The Background of the Anti-Zionist Campaign of 1967-1968 in Poland

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The nationalities problem in Poland has a rich and complex history. The partitions of the eighteenth century not only did not reduce it, but made it even more acute. The rebirth of Poland in 1918 witnessed the rise of Polish nationalistic sentiments which found their outlets in discriminatory attitudes, policies, and even violence directed against the minorities. As a result of this situation, the Polish Government was compelled by the Allied and Associated Powers to sign the Minority Treaty at Versailles on June 28, 1919. This step was of great significance considering the fact that the minorities in Poland constituted about one-third of the population. The second largest among them was the Jewish one.[1]

The Jews were not only one of the largest minorities; they were also those against whom most of the injustices and violence were directed. The Constitution of March 17, 1921, affirmed the equal rights of minorities, but the Sejm did not abolish any of the old anti-Jewish laws. The result was that the local authorities did not respect the Constitution and mobs felt encouraged enough to use violence against the Jews. Apparently, the Polish Government was not prepared and did not want to implement the Minority Treaty forced upon Poland. In fact, in 1934 the Polish Government renounced it.[2] It seems rather clear that the authorities favored the idea of evacuating Jews from Poland. This even led in 1938 to the sending of an official mission to Madagascar with the aim to explore the possibilities of Jewish settlement there.[3]

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The dark side of Jewish life in the inter-war period is actually a problem which has been discussed over and over again by both journalists and scholars. To see this period in proper perspective, however, it is necessary to remember that the Polish Jews, whose number by 1931 exceeded three million, were able to create in Poland the world's most important center of Yiddish culture, as well as to develop their own communal and religious organizations, their own youth movement, press, theater, even political parties, the greatest of which had their own representatives in the Sejm. These developments contributed largely to an increased sense of national consciousness among Jews in Poland. In 1931 eighty-seven percent gave either Yiddish or Hebrew as their mother tongue (in 1921 the percentage was lower—74.2 percent).[4]

The Second World War was the gloomiest period in the history of Polish Jewry. Various sources give different amounts for the number of Polish Jews who managed to survive under the German occupation,[5] but it is safe to assume that the number was about fifty thousand. Soon, however, due to the arrival of repatriates from the Soviet Union, Rumania, Germany, Austria, Italy, and other countries, the Jewish population in Poland increased several times. According to the estimates of the old Ministry of Public Administration, by July, 1946, it reached 243,000.[6]

The post-war agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam brought about a considerable change in the ethnic composition of Poland's population. The loss of the eastern territories to the Soviet Union and the gain of the western territories, accompanied by the mass deportations of the Germans living there, gave Poland a quite homogeneous ethnic composition. This fact, supplemented by the forced and painful introduction of Soviet rule in Poland, had a serious bearing on the nationalities question.

The Communist authorities were aware of the fact that religious and racial prejudice did not disappear with the political and social transformations in the country. As a direct response to the internal difficulties in this respect as well as to criticisms in the West, the Declaration of the Sejm in Regard to the Realization of the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens was

passed on February 22, 1947. It granted to all citizens, regardless of their nationality, race, and religious affiliation, equality before the law, as well as freedom of conscience and religious faith. These guarantees were strengthened by Articles 69 and 70 of the Polish Constitution of July 22, 1952, which stressed the right of all citizens, regardless of their nationality, race, and faith, to participate on an equal basis in the administrative, political, economic, social, and cultural life of the Polish state. In addition, the Constitution forbade spreading religious and racial hatred.[7]

As a result of the above laws, separate "national" sociocultural associations of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, Belorussian, Jewish, Czech and Slovak, Russian, German, and Lithuanian origins were allowed to exist in Poland.[8] Polish law also officially recognized and permitted fourteen religions.[9]

In the 1950's the requirement to specify religion in registration questionnaires and passports was abolished,[10] but "nationality" still had to be given. Officially there was no law specifying the choice of nationality; thus, theoretically, everyone in Poland had a free choice. For example, a Jew of Russian birth might list his nationality or origin as either Russian or Jewish. But there was also no law which could prevent him from specifying his nationality as Ukrainian, Belorussian, or even Japanese. In practice, however, the authorities did not take seriously any specified nationality if they were convinced —rightly or wrongly—that a certain person was of Jewish origin. Thus, during the anti-Zionist campaign of 1967-1968 many people were dismissed from jobs or expelled from the Party, or both, no matter what nationality they had chosen earlier. And the Jews who wanted to emigrate received permissions only after specifying their Jewish nationality in emigration questionnaires, regardless of the choice they had made before. This obviously contradicts the statement made in 1946 by General Aleksander Zawadzki, then a member of the Politburo and administrative chief in Silesia-Dabrowa province, who said that the aim of the Polish Government in regard to the nationalities question was the Polonization of minorities to create a Polish national state, not a nationalities state.[11] The practical meaning of this statement has been demon-

strated by the policies toward the Jewish minority, among others.

I

Traditional Anti-Semitism Versus Stalinist Policies, 1944-1955

For many Jews difficulties arose when Communist rule was introduced in Poland. Returning Jews, as well as those who survived the German occupation, were quite often subjected to violent attacks or threats. In 1945 alone, 352 Jews were murdered.[12] A considerable number of Poles, apart from the pre-war tradition of prejudice based mainly on ethnical, religious, or economic factors, viewed the Jews as collaborators with the Russians and thus traitors to Poland, or as those who simply wanted their properties back,[13] or both.

The Jewish population was attacked and threatened not only by underground fascist bands or civilians, but quite often also by the soldiers of the Polish Army and the members of the Citizens' Militia, which had been established by the authorities to keep order. This was best exemplified by the terrible assault which took place on July 4, 1946, when forty-one Jews were murdered in Kielce. The authorities knew about the plans for this pogrom, but the secret police, the militia, and the local Party Committee did nothing to prevent the killings.[14] Strangely enough, neither the Party leadership nor the Government took strong enough measures to prevent further massacres.[15] A correspondent of *The New York Times* described the atmosphere in Poland after this tragedy had happened:

> News of the pogrom at Kielce may have shocked the outside world. Inside Poland, as far as can be seen, there was hardly a ripple of surprise.[16]

