

Temperate Coercion: Aehrenthal's Balkan Diplomacy at the Outbreak of the Turco-Italian War

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In his memoirs, Sergei Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister in 1914, accused the late Habsburg Empire of having brought on the First World War by pursuing a reckless and aggressive policy in the Balkans. He not only condemned the policies of July, 1914, but also denounced the entire Austrian *Balkanpolitik* from 1908 to 1914.¹ Sazonov was neither the first nor the last to do so. Yet the question of the responsibility for the war of 1914 and the problem of Austro-Hungarian policies have not been resolved. Scholars still parcel out guilt and partial guilt, and the debate continues.

In defense of their arguments, critics of Austrian foreign policy are quick to point to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and the ultimatum to Serbia in 1914. But by generally neglecting the intervening years, these same critics (and also defenders of Austrian policy) overlook at least one important instance when Austro-Hungarian policy was dedicated to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans: the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912. This study does not attempt to absolve Austria of any responsibility for the cataclysm of 1914-1918, but examines the Balkan policy of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal (1906-1912), in the early stages of the Turco-Italian conflict. Yet this account of Aehrenthal's policies should counteract at least in part the stigma attached by Sazonov and others to the Austrian policy in the Balkans between 1908 and 1914.

Similarly, my conclusions should indicate how wrong some of Austria's opponents in 1911 were in their evaluation of Aehrenthal's intentions. One day before the outbreak of the

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Turco-Italian War, for example, the British ambassador in Belgrade wired home that Austria-Hungary was plotting to take advantage of the new crisis in order to occupy or at least to establish administrative hegemony over Albania.² Russian, Italian, and Serbian diplomats voiced similar concerns and occasionally proposed dangerous courses of action to counter the supposed threat. Regarding the alleged Austrian intrigues, the Serbian prime minister exclaimed that Serbia would meet the Austro-Hungarian challenge, even if it meant the end of the Serbian state.³ Thus, three years after Count Aehrenthal had engineered the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austria's rivals in Europe, and particularly her rivals in the Balkans, still looked upon her *Balkanpolitik* with jaundiced eyes.

Among her chief rivals in Europe and the Balkans, Austria-Hungary counted at least one "official" friend: the Kingdom of Italy. Ever since 1882, when Bismarck had coaxed traditionally hostile Austria-Hungary and Italy into joining together with Germany in a brotherly compact, Italy had been an increasingly reluctant and occasionally petulant partner in the Triple Alliance. In particular, for several years Italy's imperial activities had focused on the Adriatic coast, thereby coming into conflict with the traditional *macht*-political interests of the Dual Monarchy.

Aehrenthal's swift and unexpected annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October, 1908, only embittered the already difficult relations between Austria and Italy. Aehrenthal had not apprized his Italian ally of the move until it had virtually become a *fait accompli*. In September, 1911, with negotiations for renewal of the Triple Alliance already in progress, Italy returned the favor and moved against Turkey. Although Aehrenthal had originally looked upon Italy's Tripolitan adventure as a harmless way to divert Italian eyes from the Balkan coast, he soon came to the conclusion that the conflict between Turkey and Italy threatened to disturb the uneasy calm in the Balkans, and the peace of Europe as well. He acted accordingly.

II

After France had tightened her hold on Morocco in 1911, Italy moved to realize her own imperial ambitions in Tripoli. Claiming

maltreatment of Italian nationals in Tripoli and Ottoman biases against Italian economic ventures, the Italian government delivered an ultimatum to the Porte on September 27, 1911. Italy gave Turkey twenty-four hours to choose either an Italian occupation and administration of Tripoli, or war. Despite a conciliatory Turkish response to the demands, Italy declared war when the time limit expired on September 29.⁴

Although Italy informed Austria-Hungary of the decision to force a solution of the Tripolitan problem only one day before the ultimatum was delivered to Constantinople, Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, the Italian foreign minister, took pains to allay Vienna's concern regarding the possible effects of the Turco-Italian altercation on the Balkan peninsula. Already in August Aehrenthal had made it clear that he feared any action in Tripoli might provoke a military conflict with dangerous reverberations in the Balkans.⁵ San Giuliano was acutely aware of this possibility, but convinced himself and tried to convince Aehrenthal that a real danger did not exist. The Italian leader rationalized that the fall and winter of 1911 was an ideal time to move against Turkey. With a view toward justifying Italy's action, he interpreted conditions in the Balkans as being unfavorable for the outbreak of conflict there, particularly if Italy restricted her activities to the Mediterranean.⁶ San Giuliano stated further that the policy of Italy had always aimed at the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, and that Italy would not undertake anything now which could violate this policy. Although San Giuliano's remarks had been made to ease Austrian apprehensions of or opposition to the Italian action, Aehrenthal misconstrued the Italian foreign minister's statements to be pledges and statements of intent. Anticipating an easy solution to the quarrel with Turkey, Giuseppe Avarna di Gualtieri, the Italian ambassador at Vienna, added that after the liquidation of the Tripolitan question, Italy would be in an even better position to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.⁷

Aehrenthal believed that it was too late to keep Italy from her intended course of action, but he declined to inform Avarna of the Austrian government's official position. Aehrenthal wanted first to consult with Franz Josef and with Berlin. In the meantime,

however, he pointed out the friendly disposition of the Austro-Hungarian government toward Italy.⁸

Although Aehrenthal was not happy with Italy's action or San Giuliano's assurances, he promised not to place any obstacles in Italy's path. He also said that if a crisis did arise in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary would hold to her conservative policy but reserve freedom of action. "From the standpoint of our interest in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, I must express the hope that Italy, in the execution of the action, will avoid everything that could have the effect of spreading the conflict to the Balkans and to keep in mind the fact that the origins of the Triple Alliance trace back principally to the desire to keep the status quo in the Balkans."⁹ Britain's Lord Morley voiced Aehrenthal's fears when he remarked that the *Panther* was a gentle lamb in comparison with the present crisis.¹⁰

