the Northern ranks would have on American public opinion and military morale. By 1861, Garibaldi was easily one of the world's most celebrated figures. On arrival in the United States in 1850 for a nine-month stay, he had been warmly greeted as the "Modern Hannibal of Italy."⁵ The conquest of the Two Sicilies in 1860 further intensified American admiration for the dashing soldier. Numerous Independence Day celebrations in 1860 contained impassioned praise for the "Washington of Italy," and his famed red-shirted legions were widely recognized symbols of freedom.⁶ Newly forming regiments in the Union army were proudly adopting the name "Garibaldi's Guards."⁷

On July 27, 1861, Seward wrote confidentially to Henry Sanford with directions to put himself "at once in relations with the celebrated warrior for liberty." He was to tell Garibaldi that his services were "warmly desired and requested" and to proffer him the grade of major-general. Seward further instructed Sanford to work in conjunction with George Perkins Marsh, American Minister to Italy, and he enclosed a letter for Quiggle commending the Consul's actions.⁸

Although not optimistic about the project, which one of his friends in the State Department aptly labeled a "wild goose chase," Sanford immediately set about fulfilling Seward's directives.⁹ He first wrote Marsh on August 13, 1861, informing him of Seward's instructions and requesting him to secure any information that might enhance their possibilities of success.¹⁰ He then sent for Quiggle on August 14, gave him his

letter from Seward, and showed him Seward's dispatch of July 27. Sanford urged the importance of secrecy upon Quiggle, whom he later described as "a low besotted Pennsylvania politician with an eye to money-making and political capital." Quiggle pledged himself to secrecy, but Sanford remained apprehensive lest the Consul break the project to the papers.¹¹

While it is unlikely that Quiggle was the source, newspapers in the United States soon seized on the dramatic invitation to Garibaldi. On August 14, the very day Sanford and Quiggle met, the New York *Tribune* reported that Garibaldi had offered his services to the Union and that the government had reciprocated by tendering him the rank of major-general.¹² American papers continued to follow the affair with great interest into early October. As news of Sanford's efforts became known throughout Europe, the *Tribune* could announce on September 24 that Sanford had indeed visited the famed Italian; by October 2, Greeley's paper was certain that Garibaldi had spurned the Union offer.¹³ Throughout this journalistic coverage, officials in Washington remained mute, divulging no official word of Sanford's mission.

Quiggle did, however, commit a very serious indiscretion. As Sanford traveled to Turin by way of Paris, Quiggle anticipated his arrival with another letter to Garibaldi. Quiggle announced that Sanford was en route with dispatches offering to Garibaldi "the highest army commission which it is in the power of the President to confer."¹⁴ Not realizing that this "highest army commission" was in fact the rank of major-general, the Italian hero wrongly assumed that Sanford was empowered to tender him the supreme command of the Union army.¹⁵ This misunderstanding did much to prejudice Sanford's efforts in Italy.

Upon his arrival in Turin on August 20, 1861, Sanford consulted with Marsh and then elected to dispatch a messenger to Garibaldi with a confidential letter asking if the General would entertain an invitation to serve in the United States. With Marsh's counsel, Sanford judged that, since the Roman question was nearing settlement, Garibaldi would soon be summoned to help restore order in Southern Italy. It was, there-

fore, improbable that he would consider going to America. By sending a messenger, Sanford hoped to avoid any adverse publicity which could result from his receiving the expected refusal in person. Unfortunately, Joseph Artomi, the messenger entrusted with Sanford's letter to Garibaldi, further compounded the confusion surrounding the nature of the American offer. When confronted by the illustrious soldier, Artomi became flustered and told Garibaldi that Lincoln unquestionably wished to make him commander-in-chief.¹⁶

Garibaldi cleverly employed the offer of the United States as a device to force his Roman policy on King Victor Emmanuel II. Garibaldi did not believe Italy would be truly united until Rome and Venice had been incorporated, and he advocated an immediate march on Rome. The more prudent King sought to consolidate recent victories and did not wish to challenge Napoleon III, now posing as the protector of the Church. After his victory in the Two Sicilies in 1860, Garibaldi had retired to his rocky isle of Caprera to "await the happy word which summons me once more to the fields of battle"¹⁷—a word which never came. The American invitation provided the popular hero the opportunity to threaten leaving Italy if the King failed to comply with his wishes.¹⁸