It seems that many Jews could see the causes of this abnormal situation and to quite a few of them emigration seemed to be the only possible solution.[17] Their alleged co-religionists in the political leadership [18] had been either assimilated, or

were afraid to be accused of supporting Jewish nationalism.[19] As Communists, they were internationalists who opposed sympathy with any nationality as such. This problem is well illustrated by the case of Wladyslaw Gomulka. His fall in 1948 was officially explained and publicized as the result of the struggle with nationalist tendencies in the political leadership. Significantly, a few weeks after the official criticism against Gomulka had been expressed, at a conference of the Party's Jewish section, several Jewish Communists were charged with "the characteristic Jewish nuance of the general right-nationalist deviation apparent in the Party leadership." [20]

Evidently, the reluctance on the part of the Jews occupying important positions in the Party and administration to engage in the process of improving the conditions of the Jewish population was not the only and certainly not the most important thing. There were several other very important aspects of the whole situation. First of all, the Jews found many obstacles to economic adjustment. The employment rate for Jews was comparatively low during the first years after the war, especially if we take into consideration the fact that old people and children constituted a very small percentage of the Jewish population.[21] The Central Jewish Committee, operating in Poland since 1944, established in 1946 a special "productivization" department, the principal aims of which were to train the Jews in new professions and to find jobs for them. Soon after, the Council of Ministers created the office of the Government Commissar for the Productivization of the Jewish Population in Poland.[22] In spite of these efforts, however, at the end of 1948 the employed constituted only 42.2 percent of the total Jewish population.[23]

Post-war problems for Polish Jews were further complicated by the Communist take-over. Strong opposition to the new regime made it obligatory for the authorities to conceal its Communist character as much as possible. This could be achieved not only by skillful propaganda,[24] but also by allowing some people whose pasts were questionable not only from political but also from moral points of view to join the Party and pro-regime organizations — at least temporarily. Consequently, quite a few people known for their anti-Semitic and

even fascist activities before or during the war were given responsible positions in the Party apparatus, in the administration, and in social organizations.[25] But there were also quite a few other incidents demonstrating that the attitude of the political leadership toward Jews was not based simply on political pragmatism.

In 1946, a delegation from the Party's Jewish section went to Gomulka with the aim of persuading him to stop the mass emigration of Jews from Poland. As the Secretary-General of the Party and deputy Prime Minister, he was powerful enough to introduce effective measures appealing both to the Jews and the Poles. Gomulka refused. He argued that building socialism in Poland was a difficult task which should not be complicated by attempts to solve the problem of Polish-Jewish relations.[26]

In 1947, Gomulka reportedly approved a suggestion of the Minister of Public Security (secret police) to open files of Jewish employees in the secret police with the aim of replacing them with "true" Poles. To one of his former associates, who questioned this decision, he quoted Stalin, who allegedly had told a Polish delegation that Poland should be ruled by Poles and not by Jews.[27]

In 1948, at the June meeting of the Central Committee, Gomulka attacked the pre-war Communist Party of Poland for its erroneous national policy. He charged that the pre-war Party, in its program of socialist revolution, had underestimated the national independence of Poland. Gomulka made no reference to the pressure exerted by Stalin and the Comintern on the Polish Party; instead, he suggested that the error had been caused by the wrong national and class composition of the Party.[28] Since it is a fact that the Jews had constituted twenty-two to twenty-six percent of the pre-war Party membership, and that quite a few of them had been members of the leadership,[29] Gomulka's speech can be understood, at least in part, as a camouflaged assault on the Jewish members of the post-war Party leadership, most of whom had held responsible positions in the Communist Party of Poland.

The fact that in post-war Poland a considerable number of Jews occupied important positions in the Communist regime, however, was hardly any guarantee of security for either

those who considered themselves Jewish or the Poles of Jewish origin. Polish Jews, regardless of their national, religious, or political affiliation, were strongly affected by the injustices of the Stalinist regime. A number of them were arrested, including prominent Communists. Contrary to the wide-spread myth that during the Stalinist period in Poland the Jews were rather "over-represented" in the secret police services and hardly affected by the purges, the Polish Jews suffered considerably. Classified reports prepared for the Politburo in 1956 on the activities of the military secret police (*Glowny Zarzad Informacji Wojska Polskiego*) demonstrate this. Whereas only four of the several score of investigation officers were of Jewish birth (with only one occupying an important position), fully forty percent of the people affected by police activities were of Jewish descent.[30] Also, Jewish "influence" in Polish Party and administrative bodies, never very extensive, was well-balanced by the Polish gentiles (not to mention Soviet "advisers").[31]

Although it is true that the first years after the war had provided the chance to make a career for many Jewish Communists, it should be remembered that this period proved to be a short one after all. According to a foreign correspondent, from 1949 appointments or promotions of Jews to responsible positions in the administration or the Party were discontinued.[32] Moreover, Jews were quietly but systematically eliminated from important positions in the Party apparatus, in the administration, and in the armed forces.[33]

All this was not incidental, for the political leadership showed a great concern for the solution of the Jewish problem in Poland. A special governmental commission, headed by a member of the Politburo, was set up for this purpose. The members of the commission decided that the Jewish problem had to be solved radically by 1950. As Adolf Berman, chairman of the Central Jewish Committee until 1949 and also brother of Jakub Berman, a Politburo member until 1956, reported in the London *Jewish Chronicle*:

> . . . the Commission decided that by January, 1950, all Jewish institutions should be taken over by the

> State, and that the Jews should be accorded the right of free emigration to Israel if they so desired.[34]

There were also rumors that concentration camps for the Polish Jews were erected in the Bialystok province.[35]

To these new developments should be added the restrictions on the social and cultural life of the Polish Jews. Only during the first years after the war were the Jews allowed to continue some of their pre-war activities. Thus, until 1948 there were a number of Yiddish and Hebrew schools. The former were controlled by the Central Jewish Committee; the latter were under the care of Zionist organizations. Large Jewish communities were recognized by the Government and were active in religious and cultural affairs. The composition of the Central Jewish Committee at that time was as follows: six representatives of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party, four of the Bund, three of the Poale Zion Left, three of the Poale Zion Right, four of the Ichud (a Zionist coalition group), two of the Jewish partisans, and three of minor groups, including Hashomer Hatzair.[36] The program of the Central Jewish Committee was a broad one, comprising productivization, emigration, child care, education, culture, publications, and many other social activities. It seems, however, that allowing these activities was only a temporary concession to Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion abroad so as to obtain the substantial economic and financial assistance that Poland needed so badly.[37] By 1950 non-Communist organizations, parties, and institutions had been liquidated. Representatives of foreign Jewish organizations, which had been almost the sole financial and material supporters of the Polish Jewish community, were expelled. Consequently, the newly created Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland (later referred to as the Jewish Association) became a Communist puppet organization. Its aim was to rear good Polish Communist patriots by eliminating any sign of Jewish particularity.[38]

As a result of these policies, by 1954 only about 45,000 Jews remained in Poland—that is, little more than one percent of the pre-war Jewish population, and twenty percent of the number of Jews who were in Poland after the war.[39] Of these

only a few had any connection with the Jewish Association. Many of the remaining Jews preferred forced assimilation, including changing their own and their parents' names into Polish,[40] and even converting to Catholicism. But this brought peace only to a few of them and only for a short period of time. The small minority (about 0.2 percent of the total population in Poland) soon became a target for attacks launched by leading Party functionaries as well as by private individuals. The radical changes which had taken place in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin gave an impetus to these attacks.

