Did Weimar Have a National Ethnic Policy?

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Statesmen and citizens of the Weimar Republic expressed a concern for their ethnic kinsmen outside German borders that was unprecedented in the Reich's history. This concern had both private and official manifestations. The private movement, often called the *Auslandsdeutsche* movement, spawned a multitude of organizations and a flood of literature on the subject. Government activity included diplomatic initiatives and spending hundreds of millions of marks.[1] This paper analyzes the official aspect: the Weimar government's attention to Germans outside the state's borders, and more specifically, to those inhabiting territory ceded under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The focus is on the development and nature of Weimar policy towards these Germans, that is, Weimar's national ethnic or *Deutschtum* policy.[2] Furthermore, such a study reveals new evidence for the ongoing inquiry as to whether Weimar Germany's foreign policy was revisionist, that is, whether it sought to revise the Treaty of Versailles's territorial provisions, or not.

This concern for Germans abroad and the ensuing need for a policy towards them resulted primarily from two events: the First World War and the peace terms arranged in 1919. The First World War was the "hour of birth" of the *Auslandsdeutsche* movement.[3] Before 1914 the Reich government essentially neglected foreign Germans, and private initiatives concentrated on cultural support, especially for German schools.[4] During and after the war, the German public's new-found attachment to Germans outside the Reich's borders was expressed in the revival of nineteenth-century pan-German organizations such as the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland and the Alldeutscher Verband, and in the creation of new organizations like the

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Deutsche Schutzbund and the Deutsche Auslandinstitut.[5] A partial explanation for this metamorphosis lies in the war's nature as a conflict not only among states, but also among peoples, thereby emphasizing Germans' cultural and ethnic similarities regardless of habitat.[6] Though it may be excessive to say that the Reich entered into "a new spiritual relationship" with the minorities,[7] the change was certainly real.

The peace heightened this new concern. In redrawing the map of Europe after the First World War, the victorious Allies removed territory from all sides of the German Reich except the south, taking about 13 percent of its territory and 10 percent of its population.[8] Although theoretically guided by the principle of self-determination, the diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference did not consistently implement this concept, partly because they could not possibly consolidate the interspersed ethnic groups of Europe and partly because they willfully disregarded this principle. Despite successfully reducing the number of European minorities by three-quarters,[9] the diplomats created new problems by placing millions of ethnic Germans under non-German rule. In the years immediately following the war, the sense of obligation which Germany's national ethnic policy expressed concentrated on Germans in the ceded regions, though not to the exclusion of the Germandom in, for example, Czechoslovakia, the South Tirol, Southeastern Europe, the Soviet Union's Volga Republic, South America, and in Germany's lost colonies.[10] This paper, however, will focus solely on policy toward the ceded regions.

The term "policy" must be handled gingerly, especially in reference to the immediate postwar years. As a German delegate to the peace negotiations wrote in January 1919, the Germans had scarcely considered the minority rights issue until the negotiations and the continued fighting made territorial cessions in the east a very real threat. Defining a policy prior to a territorial settlement presented an obvious problem: if large areas were lost and numerous Germans thereby placed under foreign sovereignty, then the German government had a considerable interest in defining the protection of Germandom in the peace treaties. Even after border adjustments, however, non-German minorities would still live within the Reich, especially in the east. Thus, final formulation of policy had to await conclusive territorial agreements, as extensive rights for large minority groups in the Reich would create domestic problems, while limited rights for German minorities outside the Reich might not guarantee effective protection.[11]

Aware of these conflicting interests, in March 1919 Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann's government developed guidelines for the German delegation to the peace negotiations. The delegates were not to press for the Reich's right to intercede officially on behalf of German minorities. Rather, it was believed that the foreign Germans would receive a more sympathetic hearing if they organized and spoke for themselves. The delegation, however, was to seek

permission for minorities to preserve their German culture by attending German schools and churches as well as by operating German presses. If possible, the German representatives should work towards the concession of cultural autonomy for minorities.[12]

The German delegates played no significant role in the peace negotiations; instead the Allies simply presented them the completed "Conditions of Peace" on 7 May 1919. The German counterproposals, the "Observations on the Conditions of Peace" delivered on 29 May, included a call for the protection of national minorities by the future League of Nations. In exchange for these international guarantees for free cultural expression, the Reich committed itself to accord the same rights to foreign minorities within its borders.[13] Of course, the Allies rejected the German counterproposals, and Germany's exclusion from the League of Nations denied the Reich direct influence on the minority protection system established by the minority treaties signed in Paris in 1919.[14] Thus ended, temporarily, the Weimar Republic's diplomatic initiatives on behalf of foreign Germans. In the words of historian Carole Fink, "From 1920 to 1923, Germany's internal weakness and its diplomatic isolation prevented Berlin from stressing the issue of minority rights."[15] Yet the Treaty of Versailles, by defining the Reich's new borders, allowed the formulation of a Germandom policy to proceed, even if the uncertainty surrounding the plebiscite regions delayed German planning.[16]