Despite San Giuliano's assurances given only the day before, it soon appeared that Morley's and Aehrenthal's worst apprehensions might be realized. Within hours of the declaration of war on Turkey, Italian ships fired on two Turkish torpedo boats, located not off the coast of Tripoli, but between Corfu and Prevesa on the Balkan coast. This "Prevesa incident" immediately placed a severe strain on diplomatic relations between Italy and Austria.¹¹ Aehrenthal called in the Italian ambassador and warned him against the landing of any Italian troops on the Balkan coast.¹² Avarna only made matters worse by insisting that the Italian action had been caused by the "aggressive attitude" of the Turkish ships, and that Italy would probably be forced to undertake more operations of a similar nature in the same waters. Aehrenthal abruptly told Avarna that Austria-Hungary would not tolerate any more hostilities in the Adriatic.¹³

In an angry message, Aehrenthal ordered the Austrian chargé d'affaires in Rome, Baron Ludwig von Ambrózy, to inform San Giuliano that "the active intervention of Italian sea-power on the coast of European Turkey stands in flagrant contradiction to the firm declaration [of September 26, 1911] made by Duke Avarna that the Italian government wants to localize the conflict and avoid everything that could endanger the status quo on the Balkan peninsula."¹⁴ He concluded the message by warning the

Italian government that "the repetition of such action on the Albanian coast . . . would lead to grave consequences."¹⁵

San Giuliano responded immediately to Aehrenthal's note by ordering Duke Abruzzi, the commander of Italian naval forces in the Adriatic, not to expand his operations off the coast of European Turkey and not to bombard the Albanian coast or Ionian ports and fortifications. But at the same time he refused to renounce unconditionally the right to destroy Turkish torpedo boats in Albanian harbors. He considered the Turkish ships a threat not only to the Adriatic harbors of Italy, but also to the transport of the future expeditionary corps to Tripoli. While voicing his own hopes for a localization of the war, San Giuliano refused to commit himself: "It is thus impossible to demand restrictions on the field of operations of one warring power, and let the other have complete freedom."¹⁶

In the space of three days, however, San Giuliano modified his position slightly, with due regard for Aehrenthal's position.¹⁷ He told Ambrózy that the Italian fleet had been ordered not to bombard Prevesa. Still, some Italian warships would remain in the Ionian Sea to keep an eye on the Turkish torpedo boats, and, should these leave their harbors, to destroy them. San Giuliano reiterated that these measures represented "un très grave inconvénient" for the Italian navy. Ambrózy advised the Ballhausplatz that even this "inconvénient" was probably wrung from the military command by San Giuliano only after a hard fight.¹⁸ San Giuliano considered it a concession to Aehrenthal, but did not call it that.

At this juncture, San Giuliano chose to ask Vienna to assume the protection of Italian interests in European Turkey through Austro-Hungarian consulates. Aehrenthal replied that he was prepared to fulfill the Italian request and thereby show new proof of Austria-Hungary's friendship for Italy.¹⁹ But in return for assuming the responsibility for Italians in precisely the "most sensitive spots" of European Turkey, Aehrenthal wanted more assurances on the order of those made by San Giuliano on the eve of the Italian ultimatum to Turkey. This time, however, he wanted them made in the name of the Italian government and to the effect that Italian maritime operations in the Adriatic and

Ionian Seas would remain restricted unless absolutely necessary, and that firing on the cities of the Turkish-Albanian littoral as well as landings there would be unconditionally interdicted.²⁰ Upset with these Austrian stipulations, San Giuliano told Ambrózy that "this triviality would arouse an unfavorable impression in the Ministerial Council."²¹ Even so, Ambrózy was convinced that San Giuliano would work to meet Aehrenthal's demands insofar as Giolitti, the prime minister, and the Italian military command would allow. Aehrenthal accepted the Italian commission.²²

Acting with one hand bound, San Giuliano moved reluctantly to fulfill Aehrenthal's wishes. At first San Giuliano said that Aehrenthal would have to be content with the assurance that Italy would not undertake any further military action like that at Prevesa. Still, Italy would not permit Turkish torpedo boats to endanger the Italian fleet. In this regard San Giuliano tried to assure Austria that the dangerous period of troop transport would be over in a few days.²³ On October 10, San Giuliano was able to make his first formal commitment regarding Aehrenthal's demands. After consulting Giolitti, San Giuliano made the formal pledge not to undertake any troop disembarkation on the Balkan coast under any circumstances.²⁴ Moreover, the Italian government made a similar pledge with regard to the bombardment of cities and fortifications along the Albanian coast, with the stipulation that Turkey send no more warships or torpedo boats to the regions. Both pledges, however, were not made gratis. San Giuliano attached two conditions: first, that Aehrenthal promise to keep the agreement secret; second, that he support Italy against any third power which might demand similar restrictions elsewhere.²⁵ Aehrenthal, however, did not want to bind himself in any fashion. Although he rejected the Italian conditions, he accepted the Italian promises. Aehrenthal told Mérey, the regular Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome, to pretend to know nothing of any conditions.²⁶ Aehrenthal made no further demands; the Italians made no further commitments. Thus matters stood when Italy annexed Tripoli on November 5, 1911.