II

The De-Stalinization Campaign and the Jews, 1955-1957

The death of Stalin and especially the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party contributed largely to a serious upheaval in Poland. Liberal-minded intellectuals and Party functionaries demanded democratization of the system. At the same time, they were also for punishing the people responsible for the crimes committed in Poland during the Stalinist period. These demands were supported by the masses. The Soviet leadership became quickly alarmed by the developments in Poland, especially since similar phenomena could be observed in other Soviet-controlled countries. It was obvious that a consistent liberalization campaign there would lead to the elimination of the people most trusted by Moscow. This could not be allowed by the Soviet leadership. Therefore, they put forward a very peculiar solution. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Nikita Khrushchev adopted a new formula which meant "the elevation of those Communist leaders who seemed more acceptable to the people," and he "made it painfully clear that Jewish Communists like Rakosi or Berman or Ana Pauker were in his judgment handicapping their parties." [41] Soon he demonstrated his determination to implement this formula. When the Polish political leadership, after the sudden death of Boleslaw Bierut in Moscow in 1956, had to fill the vacant leading post in the Party, Khrushchev flew to Warsaw in order to prevent the election of Roman Zambrowski, a Jew.[42]

The attitude of Khrushchev toward the Jews in general and

Jewish Communists in particular was very encouraging to the Stalinist faction in the Polish Party's Central Committee. An anti-Semitic campaign seemed to them very useful. First, the fact that many assimilated Jews had held responsible positions during the Stalinist period could be a very good excuse to blame them for the abuses of power and law. The Stalinists could expect that the masses would support them, for they had opposed "Jewish rule" since the liberation of Poland by the Red Army. Second, the "thaw" in the Soviet Union had led many Jews to abandon dogmatic thinking. Together with non-Jewish Communists, non-Party and Party intellectuals, they waged a battle against the remnants of Stalinism, a battle for "socialism with human face." Therefore, to Stalinists a campaign against Jews meant also halting the process of liberalization. Accusing Jews of duplicity would possibly isolate liberals [43] who might then be considered by the masses as tools in Jewish hands.

The Stalinists were not able to achieve all their aims at once, but gradually, due to the help of extreme nationalists and anti-Semites, who had been quiet for several years, they were at least able to encourage new and to revive old antagonisms between the Poles and the Jews. The leading anti-Stalinist paper, *Po-Prostu*, warned the public from the beginning that charges against Jews were being used by Stalinists and reactionary elements to halt the process of democratization and advances on the road to socialism.[44] In one of its issues, *Po-Prostu* described the situation of the Jews:

> At the party district conference in Warsaw, voices are heard that persons of Jewish origin resume their previous names, in order that it may be easier to determine who is a Jew (and who is not).
>
> A group of officers propose Mr. X as a deputy to the Sejm. Apparently, they have full confidence in him. His candidacy is accepted, but those who submitted it before, are now wavering: Maybe their candidate is of Jewish origin. Members of a local committee state that their political opponent has adopted, as a method to liquidate people, the spread-

> ing of rumors that they are Jews. It appears that such an aspersion is much more dangerous than being charged with lack of professional or moral qualifications or even with criminal acts.
>
> From Walbrzych, Dzierzoniow, Szczecin, and other towns where there is a considerable Jewish settlement, come reports of intimidations of Jewish workers, craftsmen, and their families.[45]

Another liberal-oriented paper presented the situation in even more dramatic terms:

> It is clear that such an atmosphere became unbearable for many. Attacked from Party and public platforms, eliminated publicly or quietly from work, treated differently from other citizens, removed from the army, from factories, from offices, from positions called spectacular ones, and from not spectacular ones (what a nice word grown in the gutter of our indigenous anti-Semitism!), held responsible not only for the sins of all scoundrels of Jewish origin, but even for the spread of anti-Semitism, accused by some of Stalinism and by others of activities in behalf of world imperialism, accused of communism and nationalism—what should these Jews do? When they start fighting and protest loudly, demanding an internationalist policy, they are reproached for arrogance or at least lack of modesty, which allegedly is a national Jewish trait. If, on the other hand, they give up fighting and decide to withdraw or to emigrate, they are accused of cowardice and capitulation, which allegedly are also Jewish national traits.[46]

Folks-Sztyme, the organ of the Jewish Association, published a speech of its chairman, Grzegorz Smolar, before the Parliamentary Commission on the Problems of the National Minorities. Mr. Smolar charged the authorities with being too soft on those organizing and participating in numerous anti-Semitic activities. The Jewish Association also requested from the authorities that the mass dismissals of Jews be reconsidered and that the Sejm take a formal action against the

so-called "well-mannered anti-Semitism" (hidden racism which does not involve formal violation of the law).[47]

The injustice suffered by most Jews during de-Stalinization generated a new wave of mass emigration.[48] Among factors contributing to the exodus was also the agreement between Gomulka and the Catholic Church hierarchy that re-introduced religious instruction in the schools. A number of Jews who had been assimilated, and through adoption of Polish names had succeeded in concealing their Jewish origins, found themselves, and especially their children, in a very unpleasant position. Many of them did not want their children to attend religion lessons and such an attitude for most of the common people meant a confession of being either a Jew, or a Communist, or both.[49] Thus, emigration became the only realistic solution to those Jews who were afraid that their children would be intimidated.