On the day the treaty was signed (28 June 1919), policies toward foreign Germans were being defined by German leaders, albeit not by politicians in Berlin, but by authorities on the periphery. That very day, civilian and military leaders of East Prussia met in Danzig to consider what measures to take in light of the proposed territorial changes. The primary goal outlined in this meeting was to keep ethnic Germans from leaving the lands to be ceded.[17] The German government obviously harbored similar sentiments. In August the director of the Foreign Office's press department applied to Czechoslovakia this concern for the preservation of the Germandom.[18] In November the Foreign Office voiced the Reich's political interest in "preserving the German spirit in the future Free City of Danzig,"[19] and in May 1920 it expressed support for the same goals in the Memelland.[20]

Within the first year of the republic's existence one of the fundamental aims of a Germandom policy was established: sustaining and preserving German communities beyond the new boundaries of the Reich. In some ways this aim was no more than an instinctive reaction to two basic stimuli, one positive and one negative. The positive stimulus was the realization that in an age of self-determination only a strong German minority in the ceded territories justified revisionist claims.[21] The negative stimulus was the fact that these Germans were generally not wanted in the Reich. As early as August 1920, the Foreign Office directed regional officials to obstruct immigration into post-war Germany. Before granting an entry permit to a

German resident of a lost territory it had to be established that he was seeking political asylum. The reasons given for this obstructive action lay in the severe economic dislocation in the Reich between 1919 and 1923. Germany could neither feed nor house additional unemployed workers and their families.[22] The Foreign Office repeated this sentiment again and again,[23] and with good reason—millions of Germans from Eastern Europe were trying to enter the Reich in the early 1920s, fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution or the chauvinistic regimes in the new states.

Getting the Germans abroad to stay put was, however, not easy. Questions concerning bureaucratic control over care of foreign Germandom hindered policy implementation, not least of all because of the repeated turnover in the chancellor's office; during the first five years of the Weimar Republic, eleven cabinets came and went. These frequent personnel changes prevented a decision as to whether Germandom concerns belonged under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office or the Interior Ministry. For example, Dr. Adolf Köster served as foreign minister in the first Müller cabinet (27 March–8 June 1920) and then served as interior minister in the second Wirth cabinet (26 October 1921–14 November 1922). In both of these capacities he wanted to and believed that he had been directed to supervise support for Germans abroad. As interior minister, he antagonized the Foreign Office which claimed jurisdiction over Germans abroad. Not until January 1923 was this problem resolved, when the Cuno government decreed a careful compromise. The Interior Ministry was to care for the Germandom movement inside the Reich; the Foreign Office was responsible for Germans in both the *alten Ausland* (outside of the 1914 borders) and in the *neuen Ausland* (in the ceded territories), including the distribution of funds to their organizations.[24]

This decision did not resolve all organizational problems. For the success of its Germandom policy the Foreign Office considered control of the movement's numerous private organizations within the Reich essential.[25] Literally hundreds of groups promoted German culture abroad, assisted refugees, and lobbied for their special interests. As émigrés from the ceded territories were generally among the most vocal supporters of aggressive action toward foreign states, it was indeed in the Foreign Office's interest to exercise some control over the private movement. The Foreign Office's pessimistic prognostications as to its ability to achieve this control proved, however, accurate.[26] Although it did create an umbrella organization, the Zweckverband der Freien Deutschtumsvereine (1923), control of the private movement remained elusive because "such above-party, a-political centralized control was effectively precluded by the internal divisions of the Republic."[27]

The lack of a solid theoretical underpinning for an ethnic policy during the republic's early years represented a third obstacle to ensuring the stability of German communities abroad. In large measure this derived from the

Reich's uncertain treatment of minorities within its own borders. Although Article 113 of the Weimar Constitution adopted in July 1919 ensured the "free development" of foreign minorities within the Reich, it remained a meaningless principle until specific executive action gave it force. For example, older Prussian laws concerning education and accomodation for foreign language speakers that were contrary to the spirit of the Weimar Constitution remained in force through much of the 1920s. Thus, many foreign Germans were left without any sort of political guidance from official German sources on what rights to expect and demand as foreign-speaking minorities. One German minority leader complained that Germans abroad were confronted with an "ideological void," and that they were scarcely in a position to consider any solution to problems raised by the border revisions other than redrawing those borders by force, if necessary.[28]