III

An ill-fated proposal to neutralize formally the Adriatic and Ionian Seas as a theater of war was one outgrowth of Aehrenthal's efforts to prevent the warring parties from crossing swords in or around the Balkans. In response to Aehrenthal's harshly worded note of October 1, written immediately after the Italian naval action at Prevesa, San Giuliano made an effort to mollify his irate ally. Through Ambrózy, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, San Giuliano queried Aehrenthal if it would not be possible, through the mediation of friendly powers, to reach an accord with Turkey, not to end the war, but to localize it.²⁷ Aehrenthal did not answer the Italian foreign minister directly, but continued to insist on the restriction of Italian military operations in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas.²⁸ Under this pressure, San Giuliano worked out a proposal which he hoped would satisfy Aehrenthal's demands but would not obligate Italy to surrender her freedom of action along the Albanian coast without obtaining something from the Turks in return.

On October 9, the Italian ambassador at Vienna, Duke Avarna, discussed San Giuliano's plan for a partial neutralization of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas with Aehrenthal. San Giuliano's plan, not yet a formal proposal, was to create a zone bounded on the west by the meridian crossing through Antivari on the Dalmatian coast, on the east by the littoral of Albania, the Epirus, and Greece, and on the north and south by the 42nd and 38th parallels. The warring powers would obligate themselves not to undertake any kind of military operation in this neutral zone. Regarding a similar limitation of military activity in the Red Sea, however, where the Italian navy was also active, San Giuliano merely reserved the right to examine the question further and consult Great Britain, the power most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Red Sea region.²⁹

Favorably impressed by the Italian foreign minister's suggestions for neutralization, Aehrenthal offered, should the Italian government entrust him with the mission, to undertake a probe of the question with the Porte. On October 12, Avarna submitted to Aehrenthal the formal proposal for neutralization and requested his good offices in bringing the matter to the attention of the Turkish government. In substance the new

proposal was very much like the plan of October 9. Italy agreed not to engage in any active military operations in the neutral zone, provided the Turks not transport troops or munitions in the same area. San Giuliano's proposal made no further stipulations, and, importantly, failed to mention the possibility of interdicting military operations in the Red Sea.³⁰

Aehrenthal, however, did not want to lose any opportunity to neutralize at least one theater of war, particularly the one he feared most. Any chance of defusing Europe's powder keg was worth the effort. Accordingly, Aehrenthal instructed Margrave Johann von Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople, to take up the Italian proposal with the Porte when the opportunity presented itself.³¹

Unfortunately, that opportunity never came. In the previous week, the Italian government had rather brusquely rejected generous Turkish offers for a cease-fire and negotiations.³² Now the Porte would not listen to Italian proposals. Pallavicini told Aehrenthal that a zone of neutralization restricted only to the area of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas had little advantage for Turkey. Besides, some Turks were (rightly) convinced that Austria-Hungary had already succeeded in forcing Italy to restrict her military operations off the coast of Albania and the Epirus.³³ In this case, Turkish acceptance of the Italian proposal would have meant a foolhardy restriction of Turkey's freedom of action without a meaningful *quid pro quo*.

Perhaps the Red Sea was the missing *quid*. Although San Giuliano had considered it, and the British had agreed to it,³⁴ the offer of neutralizing the Red Sea was not included in the proposal. Thus, one ingredient which would have made the Italian overture more palatable for the Turks was missing. As early as October 6, Said Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier, had made it clear that any exclusion of the Albanian coast from military operations should be accompanied by a neutralization of the Red Sea as well.³⁵

Aehrenthal, although disappointed, did not force the issue. If Avarna ever brought the subject up, Aehrenthal decided to tell him that the time simply was not ripe, and to leave it to Vienna to choose the most favorable moment for the transmission of San Giuliano's proposal.³⁶ But a more favorable moment never came. In effect the proposal was dropped. Aehrenthal had to content

himself with the assurances of the Italian government, some voluntary, but most extracted, restricting Italian military operations in the proximity of the Balkans.

IV

When Italy delivered her ultimatum to the Porte on September 27, the Balkans were relatively tranquil. Cables to and from the Ballhausplatz addressed themselves not to the habitual unrest exhibited by most of the states of the peninsula, but to the possible state visit of King Peter I of Serbia to the Habsburg Empire, and the marriage of his daughter to a Russian prince.³⁷ Within days, however, the Balkans were drawn into the vortex of a European crisis. Count Aehrenthal and his colleagues in the foreign ministry confronted the formidable task of containing the territorial rapacity of the various Balkan states, and preventing any brushfire on the peninsula from developing into a pan-European conflagration.³⁸

At a diplomatic reception on September 28, Aehrenthal explained his viewpoint to the British ambassador and *chargés d'affaires* of Germany, Russia, and France. It was the same now as it had been at the beginning of difficulties between Italy and Turkey: peace must be maintained in the Balkans. He had worked in Rome and Constantinople to avoid the impending conflict, but because of Turkey's "negligence" and Italy's "rashness" there remained nothing more for the Powers to do than to make sure that the fire did not spread to European Turkey. To this end Aehrenthal suggested that the Powers insist that the Golden Horn on the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans.³⁹ Of course, the same impression had to be made on the Balkan states as well. Aehrenthal spoke personally to the representatives of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, and cabled his position to Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cetinje.⁴⁰

Aehrenthal was not the only one who recognized the importance of the Turco-Italian conflict for the Balkans. Other great-power statesmen and the Balkan leaders particularly were equally cognizant of the significance and possibilities of the moment. On September 28, the same day as Aehrenthal's reception, Milovan Milovanović, the Serbian foreign minister, displayed commendable accuracy in projecting the course of

events in the Balkans. He told Stefan von Ugron zu Ábránfalva, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade, that if the conflict between Italy and Turkey became protracted, repercussions in the peninsula would be inevitable. Montenegro would use the opportunity to make far-reaching demands for Turkish territory, and Bulgaria would follow her example.⁴¹ Milovanović, however, like the foreign ministers of other Balkan states, assured Vienna that his country would join such a movement only in the remotest instance.⁴²