The Party was rather slow in changing the abnormal conditions which forced many Jews to leave their country. In 1957 the Secretariat of the Central Committee issued a letter on the struggle against nationalism and anti-Semitism.[50] The letter was addressed to all Party members, and it disapproved of and warned against the anti-Semitic phenomena. It also appealed to the Jewish Communists to help the "healthy" elements in the Party in their struggle against the "anti-Party" forces.[51] This came rather late, however; besides, the letter was sabotaged by many secretaries of Party organizations, who did not even bother to read it at Party meetings. At the same time, the organ of the Central Committee and the mouth-piece of Gomulka, *Trybuna Ludu*, though admitting the existence of "a feeling of insecurity among the citizens of Jewish descent," actually reduced the complaining and unhappy Jews to sympathizers of Zionism and made it painfully clear that the "Jewish citizens of Poland who feel a stronger attachment to Israel than to Poland have a right to emigrate." [52] This right meant in practice renouncing Polish citizenship and making heavy payments for passport, custom dues, and other procedures; in other words, the emigrating Jews had to follow rules which were not applied in the same situation to other Polish citizens.

III

Gomulka's Regime and the Jews, 1957-1967

The emigration wave reduced the number of the Jews in Poland to about 25,000.[53] The vast majority of them were Polish patriots who wanted to share the hopes and fears of the Polish population. Among them were those who had survived the purges, and those who believed in the letter of the Secretariat. There were also Jews who, despite their loss of faith in the Soviet-type system, did not want to risk emigration because they were able to get other jobs or pensions. Many of these acquired new skills and got new jobs when the Polish authorities invited the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training to help the Polish Jews.[54] These were the same organizations which had been expelled from Poland in the late 1940's. The invitation of these two major Jewish welfare organizations made the Jewish population in Poland and abroad believe that Gomulka's rule was tolerable and perhaps even promising. It seemed that now the Jews did not need to hide their Jewishness and wait for troubles. They could try to rebuild the Jewish life in Poland.

Interestingly enough, in the course of the anti-Zionist campaign of 1967-1968 rumors spread that Gomulka had never been prejudiced against Jews and that it was General Mieczyslaw Moczar, the Minister of the Interior, and his followers in the Party leadership and in the administration, who either had forced Gomulka to act against Jews, or had done so themselves without his consent. Yet, although it is difficult to prove beyond any doubt that the subsequent actions of Gomulka and his associates were primarily motivated by anti-Jewish animosity, it is equally difficult to prove that they were totally devoid of it. The policies of the new regime indicated that the Jewish question did not disappear from the agenda with the end of Stalinist rule in Poland. These policies showed further that the solution of the Jewish question was of concern to Gomulka and his associates and that the new developments in this respect were logical continuations of the policies of the Stalinist regime. Again as before, they were

carried out on two levels: political (gradual elimination and barring of the Jews from the positions of importance in the Party, administration, and even social organizations), and social (through restrictions imposed on the activities of the Jewish Association and assimilated Jews, officially branded as Poles of Jewish descent).

On the political level, the whole process was divided into stages. The first step was the removal by 1957 of all Jews from the local and provincial Party Committees; this was followed by dismissals of the Party functionaries of Jewish origin at the central level (1957-1967), culminating finally—at the proper political time—in the launching of the all-out purge campaign of 1967-1968.

The first two stages were not officially announced. They were carried out semi-officially through the Party institutions, particularly through such rank-and-file training centers as the Advanced School for Social Studies and the Party Courses Center in Warsaw. Both are attached to the Central Committee of the Party. In these training centers the leading local and provincial Party activists and functionaries were informed by the members of the Polish political leadership about current changes in policy and of their practical meaning. Among frequent topics discussed there were the minorities problem and security matters, which were often linked together. Regularly lecturing on these matters was General Franciszek Szlachcic, member of the Central Committee and deputy Minister of the Interior. He emphasized in his lectures that in the case of every nomination to a responsible position in the Party apparatus and administration, the patriotism of the candidate had to be checked, as well as his loyalty to the Polish state and nation. General Szlachcic stressed that all personnel recommendations regarding persons of non-Polish descent must be carefully scrutinized. To make his point clear he gave examples of defections of people occupying responsible positions. All of these examples dealt with the defectors who happened to be of Jewish origin.[55]

There is hardly any doubt that General Szlachcic did not merely express his own attitude or feelings, or those of his immediate superior, General Moczar.[56] The same attitude

toward the Jews was reportedly demonstrated by Zenon Kliszko, the right hand of Gomulka and the second man in the Party leadership. He also made use of the list of Jewish defectors when personnel matters were discussed at the central level.[57] Significantly, this attitude was accompanied by the practice of not revealing the cases of defections of "true" Poles.[58]

Simultaneously, with the preparations of the Party's rank-and-file for the new task, the political leadership was preparing the elimination of Jews at the central level. Party congresses best served this aim, for they provided a useful cover for this sort of purge, as in 1959, when several Jews were eliminated from the Central Committee under the cover of struggle with revisionists. Some of these Jews were actually liberal-minded and had openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Gomulka's conservatism. At the same time, however, almost all of the most outspoken Stalinists, whose animosity toward Jews was well-known, regained their seats in the Central Committee, either at the Congress or soon after.[59]

In 1964, in turn, the Party Congress was carried out under the slogan of promotion of younger and better educated people to the political leadership. Again, a few more Jews were affected. But that this purge had a racist overtone and that it was a stage in a carefully planned action came to light four years later when the character of the changes in the composition of the Central Committee was revealed by Andrzej Werblan, then a member of the Central Committee and the director of its Department of Science and Education. In an article entitled "A Contribution to the Origins of the Conflict," which was an official explanation of the anti-Jewish campaign carried out by the Polish authorities in 1967-1968, Werblan stated that after the arrival of younger and better educated people in the political arena, many Poles were removed from the Party apparatus, and since there was also a comparatively large number of people of Jewish descent in the leadership, they had had to leave as well.[60] He also pointed out that "the important personal decisions in this respect were made particularly in the last years, as far as the Central Committee is concerned—at the Fourth Congress [1964], and as far as the

central apparatus of the Party is concerned—after this Congress." [61]

The new policy of the Gomulka regime affected, however, not only the Jewish members of the ruling elite.[62] Since 1957 the policy toward national minorities had undergone several important changes. In the Central Committee of the Party, a special Commission for the Nationalities was created with branches in provincial and local Party Committees. On the governmental level, the national minorities were removed from the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and put under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior (in administrative, social, and political matters), the Ministry of Culture (in cultural activities), and the Ministry of Public Instruction and Higher Education (in education). Special sections and departments in charge of national minorities were established also at the People's Councils (administrative bodies) on the provincial and local levels.[63]