Despite these obstacles, the Reich did take immediate steps to support and subsidize the German communities abroad in what some historians have called the "defensive" or "preventive refugee care" phase in Weimar's Germandom policy,[29] the period between 1919 and 1923–24. One measure was the attempt to instill confidence in the Reich's ability to protect foreign Germans. Two days after the German delegation submitted its counterproposals in Paris, the Reich government published a "Proclamation to the Germans in the East" (30 May 1919), calling on this population to "preserve the Reich . . . through calm and discipline." Even if the counterproposals were rejected, "the Reich government will make the decisions for the Reich and Germandom that are essential for the life of the German people. We [the leaders of the Reich] recognize our responsibility for the present and the future."[30] This constituted a public affirmation of the Reich's uniquely new sense of duty toward Germans who might come to reside outside Germany's borders. Additionally, in November 1921 Chancellor Josef Wirth stated that it was the duty of all German representatives abroad to preserve the love and devotion to the German fatherland of their fellow countrymen abroad.[31] This could be interpreted as an assumption of responsibilities by the Reich for Germans abroad and as its expectation of their loyalty in return. But the Foreign Office also understood that statements of support alone were insufficient, that only through financial support could Germans in the ceded territories—and especially those in Poland—be persuaded "to stick it out" (*ausharren*).[32]

Although the flow of financial aid from the Reich to Germans abroad has recently received intensive study, the total amounts of assistance remain difficult to ascertain because of the mixture of public and private funds involved and the secrecy surrounding their distribution, not to mention the statistical nightmare that inflation gradually created.[33] But despite the uncertainty surrounding their total, the sums were significant. As early as October 1919 representatives of concerned Reich and Prussian ministries recommended making 100 million marks available for support of the German press,

schools, and associations in the east.[34] And in May 1920 the German cabinet agreed to appropriate 15 million marks for assistance to Germans abroad.[35] Extremely important in this effort was the creation of the Deutsche Stiftung in November 1920, which became the central distribution mechanism of Reich funds for Germans abroad. Wearing the facade of a parliamentary advisory committee, the Deutsche Stiftung was directed by the Foreign Office and supplied aid through surreptious channels to avoid detection by states that would rightly condemn this illegal support of minorities within their borders. In addition to funds flowing through these primary channels, numerous individual appropriations were made by the Reich cabinet to support central Germandom organizations in the ceded lands.

Does this statement of a basic aim (keeping foreign Germans where they were), this organization of supply lines, and this expenditure of funds constitute a national ethnic policy? Because these are essentially *means* and not *motives* or *ultimate goals*, one must conclude that they do not by themselves define Weimar's policy. One might romantically interpret the Foreign Office's financial assistance simply as an expression of sympathy for endangered ethnic kinsmen, a conclusion that corresponds to the view that the domestic Germandom movement—the proliferation of organizations and literature—was simply an expression of national solidarity in the face of an external threat. This, however, is certainly an oversimplification and probably false. Recent research on a related topic, Reich funding of Germans prior to the plebiscites in North Schleswig, East and West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, has convincingly demonstrated that Berlin's assistance represented less an outpouring of nationalistic concern for these populations than common political horsetrading. At its most extreme, minority groups practically extorted funds with the threat: "Either money—or we vote Danish,"[36] or Polish as the case might be. On the Reich's part, financial assistance at times amounted to little more than buying voters' loyalty. Although this type of support for the contested regions is not considered here, the grain of salt mined by this research must be taken when studying other aspects of Weimar's national ethnic policy. That is, one should not blithely consider the extension of aid as the Reich's expression of emotional or patriotic concern for Germans outside its borders; instead, in defining a "policy" one must search for motives and ultimate goals.

This wariness must be maintained especially when considering the period after 1923–24, when Reich support for German minorities abroad became more generous, more visible,[37] and more systematic. For a number of reasons the Reich could gradually take bolder steps on behalf of foreign Germandom: after 1924 the economy was stabilizing, the internal debate over ministerial control was resolved, the republic was being reintegrated into European politics, and a strong, explicit ethnic policy found powerful

spokesmen. At the center of policy formulation was Gustav Stresemann, who, following a brief stint as chancellor in 1923, served as foreign minister from November 1923 until his death in October 1929. His central role in Weimar foreign policy and his self-appointed role as defender of minorities[38] has made him a natural focus for the historical literature on Weimar's Germandom policy. Although historians have clearly sketched Stresemann's words and deeds in black and white, they are far from agreed on which colors should be used to shade the crucial facets of his policies—his motivations and his goals. As a result, historians have painted strikingly different portraits of his national ethnic policy.