Garibaldi commenced his power play on September 3, 1861, by sending Caspare Trecchi¹⁹ to the King with a letter and verbal instructions to obtain an answer within twenty-four hours. Garibaldi wrote Victor Emmanuel that the United States had offered him the command of its armies. Did the King need him in Italy or should he go to America? Well aware of Garibaldi's tremendous popularity, the King consulted his cabinet and carefully considered his response. His answer, which was delayed until September 6, rejected Garibaldi's Roman policy and gave him permission to go to America.²⁰

Sanford learned of the King's answer from Colonel Trecchi, who was certain Garibaldi would now quit Italy for America. In the face of the King's rebuff, Sanford considered acceptance of the offer as Garibaldi's only means of salvaging his self-respect. From his discussions with Trecchi, he had already come to fear that negotiations with the general might falter

over the rank to be proffered. Sanford and Marsh concluded that no time should be lost in contacting Garibaldi to clarify any misconceptions he might harbor.²¹

On September 7, 1861, Sanford went from Turin to Genoa and, under an assumed name, chartered a small steamer to Caprera, Garibaldi's island retreat. He disembarked on the rugged windswept island the next day. After a mile walk over a rough, rocky path under the hot Mediterranean sun, he reached Garibaldi's humble stone cottage. Here he first met the famous Italian. The latter hardly presented the appearance of the potential savior of the Union cause. While Garibaldi was able to leave his room for the first time in four months, Sanford believed his "severe rheumatism still rendered him very much an invalid."²²

As evening approached, the General and his American visitor initiated their negotiations. Garibaldi quickly squelched any possibilities of an agreement by demanding far more than Sanford, or even Lincoln, had the power or the inclination to offer. Garibaldi, having been misled by both Quiggle and Artomi, revealed that he would not enter the Union army at any rank lower than commander-in-chief. He further requested the option of emancipating all the slaves at his discretion. As Sanford reported to Seward, the "Ex-Dictator of the Two Sicilies" had bid quite "high."²³

Sanford responded that he could only offer the rank of major-general with the command of a large army corps. This was the highest the President could constitutionally confer. After Garibaldi ruled this unacceptable, Sanford suggested that the General and his entourage might wish to make a trip to the United States, where he could make a final decision after having become fully acquainted with the American situation. Garibaldi did not decline this so peremptorily, but the next morning again returned a negative reply. Since he had not addressed any "formal or official demand of, or proposition" to Garibaldi, Sanford rather disingenuously believed he had been able to prevent the United States from appearing to have sought aid abroad and had its offers rebuffed.²⁴

Unfortunately, this was not to be the case. Despite all his efforts at secrecy, the general outlines of Sanford's activities

soon became known throughout Europe. The Italian press's first notice of the offer on August 30, 1861 was actually taken from the New York *Herald*. Sanford's fears that it was "but a foretaste of what we've to undergo"²⁵ proved only too real. Alarmed at the possibility of their hero's quitting Italy, Garibaldi's friends let out the details in early September in an effort to arouse opposition among the general public. A vehement protest immediately arose from Italy's liberal press, and petitions circulated throughout the country urging the General to remain in his native land.²⁶

The publicity accorded the affair soon spread to France and England in a somewhat garbled form and was relished by those hostile to the Northern cause. In Paris the imperialist journals reported that the United States had tendered Garibaldi the post of commander-in-chief, but that he had declined. John Bigelow, United States Consul General in Paris, observed that this was "regarded as a confession of military incompetence that has done us incalculable damage." Such an impression was especially harmful in France "where military capacity is the highest standard of merit."²⁷

The London journals assigned a similar significance to Sanford's ill-fated efforts.²⁸ In a cutting article, the London *Times* of September 17, 1861 declared:

As if despairing of native genius or enterprise, the President at Washington has actually sent to ask Garibaldi to accept the post of Commander-in-Chief, throwing into the bargain the emancipation of the slaves.