These changes meant that the Polish political leadership had decided to watch closely the non-Polish population. They did not mean, however, that all national minorities were to be given the same treatment. It is evident that the authorities were more concerned with the Jews. In 1957, the editors of *Folks-Sztyme*, a Jewish newspaper which until then had had the subtitle "an organ of the Polish United Workers' Party," were ordered to transform the paper into an organ of the Jewish Association. The editors and the leaders of the Jewish Association protested, arguing that this change might be wrongly interpreted by the readers and discourage them from participating in the Association's activities.[64] However, their protests had no effect on the decision of the authorities.[65] In Jewish cooperatives, established and supported by the foreign Jewish organizations mentioned above, systematic "Polonization" of the personnel took place. This process of Polonization (or "aryanization" as it was called in governmental circles) meant forcing managers of the Jewish cooperatives to accept Poles as well as "suggesting" non-Jews for managerial positions.[66]

As to the activities of the Jewish Association, the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior meant not only the

presence of secret police officials at the meetings of the Association's leadership but also considerable cuts in the budget and reduction of administrative personnel.[67] In 1958, seven Jewish schools (five primary and two high schools) were created, and for a short period of time there were 2,261 children and youth attending them.[68] A year or so later, however, over half of the Jewish schools were closed and the number of students reduced by over fifty percent. At the same time, authorities discontinued publishing data pertaining to the Jewish educational system in *Rocznik statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook). In the mid-1960's the Jewish Association had about 7,000 members who participated in cultural and social activities of twenty regional clubs located in the cities. Over fifty percent of the Association's members lived outside Warsaw, mostly in western Poland. About twenty-five percent were pensioners and semi-manual workers. Intellectuals constituted an insignificant number among the members of the Jewish Association. Yet despite numerous restrictions, the Jewish community in Poland was quite active. It had its own publishing house, *Yiddish Buch*, which published over ten books a year; one newspaper, issued four times a week with a bi-monthly Polish supplement, *Nasz Glos*; a literary monthly, *Yiddishe Shriftn*; a Jewish theater; and the Jewish Historical Institute.[69] Due to the help of foreign Jewish organizations, the Jewish Association was able to organize an interesting program of cultural activities as well as several summer camps for children and youth.

At the same time the public was frequently reminded of the existence of the Jewish problem. Thus, when an official of Jewish descent defected to the West or dared publicly to criticize the situation in the Communist bloc, vicious attacks with anti-Semitic overtones appeared in the press.[70] The *Pax* organization,[71] after successfully rehabilitating in its publications Roman Dmowski, a pre-war founder of modern Polish nationalism and violent anti-Semite, in 1965 published anti-Semitic memoirs of a pre-war reactionary activist, Bogdan Winiarski. At the same time, *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto* by Emanuel Ringelblum, an outstanding Jewish historian who died during the Nazi occupation in Poland, was not allowed

to be published as a separate book in Polish.[72] In 1966, the Ministry of Defense reportedly distributed among officers *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.* And in the same year, Kliszko, mentioned already as a top Party functionary, speaking at a meeting of Polish historians at Cracow, praised the patriotic spirit of the pre-war nationalists and warned against Jewish intellectuals.[73]

In the beginning of 1967, it was evident that some historians had been encouraged by the authorities to prove historically that Jewish Communists had had a damaging influence on the Polish Communist movement. Although a similarly biased approach had been reflected more or less directly a year or so earlier,[74] the credit for the first public denunciation of the "Jewish" pre-war Communist Party of Poland belongs to Wladyslaw Wolski. In an article in *Zycie Literackie*, entitled "The Dramatic History of the Communist Party of Poland; Very Personal Reflections," he made the reader understand that the pre-war Communist Party had been isolated from the nation and not very patriotic because its leadership had included Jews. He supported this statement with the following remark:

> The actual representatives of the country (within the leadership) were S. Henrykowski and A. Lampe who had come from the Poalej-Zion Left, and P. Korczyk, a representative from Western Belorussia.[75]

Whatever the intentions of the Party leadership might have been, no official criticism of this false statement was published; and the appearance of this article meant that the Party had given its consent, for the text had to be approved by the Central Committee's Press Bureau and by the censorship. It should also be mentioned that the editor of the paper which published Wolski's article was a member of the Central Committee.

Of the many critics of this article, only one finally succeeded —after a two-month effort—in publishing his letter in *Zycie Literackie.* This was Franciszek Leczycki, a prominent veteran Communist. He accused Wolski of a tendentious falsification

of facts and pointed out with many examples that the Poles had played a very important role in the pre-war Communist leadership and that their contribution had been no less than that of their Jewish comrades.[76]

This practice of not publishing critical responses from readers was not new. In a similar case in 1963, when a slanderous article on the Lodz Ghetto appeared in *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, the main organ of the Ministry of Defense, the editor-in-chief refused to publish protests from former inhabitants (or rather inmates) of this Ghetto, which had been created by the Nazis during the war. Nor were critical letters allowed to be published in the same paper in the first months of 1967, when a reviewer of *Opowiesci biblijne* (Biblical Tales) by Zenon Kosidowski found a biblical justification for the murdering of Jews by the Nazis.[77]

There were also a number of instances when the media in Poland depicted the Jews living abroad in an unfavorable light. When Barry Goldwater ran for the Presidency of the United States in 1964, the Polish media repeatedly presented him as a representative of ultra-right circles. To this, it was added that his parents had come from Poland, where their name had been Goldwasser. This in Poland could have only one connotation, namely that Goldwater is Jewish, for there was no mention that his religious affiliation was with the Episcopal Church. This fact might have created in a simple mind a belief that Jews were a reactionary element that played a leading role in the United States, the alleged center of reaction.

Much more attention in this respect, however, was given to Israel. Although it seemed that Polish-Israeli relations were rather cordial, the fact that Israeli leaders had decided to establish official relations with West Germany was met in Poland with a wave of very critical, and sometimes vicious, articles.[78] And in 1965, the Party publishing house, *Ksiazka i Wiedza*, published a slanderous book about Israel, which was presented as a center of intolerance and reaction.[79]

The above episodes were hardly incidental. Rather it seems that they demonstrate a significant shift in policy towards Jews. The Jewish community and some Party functionaries

were disturbed by anti-Semitic publications and certain restrictions imposed on the activities of the Jewish Association, but very few people in Poland suspected at that time any dramatic changes for the worse in the near future. And dramatic changes were indeed prepared by the Polish political leaders.