One instance which did cause Vienna concern pertained to reports of a general arming of Muslims in the Sanjak of Novibazar and along the Serbian border. These reports evoked among Serbians a fear for the safety of the Christian population in the Turkish territory.⁴³ Aehrenthal was quick to tell the Serbian ambassador, George Simić, that although an arming of Muslims along the Serbo-Turkish frontier was not unthinkable, it was improbable, and in any case unsubstantiated.⁴⁴ At the same time, however, he urged the Porte to refrain from taking such dubious measures along an already precarious frontier, and in particular to avoid the deployment of irregular Turkish troops along the Serbian border.⁴⁵ Aehrenthal instructed Ugron to tell Milovanović that there was no cause for the Serbian government to take any precipitate action. Instead, he urged the Serbian government to employ its "good relations" with the Porte to obtain explanations and assurances from the Turkish government.⁴⁶ After these diplomatic suggestions were acted upon, the problem of armed Muslims in the Sanjak fell to the wayside.

The Austrian military attaché in Belgrade, Otto Gellinek, touched upon one additional aspect of the Sanjak question and Serbian activity, which concerned the relations of Serbia and Austria-Hungary directly, and, ultimately, the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Writing with a poison pen,⁴⁷ Gellinek reported to Conrad von Hoetzendorf, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, that Serbia, already covetous of the Sanjak of Novibazar, now suffered from an outbreak of "phantasy" — the fear that Austria would re-occupy that narrow strip of land between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires on the other. The

Serbian newspapers printed reports from Agram (Zagreb), Sarajevo, Plevlje, and Višegrad, of Austrian troop transport and deployment, trips of ranking officers to Vienna, tight security on the Bosnian-Herzegovinan frontier, and the like, all pointing, in Serbian eyes, to an imminent Austrian re-occupation of the Sanjak.⁴⁸ These reports were false and misleading. Austria had no intention of re-occupying the Sanjak.⁴⁹ Aehrenthal, however, for reasons to be considered later, did not refute these rumors. The initial diplomatic coup connected with the Sanjak question came not from the Austrian or Serbian side, but, surprisingly, from Montenegro. Serbia remained quiet on the diplomatic front until immediately after the Italian annexation of Tripoli, when reports began to circulate regarding a secret Serb nationalist group, "The Black Hand."⁵⁰ It augured things to come.

Montenegro, despite her size and in large measure because of it, was the Balkan state most eager to turn the Turco-Italian conflict to her own advantage. The tiny kingdom had long coveted Turkish territory to the south, and aged King Nicholas even dreamed of unifying Montenegro and Albania under his own crown.⁵¹ With these *desiderata* in mind, the Montenegrin government offered Italy its services in the war against Turkey. More precisely, Montenegro offered to invade Turkish Albania.⁵² San Giuliano however, with an eye toward Vienna, resolutely rejected the Albanian overture.⁵³ At the same time, King Nicholas, displaying a gift for duplicity, told his foreign minister, Dušan Gregović, to assure Vienna that Montenegro would honor Aehrenthal's proposals of September 28 for peace in the Balkans.⁵⁴ Aehrenthal, although aware of Montenegro's covert machinations against Albania, did not chastise the Montenegrin government, but merely reiterated his insistence on the maintenance of the status quo in the region.⁵⁵

Baron Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Cetinje, was of the opinion that Montenegro, despite her Italian flirtation, would follow a peaceful policy provided the inner conditions of the Ottoman Empire did not fundamentally change, that is, if there were no convulsions which threatened the continued existence of Turkey as a European state. As for Albania, for whose political rumblings Cetinje had a particularly good ear, all was quiet. The English, French, and

Russian ambassadors admonished Montenegro to keep the peace, but Gregović responded excitedly to Giesl, perhaps tongue in cheek, that he could not understand the purpose of these visits in view of the peaceful policy and disposition of Montenegro. In a similar vein, King Nicholas told the German ambassador that he would go along with Austria-Hungary "through thick and thin," and observe Aehrenthal's proposals for peace in the Balkans.⁵⁶

On October 17, Giesl reported to Aehrenthal on the Sanjak rumors, which had already excited public opinion in Serbia. According to Giesl's accounts, the rumors that Austria-Hungary was planning to re-occupy the Sanjak, and had accordingly strengthened the border garrisons, found a home in the various Slavic embassies in Cetinje, particularly the Russian.⁵⁷ Some stories had it that an agreement had already been signed in Vienna between Aehrenthal and Gregović so that in case of an Austrian re-occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar, Montenegro would acquire Skutari, Berane or some other portion of Turkish territory. The Montenegrin government lent credence to this version by remaining silent.⁵⁸

When Aehrenthal heard of this, he was delighted. Contrary to what one might initially expect, Aehrenthal believed that one way to keep the peace in the Balkans was to cultivate fear and doubt in the minds of statesmen regarding Austrian intentions. Aehrenthal explained to Giesl that "Serbia and Russia especially — but also Italy — have presently a great interest in keeping the peace in the Balkans. The more these states believe in the possibility of the intervention of our troops in the Sanjak, the greater will be their fear to exploit complications in the Balkans to the point of crisis, the more vigorous they will work not to destroy the peace in the Balkans."⁵⁹ Accordingly, Aehrenthal, despite the fact that the rumors contained no grain of truth, instructed Giesl to take no position against them.⁶⁰