This, the *Times* concluded, could only be interpreted as a sign of "American degeneracy" and a "confession of failure."²⁹

Although vexed by these attacks, Sanford elected to issue no public explanation or disclaimer. This he felt should be done only by the "two principal parties in the transaction . . . Seward and Garibaldi."³⁰ Sanford reached this conclusion after conferring with Nelson Beckwith, his old friend and confidant.³¹ Beckwith advised and Sanford concurred that any contradiction of stories such as that in the *Times* would necessitate extensive and embarrassing explanations. Both

men doubted the *Times* would publish a correction if it were prepared, and they feared the British press would cast any such endeavor in an even worse light. Sanford chose instead to verbally deny the validity of such newspaper reports both on the basis of their erroneous claims concerning the rank proffered and on his less justifiable belief that technically he had not made any official offer to Garibaldi.³²

William L. Dayton, the United States Minister to France, further disturbed Sanford by compromising his efforts at public silence. Like John Bigelow, Dayton was appalled by the abuse heaped upon the United States by the European press. He first talked with Beckwith who told him "the straight story" of Sanford's activities.³³ He then contracted the services of James Mortimer, a New York *Herald* correspondent, and wrote George P. Marsh asking him to give Mortimer the details of the affair. Marsh denied that Garibaldi had been offered the supreme command and referred Dayton and Mortimer to Sanford if they desired further detailed information. Without contacting Sanford as Marsh had suggested, Dayton gave the denial written by Mortimer to the Paris press. Sanford was very annoyed with Dayton, whose abilities he considered limited, and he complained to Seward of Dayton's failure to consult him on the matter.³⁴

Rumors of Sanford's mission and the offer of a command to Garibaldi were being published in American papers even before Sanford reached Italy, and after his arrival, Garibaldi's friends undermined all efforts at discretion. Yet, a number of observers felt that the responsibility for the mission's wide publicity and ultimate failure rested with Sanford. Consul Quiggle charged him with having divulged his mission at Turin and with having made himself more obtrusive by chartering the private steamer to Caprera. If secrecy had been maintained and the popular reaction to Garibaldi's proposed departure avoided, Quiggle was confident that Garibaldi would have been "on his way to the United States."³⁵ Charles Francis Adams indicted Sanford for summoning Quiggle to Brussels and allowing him to see the relevant instructions. According to Adams, Sanford thereby lost exclusive control of the project and enabled Quiggle to write his misleading letter to Gari-

baldi.³⁶ Benjamin Moran, Adams's vitriolic secretary, criticized Sanford most harshly. He attributed the publicity to the Minister's "meddlesome impertinence" and dismissed him as a "forward twaddle."³⁷

The reactions to Sanford's activities were not, however, unanimously adverse. Marsh, with whom Sanford had worked in his futile efforts, was very favorably impressed by the energetic American envoy. On September 4, 1861, before Sanford had gone to Caprera, Marsh wrote Seward that:

. . . continued intercourse with Mr. Sanford impresses me more and more favorably with respect to his character as a man and as a diplomatic agent. His experience and regular training in the different grades of diplomatic life have given him much readiness and efficiency in negotiation and his fine natural and acquired qualities have fitted him to be eminently useful in his present or in higher positions of delicacy and confidence.³⁸

Nor did Marsh change his opinion after Sanford's abortive journey to Garibaldi's rocky isle. He ascribed the failure not to any "error or indiscretion" on Sanford's part, but rather to the fact that the Italian hero was only prepared to accept terms which Sanford was not authorized to convey.³⁹ The most important official reaction—that of Secretary Seward—was also favorable. After considering the reports of both Sanford and Marsh, he wrote Sanford that his execution of the mission had been "in all respects considerate and proper."⁴⁰

Regardless of their conception of Sanford's performance, all responsible observers concluded that the United States was fortunate in having failed to lure Garibaldi to America. Sanford regarded Garibaldi as incapable of the cooperative action so necessary to successful military operations; both his past career and present position demonstrated that he must be "all or nothing."⁴¹ Marsh, who had harbored apprehensions from the first concerning "this worse than *old woman* scheme," felt a command for Garibaldi would have aroused debilitating jealousy among American officers and created serious prob-

lems because of Garibaldi's attitude toward emancipation.⁴² In Paris, Dayton and Bigelow agreed with these assessments. One observer felt Dayton dismissed the entire project as an "impulsive Sewardism" and was relieved that it had miscarried.⁴³ Bigelow considered Garibaldi a most "impracticable" man who would have proven a much more "formidable foe to our army than the Secessionists."⁴⁴ In London, Minister Adams also perceived Garibaldi's refusal as a "lucky escape," since Union officers could only have considered his recruitment a "lasting discredit to themselves."⁴⁵