Now it is known that only a few years after Gomulka's return to power, the Polish political leadership entrusted the Ministry of the Interior with the task of collecting any possible evidence against the Jewish minority. As far back as 1961-1962 a full card index for all Polish Jews had been introduced in this Ministry with the consent of the Politburo.[80] By 1964 the secret police had finished a long and difficult job of "unmasking" all (or nearly all) of the Polish citizens who had hidden their Jewish origin and were regarded as true Poles.[81] The surveillance of Jews had been given such an importance that a special Department for Jewish Affairs was established in the Ministry of the Interior. After all these preparations, in 1965, the Politburo reportedly decided to solve the Jewish problem by 1970.[82] This meant that the Jews would be completely purged from all responsible positions and jobs requiring "allegiance to the Polish state and nation" (*afirmacja narodowa*), and that these purges would be prepared by the secret police. This plan was confirmed by General Szlachcic in the summer of 1968.[83]

IV

Conclusion

In 1968, a Polish Communist sociologist, Andrzej Kwilecki, maintained that "the last 20 years have brought about a marked change in the attitude of the Polish population toward national minorities. Ethnic prejudice and group stereo-types are disappearing." [84] The best indicator of these changes, he suggested, is the number of inter-group marriages. According to some studies of the Jewish population in Poland, intermarriages between 1946 and 1960 had gone up to 42.6 percent (in 1939 the percentage was 3.5) with Jewish-Polish marriages reaching 31.9 percent. As to "inter-group friendship relations," eighty percent of the Jews questioned indicated

close relations with gentiles, mostly of Polish descent. Kwilecki concluded that "it is the socio-political system generally which creates conditions conducive to the decline of ethnic prejudice; new social structure invalidates origin as a determinant of social position." [85] But Kwilecki also observed some factors disturbing the process of co-existence and integration of national minorities in Polish society. Among them are "old memories and experiences from the time of political struggle, antagonisms, and ethnic conflicts." [86] This observation gives a very important clue to the major reasons behind the racist coloring of the policy toward the Jews in Poland. It is also worthy to mention here that, interestingly enough, at a time when racial prejudice is evidently considerably reduced on the social level, it is preserved (if it does not increase) on the political level. As Zbigniew Brzezinski observed of the situation in Poland in the mid-1960's:

> In a curious way, [the] emerging new Polish communist elite resembles the pre-World War II extreme right-wing groups in Poland more than it resembles either its Comintern-reared Stalinist predecessors or the earlier, internationalist founders of the Polish Communist Party. The program of the prewar rightists had typically included advocacy of a close alliance with Russia against Germany, the desirability of a homogeneous Polish state (and not one containing many minorities), a certain dose of anti-Semitism for mass-consumption, violent emphasis on nationalism, and contempt for liberalism. Quite striking, and characteristic of the general decay of Marxism-Leninism, is the fact that many of the surviving prewar neofascist youth activists are now to be found among the most outspoken enthusiasts of the new Polish "communist" state—for the first time in centuries nationally homogeneous, allied with Russia against Germany, domestically authoritarian, and increasingly nationalist.[87]

This observation made in 1965 found its dramatic validity particularly in the years of the anti-Zionist campaign of 1967-

1968. A direct impetus to this campaign was given by the Six-Day War in the Middle East, which for the Polish political leadership became a very convenient excuse to solve the Jewish problem quickly and ultimately. This campaign, divided into several stages, started with Gomulka charging the Polish "Zionists" with creating in Poland an Israeli fifth column and ended with officials accusing Polish Jews of plotting against the political leadership and acting to the detriment of the Polish state and nation. Efficient use by the Party of fabricated detrimental materials and personal files, prepared by the secret police, contributed to quick and publicized purges of hundreds of Jews, from deputy Ministers and directors to unskilled workers and from scholars to school youth. By the end of 1968 the Jewish question seemed to be solved. On June 10, 1969, the Polish Press Agency (PAP) announced that since June, 1967, 5,264 Polish Jews had emigrated to Israel. This figure is too low, however, for by the time of this announcement the number of visas issued by the Dutch Embassy, representing Israel's interests in Poland, exceeded 20,000, that is about eighty percent of the total estimated Jewish population in Poland at that time.[88]

NOTES

1. In 1925, out of 28,896,000 Polish citizens, 3,883,000 were Ukrainians; 2,123,000, Jews; 1,057,000, Belorussians; 1,036,000, Germans; 72,000, Lithuanians; and 210,000, other minorities (Russians, Czechs, Tatars, etc.). See Francis Bauer Czarnomorski, ed., *The Polish Handbook, 1925* (London, 1925), 87-88.

2. Peter Meyer, *et al.*, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1953), 208.

3. Meyer, *The Jews*, 210. Also, Harry M. Rabinowicz, *The Legacy of Polish Jewry: A History of Polish Jews in the Inter-War Years, 1919-1939* (New York, 1965), 183ff.

4. Meyer, *The Jews*, 224. For a very comprehensive discussion of Jewish life in Poland before the war see Rabinowicz, *Polish Jews*.

5. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and Zofia Lewinowna, *Ten jest z ojczyzny mojej: Polacy z pomoca Zydom, 1939-1945* (Cracow, 1969), 7. *Zarys dzialalnosci Centralnego Komitetu Zydow w Polsce za okres od stycznia do czerwca 1946 r.* (Warsaw, 1947), 4, 8. Hereafter cited as *Zarys dzialalnosci*, 4, 8. Krystyna Kersten, "Przemiany struktury narodowosciowej Polski po II wojnie swiatowej. Geneza i wyniki," *Kwartalnik*

Historyczny, LXXVI (1969), 358-359. Andrzej Kwilecki, "National Minorities in Poland," *Polish Round Table*, 2 (1968), 147.

6. Kersten, "Przemiany struktury," 359.

7. *Kalendarz-Informator Polaka Zagranica, 1949* (Warsaw, 1949), 19. *Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej* (Warsaw, 1970), 35.

8. In the years 1965-1966, out of 31.5 million Polish citizens about 440,000 people belonged to national minorities. Of these the Ukrainians constituted about 180,000; Belorussians, 160,000; Jews, 25,000; Slovaks, 20,000; Gypsies, 18,000; Russians, 10,000; Lithuanians, 10,000; Greeks and Macedonians, 10,000; Germans, 4,000; and Czechs, 2,000. See Kwilecki, "Minorities," 146. Also, *Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna* (Warsaw, 1962-1970), IX, 71. Hereafter cited as *Encyklopedia*, 71.