One surprising development associated with Aehrenthal's attitude was that the Sanjak rumors apparently became an article of faith not only with the Serbs, but also with King Nicholas of Montenegro. Although he knew that no agreement had been signed by Aehrenthal and Gregović providing for the Austrian re-occupation of the Sanjak or Montenegrin acquisition of Turkish land, Nicholas set out to achieve an analogous understanding with

the Austrian government. In a remarkable interview on October 31, King Nicholas pleaded with Giesl to travel to Vienna and present Aehrenthal with a secret treaty which would "secure the political future of the [Montenegrin] kingdom."⁶¹ In an almost comical display of monarchial obsequiousness, Nicholas in effect prostrated himself before the Austrian eagle. In his opening remarks to Giesl, the king pointed out his loyalty to the Habsburg Empire: "Two years ago I told you that I wanted to go hand in hand with the [Austro-Hungarian] Monarchy — with body and soul — this has cost me much reproach, however, I maintain that it is right and shall go even further."⁶² Then, angling toward the crux of his argument, he explained how far he was willing to go in order to close a pact with Aehrenthal: "I pledge myself and my land — and this should be written down in a convention — always to follow Austria-Hungary's advice . . . I place my army of 40-50,000 men . . . at the service of Austria-Hungary against every enemy except Russia and Serbia — *I will even march against Italy.*"⁶³ In return for his generous support, Nicholas wanted an Austro-Hungarian endorsement of Montenegrin claims in North Albania, should the liquidation of Turkey ever commence. The king, ever mindful of his cherished goal, told Giesl: "I shall do everything Austria-Hungary wants — for example, place a kingdom of Montenegro united with North Albania under the protection of Austria-Hungary."⁶⁴

King Nicholas was plainly fishing in the wrong waters if he expected to bait Aehrenthal. The Austrian minister, astonished and angry at the Montenegrin proposals, refused them out of hand, and this time rebuked Nicholas for his inane schemes which threatened to subvert Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy. Aehrenthal reminded Nicholas that Austria-Hungary, through the floatation of loans, construction of roads and railroads, etc., had repeatedly demonstrated that she had the interests of Montenegro at heart. Now Aehrenthal, holding out an economic plum to Nicholas, explained that Austria-Hungary was prepared to continue this policy, provided that her strivings were duly appreciated by the Montenegrin king, and that Nicholas did not neglect Austria-Hungary's interests in the pursuit of his own. To soften the edge of his remarks and also give them additional

savor, Aehrenthal intimated that a customs union between Montenegro and Austria-Hungary could probably be arranged within three or four years.⁶⁵ Aehrenthal's proposals were made with the express purpose of subduing the venturesomeness of the tiny kingdom. He knew well which corner of the Balkans might be expected to toss the first stone against the crumbling Ottoman facade.

Greece was the southern bastion of the Balkan *Kleinstaaterei*. Like Montenegro, she cast a covetous eye on the Balkan possessions of the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks wanted an immediate solution to the Cretan problem, and, more importantly for Turkey, entertained grandiose aspirations of expanding into the Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace. Still, the Greeks were not militarily prepared to take on the Turks alone. On October 1, the prime minister of Greece, Eleutheros Venizelos, himself a Cretan, discussed the new Turco-Italian crisis with Baron Karl Braun, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Athens. Venizelos was disturbed by reports of Turkish mobilization in the neighboring vilayet of Janina.⁶⁶ Although he did not believe that the rumors of a general Turkish mobilization were true, he pointed out the danger to Greece of having mobilized Turkish units on her doorstep. Despite this threat, Venizelos pledged that Greece would not mobilize her army at this time, but, in order to strengthen the garrison at Artá, opposite Janina, he reserved the right to mobilize a single regiment. Should this step become necessary, he urged Vienna to look upon it as a direct consequence of Turkey's mobilization in Janina. In any event, Venizelos assured Braun that Greece would not take advantage of the present situation in Turkey,⁶⁷ but, should Turkey antagonize Greece (which he doubted) or should other powers complicate the situation (which Aehrenthal feared), Greece would not ignore her own interests.⁶⁸

Aehrenthal interpreted the mobilization of even one regiment as representing one step closer to the Balkan conflict he aimed to prevent. Accordingly, he urged the Porte to assure the Balkan states of Turkey's peaceful intentions.⁶⁹ Moreover, Aehrenthal personally told the representatives of the Balkan states, including the Greek ambassador, that it was his opinion that such measures as mobilization were taken by the Turkish government only

because the Ottoman Empire was at war with Italy and had to provide for the possibility of domestic complications, not because the Porte plotted aggression against any Balkan state.⁷⁰

On October 18, the Greek ambassador at Vienna, George Streit, informed Aehrenthal that Said Pasha had allayed the earlier Greek apprehensions concerning Turkish mobilization by making known some details of the Turkish military activity in Janina, and providing Venizelos with the formal assurance that the Turkish measures contained no kind of aggressive disposition toward Greece. Streit pointed out that although the Greek government would continue to watch developments in Turkey, the Turkish pronouncement and explanations now enabled Greece to forego the necessity of any mobilization.⁷¹ Thus, Aehrenthal achieved a minor victory in his quest to reduce tensions in the Balkans. He faced a similar problem in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria, like Greece, had a long common frontier with Turkey, and also aspired to large tracts of Ottoman territory.⁷² When the Turco-Italian conflict broke out, T. Todorov, the Bulgarian finance minister and acting prime minister, assured Vienna of Bulgaria's friendly disposition toward Turkey, and remarked that the Tripoli affair should not change this. Tripoli was not the affair of Bulgaria, and he professed to be indifferent to what happened there. The minister's only fear was for the effects of the controversy on the domestic situation in Turkey. If anarchic conditions should develop in the Ottoman Empire, then the Balkan states, including Bulgaria, which had to defend their "nationals" in European Turkey, would be hard pressed to take action.⁷³ King Ferdinand, however, let it be known that only excesses and massacres in Macedonia, which had a large Bulgar population, could force the Bulgarians to take up arms.⁷⁴ After appraising conditions in Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Sofia, Count Adam Tarnowski von Tarnow, reported to Aehrenthal that he had no reason to doubt that Bulgaria would remain calm as long as the conflict remained localized and no domestic upheaval erupted in Turkey.⁷⁵