Many in the United States were also having second thoughts. On October 4, 1861, the New York *Herald*, which had so loudly trumpeted the General's coming only a few weeks before, sounded a far different note. Although he had been a great success in Europe, Garibaldi's prospects for a comparable achievement in the New World were negligible since he simply did not "understand the Americans and their motives."⁴⁶ Seward, despite expressing regret at Garibaldi's decision, also seems to have reconsidered the advisability of importing the famous Italian. The Secretary implied as much in a letter to Marsh, and as Charles Tansill observes, his ability to maintain such "perfect equanimity" when confronted with his project's dismal failure indicates he was not overly disappointed.⁴⁷ That Seward's outlook had changed is demonstrated by his much cooler handling in 1862 of Garibaldi's renewed offer to come to the United States.⁴⁸

The entire episode soon faded from public and official interest in both the United States and Europe when the infinitely more serious Trent affair burst onto the scene. It had caused the United States, Secretary Seward, and envoy Sanford considerable embarrassment and had served to confirm the views of pro-Southern groups in Europe that were ever-watchful for the slightest hint of Northern weakness. Some, like Adams and Moran, took the occasion to criticize Sanford's abilities, but in fact the secrecy of his mission had been badly prejudiced from the beginning and was totally betrayed by Garibaldi's associates in a manner he could hardly have prevented. He also had the misfortune to be caught in the middle of Garibaldi's attempt to use the American offer to force his Roman

policy upon King Victor Emmanuel II. Sanford did err in communicating his instruction to Quiggle and thus helped to foster Garibaldi's belief that he was to receive the supreme command. However, even if this misunderstanding had not occurred, the General's demands regarding emancipation would have presented an insurmountable obstacle to an acceptable agreement.⁴⁹ Garibaldi's ambitions centered on the capture of Rome, not Richmond, and he sought to use the American offer as a device for gaining this end. Even if he sincerely considered coming to the United States, it is very doubtful that he was either physically or temperamentally prepared to have aided materially the Union cause. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this bizarre, ill-conceived project was foredoomed to failure from the start—and that from the Union perspective, this result was fortunate.

NOTES

1. This is by no means the first examination of this curious episode. The earliest treatment was that of H. Nelson Gay in "Lincoln's Offer of a Command to Garibaldi: Light on a Disputed Point of History," *Century Magazine*, LXXV (1907), 63-74. Gay, an avid student of the Italian *Risorgimento*, published all the relevant official correspondence. His study lauds Garibaldi, never questions the General's sincerity or motivation, and offers little analysis. In "A Secret Chapter in Civil War History," *Thought: Fordham University Quarterly*, XV (1940), 215-224, Charles Tansill presents a well-written, concise account but furnishes no new information other than the highly dubious conclusion that Garibaldi might well have proved himself useful as a Northern commander. In 1943, Howard R. Marraro published "Lincoln's Offer of a Command to Garibaldi: Further Light on a Disputed Point of History," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XXXVI (1943), 237-270. Marraro adds little further light other than some very useful American newspaper reactions. My approach differs from that of these authors in that I focus much more on the activities of Henry Sanford than on those of the famous Italian General. In addition, I have been able to make use of the private papers of Henry Shelton Sanford, William Henry Seward, George Perkins Marsh, and William Lewis Dayton—none of which were available to the above authors. These papers afford a much more intimate view both from Sanford's perspective and from that of the other principal American participants and observers in Europe. The most recent work on this topic is R. J. Amundson's "Sanford and Garibaldi," *Civil War History: A Journal of the Middle Period*, XIV (1968), 40-45. Amundson also uses the Sanford and Seward

collections, but in so doing, he failed to locate a number of useful letters touching on the subject (particularly in the Sanford Papers). He also failed to acknowledge the work of previous historians. The present article differs from Amundson's in that I have attempted to give some attention to the reactions in the European and the American press, to consider the opinions and observations of other American diplomats, and to evaluate Sanford's effectiveness in his role as envoy and his subsequent behavior in the face of the adverse publicity showered on his mission.

2. Charles Francis Adams, Diary, Sept. 20, 1861, Adams Family Papers, microfilm copy, Reel 76. This entry was published by Charles Francis Adams, Jr. as "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, 3d Ser., I (1908), 321.

3. Gay, "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi," 66. Vecchi was Garibaldi's "oldest and best friend." See George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (London, 1911), 262.

4. J. W. Quiggle to William H. Seward, July 5, 1861, Department of State, Consular Dispatches, Antwerp, V, Dispatch #20, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Enclosed in this dispatch were: Quiggle to Garibaldi, June 8, 1861, and Garibaldi to Quiggle, June 27, 1861.