9. *Encyklopedia*, 123-124.

10. *Ibid.*, 123.

11. Janusz Wojciech Golebiowski, "Kwestia narodowosciowa w polityce wladzy ludowej w wojewodztwie slasko-dabrowskim (1945-1947)," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXXI (1964), 391.

12. *European Jewry Ten Years After the War* (New York, 1956), 16. Hereafter cited as *European Jewry*, 16.

13. During the war the property abandoned by the Jews was often taken by gentiles, of whom quite a few had a definite intention to keep it forever.

14. Based on unpublished reports which are in the possession of the Party History Institute's Department of Gathered Recollections and Memoirs (ZHP ZGW) in Warsaw. See also Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Indianapolis, 1948), 240-254, and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland* (New York, 1948), 167-168.

15. The leaders of the Jewish community criticized the authorities for their leniency toward anti-Semites and for not passing a decree which would proclaim anti-Semitism a crime against the state. See Meyer, *The Jews*, 262.

16. *The New York Times*, July 17, 1946. See also the *Manchester Guardian*, July 13, 1946; Abbe A. Glasberg, "Poland: Revival of Anti-Semitic Movements," *Une Semaine dans le Monde*, June 19, 1946. The last two reports are also published in Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Department Prasy i Informacji, *Foreigners on Poland, Part I* (Warsaw, 1946), 183-187, 192-196. S. L. Shneiderman, *Between Fear and Hope* (New York, 1947), 85ff.; *European Jewry*, 15ff.

17. The years 1946-1947 were characterized by a mass exodus of Jews from Poland, and even later, between 1949 and 1952, some 30,000 Jews emigrated. See Meyer, *The Jews*, 308ff. Also Kersten, "Przemiany struktury," 360ff.

18. According to the *Neue Berner Zeitung*, April 2, 1957, there were three Jews among the thirteen members of the Politburo and eleven among the seventy-seven members of the Party's Central Committee. There was also a considerable number of top officials of Jewish descent in the administration.

19. Information bulletins of the Central Jewish Committee in this period show that Jewish problems were discussed almost exclusively with gentiles.

20. *Folks-Sztyme*, November 12, 1948, as quoted in Meyer, *The Jews*, 290.

21. *Ibid.*, 266-277. Also *European Jewry*, 27-32.

22. *Zarys dzialalnosci*, 8; Kersten, "Przemiany struktury," 359; Meyer, *The Jews*, 274.

23. Meyer, *The Jews*, 274ff.; *European Jewry*, 29.

24. See, for example, Glowny Komitet Wyborczy Bloku Demokratycznego, *Informator Wyborczy* (Warsaw? 1946?).

25. At least three members of the Party's Central Committee (two of whom were also Politburo members) were involved in killing Jewish partisans during the war. A former leader of an anti-Semitic organization was a member of the first Polish Communist Government. The *Pax* Christian Association created in 1945 with the aim to break the unity of the Catholic Church and thus to strengthen the Communist regime was led by a leader of a pre-war fascist organization. These are only a few of the well-known examples. See Jozef Swiatlo, *Behind the Scene of the Party and Bezpieka*, (New York, 1954?), 18ff.; Meyer, *The Jews*, 232; Simon Wiesenthal, *Anti-Jewish Agitation in Poland* (Vienna? 1969?), 12-32. Also based on materials which are in the possession of the Party History Institute's Department of Gathered Recollections and Memoirs in Warsaw.

26. *The Anti-Jewish Campaign in Present-Day Poland* (London, 1968), 9. I was also informed about this and similar incidents by former top activists of the Central Jewish Committee.

27. Paul Lendvai, *Anti-Semitism Without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe* (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 225. I know about these facts also from former secret police officials.

28. Peter Raina, *Gomulka: Politische Biographie* (Köln, 1970), 74ff. Josef Cywiak, "Why the Jews Left Poland?" *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs*, 5 (May, 1970), 66.

29. M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 88-126; *Polityka*, November 29, 1958; Rabinowicz, *Polish Jews*, 119.

30. Michal Checinski, "An Intended Polish Explanation, December 1956," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 3 (May, 1972), 83ff.; *Trybuna Ludu*, April 7, 1956; *European Jewry*, 41; *Colonel Tykocinski's Revelations* (New York, 1965?), 13; Israeli *Nowiny Kurier*, July 30, 1971; Stanislaw Wygodzki, *Zatrzymany do wyjasnienia* (Paris, 1968). For the ethnic composition of the secret police see Romuald Barwicz, "UBE a sowiecka sluzba bezpieczenstwa," *Kultura* (Paris), 6/273 (June, 1970), 78ff. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 120ff.

31. R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1961), 165ff.

32. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 1, 1950.

33. Juliusz Burgin, "Zaraza," *Przeglad Kulturalny*, February 13, 1957.

34. London *Jewish Chronicle*, June 23, 1950.

35. Cywiak, "Jews Left Poland," 65. I also heard these rumors myself.

36. *Zarys dzialalnosci*, 7.

37. For the extent of the foreign help for Polish Jews see Meyer, *The Jews*, 268.

38. *Ibid.*, 290ff.

39. Oscar Halecki, ed., *Poland* (New York, 1957), 44ff.; *European Jewry*, 20.

40. They were encouraged or forced by the authorities to do so, especially when they applied for responsible positions.

41. Brzezinski, *Soviet Bloc*, 171.

42. *Ibid.*, 245. Significantly, Khrushchev's candidate was Franciszek Mazur, the man who previously had led the governmental commission for the solution of Jewish problem in Poland. See *ibid.*, 360. According to Raina, Zambrowski was not the only candidate put forward for the vacant position, and even without Khrushchev's intervention he could not have won a majority of the Central Committee's members. See Raina, *Gomulka*, 95. A few months later Khrushchev was back in Warsaw to prevent the Poles from "selling their country to the Americans and Zionists." See *The New York Times*, October 20, 1956.

43. The term liberal is not used in this paper to define an ideological position, but to point out an attitude toward political change.

44. Leszek Kolakowski, "Antysemici—piec tez nienowych i przestroga," *Po-Prostu*, May 27, 1956.

45. J. Ambroziewicz, E. Gonczarski, and J. Olszewski, "Gdy budza sie upiory," *Po-Prostu*, January 6, 1957, as quoted in *Poland After "October"* (New York, 1957), 21. Hereafter cited as *"October,"* 21.