In September 1925 Stresemann wrote to the former German crown prince that protection of the foreign Germans was one of the three most important tasks of German foreign policy.[39] In a memorandum dated 23 March 1926 he presented to the cabinet his defense of this assertion. Prior to the war, the Reich's limited cultural support for foreign Germans had sufficed. Since the war, however, German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe were threatened both by their deteriorating economic situation and by the continuously increasing national chauvinism of the majority populations. The regimes in the countries holding East Upper Silesia, Posen, West Prussia, Memel, and North Schleswig were intent on destroying the economic foundation of Germandom. The Reich could not stand idly by because these minorities were significant not only as national brethren, but also as potential agents of German influence and as an economic market. Therefore, German policy had to attempt to preserve the minorities' autonomy by protecting their property, organizations, and legal rights. With an eye to the economic viability of its recipient, the goal of relief action was to satisfy the most urgent needs and provide credit *where the Reich's political interests were directly or indirectly at stake.* With this aid the minorities would be able to help themselves in the future. Finally, Stresemann suggested that as private financing was unavailable, the Reich had to supply thirty million marks to implement this action.[40] A week later, on 31 March 1926, the German cabinet agreed to appropriate funds for the purposes Stresemann outlined.[41]

In December of the same year Stresemann called for an expansion of credit to maintain Germandom in Europe. Previous financing had been essentially limited to the territories ceded under the Versailles Treaty, but economic conditions demanded that other areas be assisted, including Austria and Czechoslovakia. Danzig and East Upper Silesia, earlier deemed economically viable without assistance, were also in need of help. Without credit, German enterprises in these latter two areas would fail, their businesses would be Polonized, and an exodus of ethnic Germans would ensue. He requested eighty to one-hundred million marks for which the Reich would not only receive interest but could also prepare a secure foundation for the German

export economy.[42] Without chronicling the expansion of financing that followed Stresemann's seminal 1926 memorandum, suffice it to say that the this effort was continued throughout the Weimar Republic's short life.

A major front organization, Ossa Vermittlungs- und Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. ("Ossa"), founded in 1926, played a key role in distributing these funds.[43] By June 1927 Ossa directors reported that the organization had distributed over forty-one million marks in credits. As this was only an initial report and as other supply systems existed as well, the figures taken in isolation do not reveal the total financial effort. However, comparing the amounts of credits distributed to the number of Germans living in the ceded territories raises interesting questions.

Ceded regions	Amounts received from Ossa by June 1927[44]	German Population in 1927[45]
Poland	RM 20,320,000	1,058,824
North Schleswig	RM 7,194,000	40,172
Memelland	RM 2,504,000	71,781
Eupen-Malmedy	RM 685,000	98,458
Hultschin	RM 40,000	not known

The most obviously asymmetrical statistics are for North Schleswig and Eupen-Malmedy. Why did the region with the smallest listed population, North Schleswig, receive the second-largest amount of funding? And why did Eupen-Malmedy, with the second-largest listed population, receive so little? One could pose hypothetical answers to these questions. North Schleswigers had proven themselves quite adept at exploiting their "endangered" position during the plebiscite campaign, winning an estimated five million marks from Berlin in the months prior to the vote,[46] and North Schleswig calls for support of the same cause (protecting the German community) continued to be rewarded throughout the republic's existence.[47]

Eupen-Malmedy, on the other hand, posed less of a "nationality" problem for the republic than it did a "cabinet politics" problem. Although the Treaty of Locarno confirmed the German-Belgian border, Berlin repeatedly attempted to negotiate the return of Eupen-Malmedy not on the basis of its national rights, but in exchange for monetary compensation. In fact, in the dickering over Eupen-Malmedy, "its inhabitants were never consulted, although Berlin expended funds [there] to maintain sympathies for Germany."[48] For example, in July 1926 Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht believed he had reached a deal for the immediate return of these territories for fifty million dollars; one of the conditions of the agreement was that there be

no popular referendum.[49] In May 1929 Stresemann wrote that the Reich was temporarily willing to drop its demands for Eupen-Malmedy but expected to pay for their return sometime in the future.[50] Presumably, the Foreign Office did not feel the same need to support the Germans in Eupen-Malmedy as it did in North Schleswig, demonstrated by Eupen-Malmedy receiving only RM 2.15 million in credits from the Reich and Prussia by 1929,[51] less than a third of what North Schleswig received in the first year Ossa operated. The point of this admittedly theoretical exercise is to suggest that the Reich's leaders supported Germandom abroad primarily with an eye to the state's interests, and not necessarily to minorities' needs.