5. New York *Herald*, July 31, 1850. For the details of Garibaldi's reception see New York *Tribune* and New York *Herald*, July 26-August 8, 1850, and Howard R. Marraro, *American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861* (New York, 1932), 166-169. For details on the General's activities in New York, where he worked as a candlemaker, see George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (London, 1909), 14-16.

6. Marraro, "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi: Further Light," 237; Jay Monaghan, *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers: Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1945), 133. In 1860, the celebrated Italian was also the subject of one of the widely distributed Beadle publications. See Orville James Victor, *The Life of Joseph Garibaldi: The Liberator of Italy* (New York: Beadle and Co., 1860).

7. New York *Tribune*, June 2, 1861.

8. Seward to Sanford, July 27, 1861, Dept. of State, Diplomatic Instructions, Belgium, I, 129, National Archives; Sanford to Seward, August 16, 1861, William Henry Seward Papers, University of Rochester.

9. For the quote see W. Hunter to Sanford, July 29, 1861, Henry Shelton Sanford Papers, box 122, folder 7, General Sanford Memorial Library, Sanford, Fla. Hereafter cited as Sanford Papers, 122/7. Sanford to George P. Marsh, Aug. 13, 1861, George Perkins Marsh Papers, University of Vermont.

10. Sanford to Marsh, Aug. 13, 1861, Marsh Papers; Marsh to Sanford, Aug. 19, 1861, Sanford Papers, 128/1.

11. Sanford to Seward, Aug. 14, 1861, Dept. of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Belgium, V, Dispatch #18, National Archives; quoted in

Sanford to Seward, Aug. 16, 1861, Seward Papers; Quiggle to Seward, Aug. 15, 1861, Dept. of State, Consular Dispatches, Antwerp, V, Dispatch #21.

12. New York *Tribune*, Aug. 14, 1861.

13. New York *Tribune*, Aug. 14, Sept. 23, 24, 26, Oct. 2, 1861; Marsh to Sanford, Aug. 30, 1861, Sanford Papers, 128/1.

14. Quiggle to Garibaldi, Aug. 5, 1861, enclosed in Quiggle to Seward, Aug. 15, 1861, Dept. of State, Consular Dispatches, Antwerp, V, Dispatch #21.

15. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 12, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V, unnumbered dispatch. Hereafter any of Sanford's dispatches for which a number is not indicated should be read as unnumbered personal reports.

16. Joseph Artomi to Sanford, Aug. 21, Sept. 3, 1861, Sanford to Artomi, Aug. 30, 1861, Sanford Papers, 139/1; Sanford to Seward, Aug. 21, 1861, Seward Papers; Sanford to Seward, Aug. 29, Sept. 18, 1861, Sanford to Garibaldi, Aug. 26, 1861 (enclosed with Sanford to Seward, Aug. 29, 1861), Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V. Joseph Artomi, an Italian-American, was Marsh's Secretary of Legation.

17. Garibaldi to Camillo Benso Cavour, May 18, 1861, quoted in William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Times of Cavour* (Boston, 1911), II, 483.

18. For Garibaldi's designs on Rome see Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, 281, 284.

19. Trecchi, like Vecchi, was a devoted Garibaldian, but he was also Victor Emmanuel's aide-de-camp and served as the regular medium of communication between Garibaldi and the King. See Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, 116.

20. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 4, 7, 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V; Nelson Beckwith to Sanford, Sept. 1, 9, 1861, Sanford Papers, 115/4; John Bigelow, *Retrospections of an Active Life* (New York, 1909-1913), I, 372.

21. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 7, 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V; Sanford to Marsh, Sept. 7, 1861, Marsh Papers; Sanford to Garibaldi, Sept. 18, 1861, draft in Sanford Papers, 139/1.

22. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 12, 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V. References to the island's appearance are taken from Artomi to Sanford, Sept. 3, 1861, Sanford Papers, 139/1, and Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand*, 32-33.

23. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 12, 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V.

24. *Ibid.*; Sanford to Marsh, Sept. 12, 1861, Marsh Papers.

25. Sanford to Marsh, Aug. 30, 1861, Marsh Papers.

26. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 12, 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V; New York *Tribune*, Oct. 9, 1861; Gay, "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi," 71.