46. Burgin, "Zaraza," as translated in *"October,"* 21. For foreign reports see the *Manchester Guardian*, April 15, 1957; *Die Weltwoche*, April 18, 1957; *The Jerusalem Post*, May 24, 1957; *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, March 20, 1957; *Neue Berner Zeitung*, April 2, 1957; *The New York Times*, August 9, October 23, 1956, January 2, 9, 13, May 7, 1957, among others.

47. *Folks-Sztyme*, May 18, 1957.

48. *Manchester Guardian*, April 15, 1957, informed that "Of the 60,000 or 70,000 Jews in Poland, not more than 10,000 or 15,000 are prepared to await the results [of the growing anti-Semitism] . . . . A special passport office has been set up in Warsaw . . . ."

49. Religious instruction was re-introduced on an optional basis, that is only in those schools where a majority of the parents requested it. However, the demand was so great that very soon, out of some 17,000 schools in Poland, only 120 had no religious instruction in their curricula. And it was only in 1960 that the authorities became alarmed by the

increased influence of the Catholic Church and banned religious instruction in schools. See Alexander J. Groth, *People's Poland: Government and Politics* (San Francisco, 1972), 83.

50. Kwilecki, "Minorities," 152.

51. Yudel Korman, "How the Job Was Done in Poland," *Jewish Currents*, XXIV (February, 1970), 26.

52. As quoted in "*October*," 25.

53. Kwilecki, "Minorities," 146ff.

54. *The New York Times*, October 4, November 29, 1957.

55. I was informed about these lectures by people who occupied important positions in the secret police and the Party apparatus.

56. For the attitude toward Jews of Moczar, Szlachcic, and other secret police officials see "USSR and the Polish Antisemitism, 1956-1968," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 1 (June, 1971), 19-39. Hereafter cited as "USSR," 19-39. Also Adam Kornecki, "Mieczyslaw Moczar i inni," *Na Antenie* (November, 1969), 8-15.

57. Lendvai, *Anti-Semitism*, 144.

58. "USSR," 22. For the cases of defections of true Poles see Ignacy Tomaszewski, *Rakowiecka nr 2* (London, 1969), 93ff. Also Guy Richards, *Imperial Agent: the Goleniewski-Romanov Case* (New York, 1966).

59. *Third Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, March 10-19, 1959* (Warsaw, 1959), 595ff.; *The New York Times*, March 20, October 28-30, November 12, 15, 21, 1959; Raina, *Gomulka*, 124ff.

60. Andrzej Werblan, "Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu," *Miesiecznik Literacki*, 6 (June, 1968), 61-71.

61. *Ibid.*, 69. Also *IV Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej. Stenogram* (Warsaw, 1964), 979ff.

62. Perhaps, it should be explained here that the Jewish officials were actually Poles of Jewish origin who did not want, and for political reasons could not maintain, any contacts with Jewish life in Poland and elsewhere. According to my own experience and my interviews with Communist officials, no Jew who associated with religious or social Jewish organizations or demonstrated an interest in Jewish affairs could hold an important position in the Party or administration.

63. Kwilecki, "Minorities," 152.

64. According to them, this change might have been understood as the dissatisfaction of the Party leadership with the Association's activities.

65. Korman, "Job in Poland," 27.

66. Based on my interviews with several managers of Jewish cooperatives and activists in the Jewish Association.

67. Korman, "Job in Poland," 27.

68. *Rocznik statystyczny, 1959* (Warsaw, 1959), 281.

69. Kwilecki, "Minorities," 150; *Zycie Literackie*, April 3, 1966.

70. For example see the reaction of a Central Committee member, Wladyslaw Machejek, on the defection of Colonel Wladyslaw Tykocinski in *Zycie Literackie* of May, 1965. Also Jozef Chalasinski, "Bezdomnosc

czlowieka 'uniwersalnego,'" *Tygodnik Kulturalny*, December 19, 1965. This is a review of the book *Marksizm a jednostka ludzka* by Adam Schaff. For the criticisms expressed by the Party top officials and Party intellectuals see *Nowe Drogi*, 12/199 (December, 1965), 57-186.

71. This organization has been mentioned above. It should be noted here that since 1956 the *Pax* Christian Association has been the most outspoken Stalinist group and one of the most important extreme right-wing organizations in Poland. For the characteristics of the *Pax* and its leaders see Richard F. Staar, *Poland, 1944-1962* (Baton Rouge, 1962), 263ff.; Lucjan Blit, *The Eastern Pretender* (London, 1965); William Woods, *Poland: Eagle in the East* (New York, 1968), 205ff.

72. It was published in Yiddish in 1952 and in Polish in the *Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, which has a very small circulation.

73. Both incidents reported in Lendvai, *Anti-Semitism*, 144ff., 226.

74. *Biuletyn Zwiasku Dlugoletnich Dzialaczy Rewolucyjnego Ruchu Robotniczego* (Tel Aviv, November, 1970), 24-26.

75. Wladyslaw Wolski, "Dramatyczne dzieje KPP; refleksje jak najbardziej osobiste," *Zycie Literackie*, January 15, 1967. Wolski did not explain to the reader that the Poalej-Zion Left was a Jewish Communist Party. He failed to mention that Lampe was the author of the ideological program of the Polish Workers' Party, which had been headed for several years by Gomulka, who regarded this party as a true Polish Communist organization. See, for example, Polska Akademia Nauk and Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, *20 lat Ludowego Wojska Polskiego* (Warsaw, 1967), 41ff., 217ff., 520ff., 1046.

76. This was the only critical response to the article that was published. Significantly, the Party History Institute made no effort to clarify the issue.

77. "USSR," 27ff.

78. See, for example, W. Zabrzeski, "Sojusz ofiar z katami," *Prawo i Zycie*, November 21, 1965; Kazimierz Kakol, "Metna fala," *Prawo i Zycie*, April 10, 1966; "Caffé Nizza godz. 20.30," *Panorama Polnocy*, February 20, 1966.

79. Andrzej Zeromski, *Na zachod od Jordanu* (Warsaw, 1965).

80. "USSR," 22.

81. Barwicz, "UBE," 84.

82. "USSR," 23.

83. Lendvai, *Anti-Semitism*, 177.

84. Kwilecki, "Minorities," 155ff.

85. *Ibid.*, 156.

86. *Ibid.*, 157.

87. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York, 1965), 32.

88. Kajetan Skarbek, "Wyjazd," *Kultura* (Paris), 10/265 (October, 1969), 29-30.