Within a week, however, a crisis of the first order had developed in the Bulgarian capital. The mobilization of Turkish troops in the Ottoman vilayet of Adrianople, along Bulgaria's southern frontier, generated as much anxiety in Sofia as the

similar mobilization along the Greek border had in Athens.⁷⁶ Although Ivan Gešov, the regular prime minister, had also given Aehrenthal the "strongest assurances" of Bulgaria's peaceful intentions, he found upon his return to Sofia an excited public opinion and a cabinet almost frenetic about the Turkish measures. In response to the Turkish mobilization, the Bulgarian cabinet, in Gešov's absence, had decided upon the partial mobilization of the army, in particular of divisions along the Turkish border. Gešov, however, wanted to avoid all countermeasures of this sort. He realized, as did Aehrenthal, that the mobilization of even one division would mean a "trâinée de poudre." Despite the vigorous opposition of the war minister, Major-General Nikyphorov, Gešov succeeded in having the cabinet order rescinded, at least temporarily.⁷⁷

But the assurances of the Porte that it entertained no aggressive designs against Bulgaria did not mollify the jittery Bulgarians.⁷⁸ Gešov complained to Tarnowski that he did not understand why the Turkish mobilization had taken place along the Bulgarian border, in places where there was no unrest. Turkish troops were reported concentrated in Adrianople, Rodosto, and Kirk Kilise. Because of the strength of the military party in the Bulgarian cabinet, Gešov explained that the Turkish assurances would mean something only if guaranteed by the Great Powers: "I must have at least this," or be forced by responsibility and public opinion to acquiesce in the mobilization of the Bulgarian army.⁷⁹ Within twenty-four hours, Bulgarian representatives were instructed to present Gešov's *démarche* to the Great Powers.⁸⁰

Aehrenthal, responding immediately to the new crisis in Sofia, wired his ambassador in Constantinople. He implored the Turkish government to restrict military activities in European Turkey to those most essential for the prosecution of the war against Italy and the maintenance of peace at home, and, in particular, to avoid creating any disturbance in the Adrianople and Macedonian vilayets.⁸¹ Aehrenthal pointed out that the massing of Turkish troops at critical points along the Bulgarian border could only be viewed with apprehension in Sofia, if not with outright alarm. As Assim Bey had just been appointed to head the Ottoman foreign ministry, Aehrenthal also suggested that this was an opportune time for Turkey to smooth over relations with her flustered neighbor.⁸²

Gešov, duly informed of Aehrenthal's exertions at the Golden Horn, asked Tarnowski to transmit to Aehrenthal his deepest gratitude. Gešov only hoped that Aehrenthal's actions would calm the Bulgarian cabinet, especially as new reports had been received which told of the extension of Turkish measures in Adrianople and Kirk Kilise.⁸³ But although he certainly appreciated Aehrenthal's endeavors in Constantinople, Gešov wanted the Austrian foreign minister to go one step further and assent to his *démarche*. He explained to Tarnowski that he needed a great-power guarantee, if for no other reason than to preserve his political position against the demands of public opinion and the military party in Sofia.⁸⁴ King Ferdinand was scheduled to return to the capital soon, and Gešov wanted the monarch's support against the agitation of the war minister. Aehrenthal, however, when formally presented with the Bulgarian *démarche*, merely told Sallabašev, the Bulgarian ambassador in Vienna, what he had already wired Sofia: that the Bulgarian government should utilize the appointment of Assim Bey as new Ottoman foreign minister to request explanations and further assurances from the Turkish government.⁸⁵ Aehrenthal was reluctant to accede to Gešov's *démarche*, not because he thought the situation in Sofia was not serious, but because he thought that it was not critical enough to require formal guarantees on the part of the Great Powers. Aehrenthal was confident that the difficulties between Bulgaria and Turkey could just as well be set aside through bilateral discussions between the two governments as through the formal intervention of the Great Powers.

Developments in the Balkans convinced Aehrenthal that his position was correct. In the first place, Turkish measures along the Bulgarian frontier were not designed to intimidate the Bulgarians. The Austro-Hungarian consulate in Adrianople reported that the Turkish mobilization in that vilayet was limited in scope and not aimed at offensive action.⁸⁶ Secondly, Bulgaria and Turkey managed to achieve a *détente* on their own.⁸⁷ On October 14, Assim Bey carefully explained the Turkish measures to the Bulgarian government and once more pledged Turkey's good intentions toward Bulgaria. Tarnowski informed Aehrenthal that Assim Bey's assurances had made a good impression in Sofia, and that the press was quiet and the government

satisfied.⁸⁸ Aehrenthal now hoped that Gešov would be as content with Turkish pledges as Venizelos in Athens.