27. Quoted in John Bigelow to Seward, Sept. 23, 1861, Seward Papers. For the reaction of the French press see William L. Dayton to F. Sum-

ner, Sept. 21, 1861, William Lewis Dayton Papers, Princeton University, and W. Reed West, *Contemporary French Opinion of the American Civil War* (Baltimore, 1924), 34.

28. Charles Francis Adams, Diary, Sept. 20, 1861, and Sarah Agnes Wallace and Frances Gillespie, eds., *The Journal of Benjamin Moran* (Chicago, 1948), II, 881-882, entry for Sept. 20, 1861.

29. This article in the *London Times*, Sept. 17, 1861, was republished in the *New York Tribune*, Oct. 4, 1861.

30. Sanford to Marsh, Oct., 1861, Marsh Papers.

31. Nelson M. Beckwith was an American living in Paris. A staunch Unionist, he associated closely with both Sanford and John Bigelow. See Margaret Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow* (Boston, 1947), 168-179.

32. Beckwith to Sanford, Sept. 17, 22, 1861, Sanford Papers, 115/4; Sanford to Seward, Sept. 21, 1861, Seward Papers; Sanford to Seward, Sept. 27, Oct. 1, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V. It is interesting to compare the consistent similarity and sometimes identical wording of Beckwith's letters to Sanford with Sanford's subsequent dispatches to Seward.

33. Beckwith to Sanford, Sept. 16, 1861, Sanford Papers, 115/4.

34. Marsh to Sanford, Sept. 23, 26, Oct. 3, 1861, Sanford Papers, 128/1; Sanford to Marsh, Oct., 1861, Marsh Papers; Sanford to Seward, Oct. 1, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V.

35. Quiggle to Seward, Sept. 30, 1861, Dept. of State, Consular Dispatches, Antwerp, V.

36. Charles Francis Adams, Diary, Sept. 20, 1861. Adams disliked Sanford and considered him to be a "poaching, second class" diplomat because of his secret service activity in England. See Charles Francis Adams, *Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865* (New York, 1911), 366.

37. Wallace and Gillespie, eds., *The Journal of Benjamin Moran*, II, 881-882, Sept. 20, 1861. Moran shared Adams's views, but his criticism, which eventually fell on nearly every public man in both the North and the South, was especially violent of Sanford.

38. Marsh to Seward, Sept. 4, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Italy, X, unnumbered dispatch.

39. Marsh to Seward, Sept. 14, 1861, *ibid.*, Dispatch #19.

40. Seward to Sanford, Oct. 11, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Instructions, Belgium, I, 136. Seward also wrote a praise-filled letter to Consul Quiggle thanking him for his services and complimenting his discretion. This tends to indicate that Seward was not greatly disturbed that Garibaldi had refused. See Tansill, "A Secret Chapter in Civil War History," 224.

41. Sanford to Seward, Sept. 18, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Dispatches, Belgium, V; Sanford to Seward, Sept. 21, 1861, Seward Papers.

42. Marsh to Sanford, Sept. 7, 1861, Sanford Papers, 128/1; Marsh to Seward, Sept. 14, 1861, Dept. of State Dipl. Dispatches, Italy, X,

Dispatch #19; quote in David Lowenthal, *George Perkins Marsh* (New York, 1958), 227.

43. Beckwith to Sanford, Sept. 16, 1861, Sanford Papers, 115/4.

44. Bigelow to Seward, Sept. 23, 1861, Seward Papers.

45. Charles Francis Adams, Diary, Sept. 20, 1861.

46. Quoted in Marraro, "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi: Further Light," 243.

47. Seward to Sanford, Oct. 11, 1861, Dept. of State, Dipl. Instructions, Belgium, I, 136; Seward to Marsh, Oct. 10, 1861, *ibid.*, Italy, I, 137; Marsh to Sanford, Oct. 31, 1861, Sanford Papers, 128/1. The observation concerning Seward's "equanimity" is in Tansill, "A Secret Chapter in Civil War History," 224. See also above note 40. Tansill is much less perceptive in his conclusion that Garibaldi would have aided materially the Union cause. The conclusion of J. G. Randall and Richard N. Current, *Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure* (New York, 1955), 79, is much more sound; they essentially agree with the more pessimistic observations I have cited above.

48. Gay, "Lincoln's Offer to Garibaldi," 71-73; Mary Philip Trauth, *Italo-American Diplomatic Relations, 1861-1882* (Washington, 1958), 23-26.

49. This in fact proved to be the case in 1862. See *ibid.*