Indeed, most historians writing on the subject today agree that the Foreign Office never let its interest in the foreign Germans obscure its pursuit of broader goals. Different historians, however, view these goals differently. Norbert Krekeler understands the Foreign Office's financial support of minorities, especially those in Poland, to have been primarily a means to revisionist ends. It was necessary to keep Germans on the land in order to justify claims for the return of the ceded lands.[52]

John Hiden, on the other hand, in explaining why Krekeler is wrong, labels as "fantasy" any contention that treats "all efforts to alleviate the lot of the *Auslandsdeutsche* as subordinate to one overriding concern," that is, revisionism.[53] Instead, Hiden suggests, "Stresemann's known concern for the *Auslandsdeutsche* was not permitted to disrupt the wider policy strategy," meaning his concern did not lead him to revisionism. In his specialized study of German-Estonian and German-Latvian relations Hiden argues that the Reich's support of Germans in these Baltic states was not intended as a prelude to German absorption of them. Instead, supporting Germans abroad was a means to other ends, especially the goal of expanding Germany's foreign trade. Although the term "revisionism" cannot apply to Estonia and Latvia (because they were not a part of the Reich before World War One), Hiden generalizes the conclusions of his Baltic study to deny that revisionism was the primary goal of Weimar's support for foreign Germans anywhere.[54] Karl-Heinz Grundmann's work, concentrating on the same part of Europe as does Hiden, supports this interpretation.[55]

Going still further in refuting Krekeler's conclusions, Bastiaan Schot writes that the subsidies granted to the Germandom movement served domestic political purposes, not the furthering of German culture abroad, and they were by no means part of a policy to absorb territories in Eastern Central Europe that had German inhabitants. He argues that Stresemann used the minority issue to counter the increasing alienation between himself and the bourgeois-nationalist groups in the Reich, and in exchange for support granted subsidies to further the political ambitions of minority representatives. Minority leaders used Stresemann to bring the Germandom movement from

the periphery to the center of German politics, and Stresemann used generous financial support to buy the loyalty of the German minorities to the republican constitution.[56]

Peter Krüger provides yet another interpretation of Weimar's Germandom policy. Positing that a central question for all study of Weimar foreign policy must be to determine to what degree republican policy was unique in German history, Krüger views Weimar's attempt to keep Germans on their agricultural lands in the east as a continuation of nineteenth-century policies. This was part of a long-standing attempt to prevent "overindustrialization" and overpopulation in urban areas, or more colloquially, to keep them down on the farm.[57] Schot continues this line of thinking—that these subsidies were really nothing new—arguing that Berlin's financing eastern agricultural interests in exchange for political support was an old Bismarckian strategy.[58]

Clearly, historians do not agree on any one interpretation of Weimar national ethnic policy, and convincing arguments deny that the republic's policies had anything to do with revisionism. But before discrediting the revisionist hypothesis altogether, one should consider the Foreign Office's activity in yet another of the ceded territories, Alsace-Lorraine. Since 1921 the Deutsche Stiftung had financed a German-language press in these provinces, which contained over one-and-a-half million Germans.[59] By the mid-1920s the Foreign Office was secretly supporting a largely German autonomist movement in Alsace-Lorraine with RM 113,247 in fiscal 1925–26 and RM 281,291 in 1926–27.[60] The funding of the autonomist political organizations and press continued despite Berlin's explicit rejections of French allegations that it was doing so,[61] despite extensive French efforts to discover a financial link between the autonomist movement and the Reich,[62] and despite such judicial spectacles as the Colmar trials. Annual funding for 1927–29 averaged RM 420,000, but the appropriation for fiscal 1930–31 was reduced to RM 160,000, supposedly on Stresemann's orders.[63]

In April 1930, Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow (*Dirigent* of Department II of the Foreign Office at this time) defended a request for increasing these funds by explaining Germany's interest in the political success of the autonomists.[64] A powerful Alsatian autonomist movement would be of immediate use to Germany by encouraging other splinter movements in France, and thereby directing some of Paris's political energies to internal rather than external affairs. Furthermore, the autonomists functioned as weapons in Germany's struggle against the Versailles Treaty. If Alsace could successfully fight for the self-determination denied it by the treaty, then an important precedent would be set for German revisionist aims in other areas. Finally, the struggle for Alsatian autonomy was a struggle against the insincerity (*Unwahrhaftigkeit*) of the Versailles Treaty, that is, against the treaty that did not follow the

Wilsonian principles that the Reich had originally accepted as a basis for negotiation.[65]

This memorandum is one of the clearest explanations of how support of Germandom in the ceded territories could be used for revisionist ends. One indication of such a policy's acceptance is demonstrated by the promotion of the memorandum's author, Bülow, to the second-highest post in the Foreign Office, that of *Staatssekretär* (state secretary), only two months after submitting this memo. Considering the Reich's consistent funding of the autonomist movement in the second half of the 1920s, one could suggest that Stresemann had similar goals to those described in the memorandum, though this remains speculation because Bülow wrote it after Stresemann's death.