Such was not to be the case. Whereas Aehrenthal had forged ahead in trying to allay the initial fears of the Bulgarians, and in large measure had achieved his goal, Anatol Neratov, the acting Russian foreign minister, now took the lead in pressing for great-power acceptance of Gešov's *démarche*.⁸⁹ Neratov was of the opinion that it was still necessary to strengthen Gešov's hand against the military party in Sofia.⁹⁰ He urged the cabinets of the Great Powers, through their representatives in Sofia, to declare their trust in the sincerity of the Turkish pledges. At the same time, he advised the cabinets to tell the Ottoman government of their action.⁹¹ Aehrenthal, however, when queried by the Russian ambassador regarding the position of the Austrian government, replied that his sources had indicated that a *détente* had already been reached between Bulgaria and Turkey, and under these conditions there was no need for any action by the Great Powers.⁹² Still, Aehrenthal did not reject Neratov's proposals on all counts. If the Powers were to pursue the project in order to strengthen Gešov's position, then he was willing to agree to an oral *démarche*.⁹³ Similarly, if unrest should develop once more between Sofia and Constantinople, then he would consider taking part in a common effort of the Great Powers "in the sense" of Neratov's suggestion.⁹⁴

Whereas the Austrian foreign minister was reluctant to take the Bulgarian plunge, Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter, Aehrenthal's counterpart in the Wilhelmstrasse, was not. Kiderlen first wired St. Petersburg that he was in agreement with Neratov's proposed *modus procedendi*, and then turned his attention to persuading Aehrenthal that action by the Powers in Sofia would be useful, even if unnecessary.⁹⁵ Under pressure from his German ally, Aehrenthal finally consented to an oral *démarche*, and commissioned Tarnowski to participate in the collective action in Sofia.⁹⁶

At this juncture, Below-Saleske, the German ambassador in Sofia, informed Tarnowski that he had been authorized to deliver a written declaration to the Bulgarian government, but only if the Russian ambassador and Tarnowski received similar instructions. But Aehrenthal, who had already given ground to

Kiderlen-Waechter on the question of an oral *démarche*, refused to yield any more on this new count. He wrote in the margin of Tarnowski's dispatch: "My instructions remain the same."⁹⁷

Tarnowski, on the other hand, was hesitant to go even that far without first taking additional steps. Fearful of Russian influence in Sofia, he wired Aehrenthal that Austria's reluctance to accept the Neratov proposal could only hurt the Monarchy's already precarious position in Bulgaria, but at the same time acceptance of the *démarche* would benefit only Russia.⁹⁸ In order to circumvent the possibility of Russia winning all the laurels for the collective action, Tarnowski now urged Aehrenthal to authorize him to show Gešov the final sentence of a dispatch of October 20, which in effect demonstrated that Austria-Hungary had already acted in the sense of the Neratov proposal before formally agreeing to it.⁹⁹ Aehrenthal, apprehensive of having Austria's participation in the collective action degenerate into a thankless exercise, agreed to Tarnowski's suggestion, which was immediately acted upon by Tarnowski himself.¹⁰⁰

The Austrian ambassador was satisfied with the fruits of his labors. Gešov praised Aehrenthal for the "spontaneous step," taken independent of the other Great Powers.¹⁰¹ Even so, Gešov indicated that he still placed some importance on the collective action. This time Aehrenthal consented. Accordingly, on October 28, Tarnowski and the envoys of Germany, France, and Russia made their declarations to the Bulgarian prime minister. Gešov expressed his appreciation for the support of the Powers.¹⁰² For the time being at least, Bulgaria remained tranquil.

Rumania, on the periphery of the Balkans, politically as well as geographically, did not experience the same kind of crisis as Bulgaria or the other Balkan states. Without a common frontier with Turkey, Rumania would not benefit directly from the dismemberment of European Turkey. Consequently, the Rumanian government did not revel in the discomfiture of the Porte after the Italian declaration of war, or plot any disturbance which might lead to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Rumania stood aloof from the Turco-Italian conflict, observing strict neutrality and intimating intervention only if the Bulgarians took action against the Turks.¹⁰³

Because of Rumania's unique position among the Balkan states,

Aehrenthal took Bucharest into his special confidence, particularly during the final week before the Italian annexation of Tripoli.¹⁰⁴ At this time the Powers were engaged in an unavailing flurry of diplomatic exchange aimed at achieving collective mediation of the Turco-Italian conflict.¹⁰⁵ King Carol and Peter Carp, the prime minister, expressed great satisfaction that Aehrenthal placed the main emphasis of his diplomatic endeavor on keeping the status quo in the Balkans.¹⁰⁶ Carp, however, was pessimistic concerning the chances of achieving this object during the Turco-Italian War. Anticipating the Balkan Wars, he explained that "two begin the round, and many finish it."¹⁰⁷

V

The cornerstone of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy during the course of the Turco-Italian War (at least during Count Aehrenthal's lifetime) was the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. To achieve this end, the Austrian foreign minister sought to localize the conflict, eliminate the Balkan coast as a theater of war, and restrain the restless Balkan states from embarking on any foolhardy projects which might endanger the general European peace.

Before the Italian annexation of Tripoli on November 5 frustrated great-power efforts to mediate peace, Aehrenthal's measures to maintain the status quo in the Balkans had met with considerable success. Despite his failure to achieve the construction of a neutral zone in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, the Austrian foreign minister was able to extract from Italy pledges to limit that country's naval operations off the coast of European Turkey. Moreover, Aehrenthal's efforts to pacify the Balkan peninsula prevailed in varying degrees against the fears and aspirations of the Balkan states vis-à-vis Turkey. In the days between the outbreak of war and November 5, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro all passed through crises stemming from the Turco-Italian conflict. Only Rumania remained tranquil. By November 5, however, it became increasingly clear what turmoil a prolonged struggle between Italy and Turkey might spawn in the Balkans. Already Montenegro had broached with Vienna the subject of Montenegrin occupation of Turkish Albanian territory, and the "Black Hand" had made its presence felt in Serbia.