Far from demonstrating that Weimar's national ethnic policy was merely a revisionist tool, the example of Alsace-Lorraine supports the general conclusion that the Reich assisted Germans abroad as it suited broader policy interests. This differs only subtly from Hiden's interpretation that Germandom policy was not revisionist by saying that it certainly *could* be used to revisionist ends, depending on the larger goals of the Foreign Office at a given time. It must always be remembered that Foreign Office records contain a host of motives and goals for providing funds to different regions. Germans in Poland were supported to keep them on the land, to keep them out of Germany, to form them into a glacis against a Polish threat,[66] and to preserve claims for lost territory. The minority in the Memelland received funds to encourage its political unity,[67] to create an economic link to the east[68]; and perhaps also to support revisionist aims.[69] The Free City of Danzig received tremendous amounts of financial aid in the late 1920s and early 1930s[70] because Danzig was essential to Germany's *Ostpolitik*, an argument based on the belief that losing Danzig would lead to the loss of East Prussia.[71] These examples represent only a few of the motives behind Weimar's support of Germans in the ceded territories. Though the means of support were similar—providing secret financial aid and demanding legal rights in international organizations—the goals behind this support varied.

The Weimar Republic expressed a degree of concern for foreign Germans unprecedented in the Reich's history, and the Germans in the territories ceded under the Versailles Treaty's terms were of paramount importance in this concern. After several years during which the Reich tentatively sorted out its priorities and procedures for assisting Germans in Europe, Stresemann forcefully articulated the fundamental aims and means of Weimar policy. But the motives and ultimate goals behind Berlin's assistance varied not only from place to place, but also over time, all of which emphasizes that Weimar did not have *a* national ethnic policy but instead had variations on a theme more practical than ideological. Rather than simply

supporting ethnic kinsmen abroad, the Weimar Republic's Germandom policies were part of a larger effort to restore and protect Germany's status in Europe, in this case by attempting to use both the alienated German subjects and the Germandom movement that they inspired.

ENDNOTES

1. John Hiden, "Germany, Home and Away," *Historical Journal* 30, 2 (1987): 470.

2. *Deutschtum* can be defined as the entity encompassing both Germans and their civilization.

3. Karl-Heinz Grundmann, *Deutschtumspolitik zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie am Beispiel der deutsch-baltischen Minderheit in Estland und Lettland* (Hanover, 1977), 49.

4. Grundmann, *Deutschtumspolitik*, 267.

5. Anthony Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich; Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars* (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1980), 1-4.

6. John W. Hiden, *The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 42; Helmut Pieper, *Die Minderheitenfrage und das Deutsche Reich, 1919–1933/34* (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1974), 53.

7. Pieper, *Minderheitenfrage*, 56.

8. By the treaty's terms Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine to France, Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, the Hultschin district to Czechoslovakia, and surrendered the Memelland to Allied control. Part of North Schleswig went to Denmark after a 1920 plebiscite. In addition, much of Posen and West Prussia was given to Poland, and Danzig was made a Free City. East Upper Silesia was lost to Poland following a 1921 plebiscite.

9. From roughly 100 million to 25 million. Carole Fink, "Stresemann's Minority Policies, 1924–29," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979): 404.

10. Pieper, *Minderheitenfrage*, 58.

11. Walter Simons (head of the legal commission of the German peace delegation) to Friedrich Wilhelm Otto Gaus (legation councilor who replaced Simons after 18 April 1919), 9 January 1919, *Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945,* Series A: 1918–1925 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1982), 1:166 (hereafter cited as *ADAP*).

12. "Anlage zum Protokoll der Kabinettssitzung vom 21. März 1919," 21 March 1919, *ADAP,* Series A, 1:326.

13. Herbert Michaelis, et al., eds., *Die Weimarer Republik, Die Wende der Nachkriegspolitik, 1924–1928* (Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag Dr. Herbert Wendler, n.d.), Band 6, *Ursachen und Folgen,* 669.

14. The new or enlarged countries of Eastern Europe were required to agree to the Minority Treaties "acknowledging an international obligation to grant protection to their minority inhabitants." Fink, "Stresemann's Minority Policies," 404. For a succinct description of the League of Nations' minority system, see ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Hermann Müller (foreign minister), 21 October 1919, *ADAP*, Series A, 2:369-70.

17. "Besprechung über die Friedensfragen am 28.6.1919 Vormittags 9 Uhr beim Oberpräsidium in Danzig," n.d., *ADAP*, Series A, 2:139-43.

18. Victor Naumann (Foreign Ministry's news department director) to Hermann Müller, 1 August 1919, *ADAP*, Series A, 2:213-14.

19. Josef Mertens (councilor in the peace department of the Foreign Office) to the president of the Prussian state ministry, 20 November 1919, *ADAP*, Series A, 2:423-24.

20. "Richtlinien für die Behandlung des Memelgebietes," memo attached to Paul Göhre (undersecretary in the Prussian state ministry) to the *Reichsminister* and the Prussian *Staatsminister*, 3 June 1920, *ADAP*, Series A, 3:278-80.

21. Peter Krüger, *Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 305.

22. Frederic Hans von Rosenberg (representative of the undersecretary) to the Saxon legation in Berlin, 25 August 1920, *ADAP*, Series A, 3:521.

23. E.g., Edgar Karl Alfons Haniel von Haimhausen (undersecretary for political affairs in the Foreign Ministry) to the Reich Ministry for Reconstruction, 10 January 1921, *ADAP*, Series A, 4:237-38; and "Die Abwanderung in Posen and Westpreußen, n.d. (ca. 25 February 1921), Peter Wulf, ed., *Das Kabinett Fehrenbach* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1972), *Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik*, 491-95. The cabinet formally adopted this stance in a meeting on 15 March 1921, *Das Kabinett Fehrenbach*, 562-63.

24. Grundmann, *Deutschtumspolitik*, 135-40.

25. Ibid., 134.

26. At an April 1920 cabinet meeting it was concluded that the Foreign Office had failed to create a unified association for *Auslandsdeutsche* interests. Ingrid Schulze-Bidlingmaier, ed., *Die Kabinette Wirth I und II (Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik)* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1973), 2:689-70.

27. John Hiden, "The Weimar Republic and the Problem of the Auslandsdeutsche," *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (1977): 274-75.

28. Pieper, *Minderheitenfrage*, 57.

29. Carole Fink, "The Weimar Republic as the Defender of Minorities 1919–1933" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1968), 33; and Norbert Krekeler, *Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik; die Subventionierung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973), 48-52.

30. Michaelis, *Der Weg in die Weimarer Republik*, 3:325.

31. Joseph Karl Wirth (Reich chancellor), 22 November 1921, *ADAP*, Series A, 5:390-91.

32. Siller (advisor in the Reich finance ministry) to the Foreign Office, 20 April 1921, *ADAP*, Series A, 4:519-20.

33. Hiden, "The Weimar Republic," 279-80.

34. "Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 30. Oktober 1919 über Erhaltung und Förderung des Deutschtums in den Ostprovinzen," n.d., *ADAP*, Series A, 2:364-66.

35. Schulze-Bidlingmaier, ed., *Kabinette Wirth I und II*, 2:689-70.

36. Terry Hunt Tooley, "Fighting without Arms: The Defense of German Interests in Schleswig, East and West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, 1918–1921" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1986), 800.

37. I am referring to Stresemann's work for minority rights in the League of Nations, a subject not under consideration here.

38. Fink, "Stresemann's Minority Policies," 405-6.

39. Henry Bernhard, ed., *Gustav Stresemann Vermächtnis; der Nachlass in drei Bänden* (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein, 1932), 2:551.

40. Emphasis added to this well-known document. Gustav Stresemann, "Denkschrift betreffend die Bereitstellung von 30 Millionen RM für die Gewährung von Krediten an das bodenständige Deutschtum im europäischen Ausland," 23 March 1926, *ADAP*, Series B, 1, 1:430-33.

41. Report of ministerial conference, 31 March 1926, Karl-Heinz Minuth, ed., *Die Kabinett Luther I und II (Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik)* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1977), 2:1247.

42. Stresemann to Hermann Josef Maria Ernst Pünder (undersecretary in the Reich chancellery), 29 December 1926, *ADAP*, Series B, 1, 2:651-54.

43. Krekeler, *Revisionsanspruch*, 89-95.

44. Max Winkler (Deutsche Stiftung board member and Ossa financial administrator) and Hans Erdmann von Lindeiner-Wildau (Reichstag deputy and Deutsche Stiftung board member) to the Foreign Office, 28 June 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 5:614-17.

45. Michaelis, *Die Weimarer Republik*, 6:718.

46. Tooley, "Fighting Without Arms," 337-38.

47. E.g., Werner von Levetzow (consular advisor, Copenhagen) to Albert Duckwitz (consular advisor in Department IV of the Foreign Office), 7 September 1932, *ADAP*, Series B, 21:92-93.

48. Manfred J. Enssle, *Stresemann's Territorial Revisionism; Germany, Belgium, and the Eupen Malmédy Question 1919–1929* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980), 192.

49. Hjalmar Schacht (Reichsbank president) to the Foreign Office, 14 July 1926, *ADAP*, Series B, 1, 1:646-48.

50. Stresemann, 31 May 1929, *ADAP*, Series B, 11:602-3.

51. Ferdinand Seiler (*Konsul* in Department IV of the Foreign Office), "Aufzeichnung über die Kreditaktion in Eupen-Malmedy," 12 March 1929, *ADAP*, Series B, 11:269-71. Kimmich summarizes the organization of the Foreign Ministry in Christoph M. Kimmich, ed. *German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; A Guide to Research and Research Materials* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1981), 3-8.

52. Norbert Krekeler, "Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen und die Revisionspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1919–1933," in Wolfgang Benz, ed., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten; Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 15-28, esp. 27.

53. Hiden, "The Weimar Republic," 278.

54. Hiden, *Baltic States*, 195.

55. See Hiden on Grundmann in Hiden, "Germany, Home and Away," 471.

56. Bastiaan Schot, *Stresemann, der deutsche Osten und der Völkerbund* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984), 5, 59, 62.

57. Krüger cites no pre-1914 examples to buttress this point. Krüger, *Aussenpolitik*, 306.

58. Schot, *Stresemann*, 13, 21.

59. Gerhard Köpke (*Ministerialdirektor, Leiter* of Department II of the Foreign Office), "Bemerkungen zu dem Unterstützungsgesuch der elsass-lothringischen Heimatbewegung," 5 April 1930, *ADAP*, Series B, 14:448; and 1927 population was 1,634,260. Michaelis, *Die Weimarer Republik*, 6:718.

60. Bernard Wilhelm von Bülow, 28 March 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 5:86-91.

61. Walter Zechlin (*Ministerialdirektor, Leiter* of the Press Department of the Reich government), 12 July 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 6:47-48.

62. Leopold von Hoesch (ambassador to Paris) to Foreign Office, 5 December 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 7:432-34.

63. Köpke, "Bemerkungen zu dem Unterstützungsgesuch," 5 April 1930, *ADAP*, Series B, 14:443-48.

64. Department II generally handled matters pertaining to Western and Southern Europe, the Vatican, occupied territories and the Saar, and disarmament questions. Kimmich, *German Foreign Policy*, 3-8.

65. Köpke, "Bemerkungen zu dem Unterstützungsgesuch," 5 April 1930, *ADAP*, Series B, 14:443-48.

66. Pieper, *Minderheitenfrage*, 60.

67. August Winnig (*Oberpräsident* of East Prussia) to Foreign Office, 19 July 1919, *ADAP*, Series A, 2:184-85; Oskar P. Trautmann (*Ministerialdirektor, Leiter* of Department IV of the Foreign Office), 3 January 1929, *ADAP*, Series B, 11:14; Trautmann, 5 May 1930, *ADAP*, Series B, 15:16-18; and Trautmann, 9 June 1931, *ADAP*, Series B, 17:398.

68. "Richtlinien für die Behandlung des Memelgebietes," attached to Paul Göhre to the *Reichsminister* and Prussian *Staatsminister*, 3 June 1920, *ADAP*, Series A, 3:278-80; and

"Aufzeichnung über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Memelfrage," n.d. (ca. 23 November 1921), *ADAP*, Series A, 5:393-97.

69. Hans Ludwig Moraht (envoy, Kowno) to von Bülow, 28 August 1930, *ADAP*, Series B, 15:486-491.

70. Among many examples, see "Aufzeichnung über die Sanierung der Hansabank," 4 February 1926, *ADAP*, Series B, 2, 1:164-65; Erich Zechlin (advisor in Department IV of the Foreign Office), 10 December 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 7:480-81; and Wilhelm Noebel (advisor in Department IV of the Foreign Office), 16 November 1928, *ADAP*, Series B, 10:339-41; and Ernst Reichard (ministerial advisor in the Finance Ministry), 1 March 1932, *ADAP*, Series B, 20:3-4.

71. Herbert von Dirksen, "Aufzeichnung über das danziger Zuschuss-Programm," 3 August 1927, *ADAP*, Series B, 6:173–77.