Aehrenthal combined his dogged insistence on the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans with a marked reluctance to bind himself formally to certain measures which might have helped secure his goal. In one instance, he refused to accept the two conditions attached to San Giuliano's formal pledges of October 10. Another time he balked at participating in the collective action of the Great Powers in Sofia, although he had already acted in the sense of the Neratov proposal. Aehrenthal pursued his goal of Balkan peace along several avenues, some of which occasionally led him to unexpected destinations. His notion that the interest of peace would be served by leaving the Sanjak rumors unanswered prompted Montenegro to seek a realization of those rumors, ultimately to the detriment of peace in the Balkans. In most instances, however, Aehrenthal conducted his policy in conventional channels. Time and again he played the role of mediator, and performed it well. Although Aehrenthal himself considered his diplomatic exertions to maintain the status quo in the Balkans to be only stop-gap measures, he was nonetheless willing to persist in them. On October 21, he wrote the other Great Powers: "I am prepared to continue my efforts for the localization of the military operations as well as for the pacification of the Balkan states in the future, but I suffer no illusion that this diplomatic activity represents anything but a palliative, whose effectiveness is therefore neither sure nor lasting, because it allows the evil to continue to exist at its root. The main goal remains to achieve an end to the war between Italy and Turkey." ¹⁰⁸

Unfortunately, the Italian decree of November 5 minimized the chances of reaching a settlement in the near future. Aehrenthal was convinced that the Turks would only prosecute the war with greater vigor than before.¹⁰⁹ If the Italian ultimatum of September 27 had opened up a Pandora's box for Austrian efforts to pacify the Balkans, the Italian annexation of November 5 now kept the lid firmly open. The Balkans simmered until they finally boiled over in the autumn of 1912.

In fact, the long-awaited resolution of the Turco-Italian War was forced by the outbreak of the First Balkan War. Diminutive Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912. Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria followed the Montenegrin lead

within a week. Because of this danger to her northern frontier, as well as Italian threats to expand the war in the Aegean, Turkey signed the secret Treaty of Ouchey on October 15. Only then, in the wake of what actually was a military misadventure for Italy, did the members of the Triple Alliance renew their pact.¹¹⁰ Aehrenthal, however, did not live to see the end of the old war, which he had endeavored to conclude, or the beginning of the new one, which he had labored to stave off. Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, a villain in the eyes of Sazonov, died of leukemia on February 17, 1912.

NOTES

1. Serge Sazonov, *The Fateful Years, 1909-1916: the Reminiscences of Serge Sazonov*, London, Cape, 1928, *passim*.
2. Paget-Grey, 28 September 1911, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (hereinafter cited *B.D.*), ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, 11 vols., London, 1926-1938, IX, Nr. 249.
3. Paget-Grey, 28 September 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 249.
4. The best specialized treatment of the Turco-Italian war is in William C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1942. The best general treatment of the war is in Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, trans. and ed. by Isabella M. Massey, 3 vols., London, Oxford University Press, 1952, I, pp. 345-63. For an excellent account of the diplomatic negotiations and agreements by which Italy secured recognition of her rights in Tripoli before the war, see Fritz Fellner, *Der Dreibund: Europäische Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Munich, Oldenbourg Verlag, 1954.
5. Directive from Aehrenthal to Constantinople, Rome, and Berlin, 31 July 1911, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914: Diplomatische Aktenstuecke des oesterreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aeussern* (hereinafter cited *Oe-U.*) ed. by L. Bittner, F. Pribram, H. Srbik, and H. Uebersberger, 9 vols., Vienna, 1930, III, Nr. 2576.
6. Giolitti, on the other hand, listed the "Austrian" rather than the "Balkan" problem among his reasons for moving against Tripoli. In his memoirs, the Italian prime minister stated that when he learned that Aehrenthal had expressed displeasure concerning Italy's position in Tripoli (sometime after the onset of the Morocco Crisis of 1911), he decided to force the question. Giovanni Giolitti, *Memoirs of My Life*, tr. by Edward Storer, London, Chapman and Dodd, 1923, p. 275.
7. Bulletin on the visit of the Italian ambassador, 26 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2654.
8. Aehrenthal-Flotow, 27 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2655.
9. Aehrenthal-Flotow, 27 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2655. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Italy had requested an early renewal of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Renewal negotiations continued off and on for the duration of the Turco-Italian War. Fellner, *Der Dreibund*, pp. 74-83.

10. Morley was referring to the German gunboat, *Panther*, whose anchorage at Agadir, Morocco, provoked a major diplomatic crisis in the summer of 1911. See, for example, Albertini, *Origins of the War*, pp. 327-40; Oswald Henry Wedel, *Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, 1908-1914*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1932, pp. 125-35.

11. The effect of Prevesa was obvious. Cartwright, the British ambassador in Vienna, wrote Sir Edward Grey that diplomatic relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary were "on the verge of being seriously disturbed by the incidents in the Adriatic." Cartwright-Grey, 11 October 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 283.

12. Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918*, 5 vols., Vienna, Rikola Verlag, 1921, II, p. 175; Albertini, *Origins of the War*, p. 346.

13. Tschirschky to Foreign Office, 1 October 1911, *Die Grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswaertigen Amtes* (hereinafter cited *G.P.*), ed. by J. Lepsius, F. Thimme, and A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, 40 vols., Berlin, 1922-1926, XXX, Nr. 10857.

14. Aehrenthal-Ambrózy, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2683.

15. Aehrenthal-Ambrózy, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2683. Aehrenthal informed Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna, of the content of the note. Tschirschky to Foreign Office, 1 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10857.

16. Ambrózy-Aehrenthal, 2 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2692.

17. San Giuliano had requested that Germany act to calm the Austrian foreign minister. Jagow to Foreign Office, 2 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10863. In turn, Bethmann Hollweg requested that Italy refrain from firing on the Albanian coast, restrict her military activities to blockading and observing Trukish ships, and avoid at all cost the landing of troops on the coast of European Turkey. Bethmann Hollweg-Tschirschky, 3 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10865.

18. Ambrózy-Aehrenthal, 5 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2714.

19. The towns with consultates were Skutari, Durazzo, Janina, Valona, Monastir, Uskub (Skopje), and Prisen. Aehrenthal-Ambrózy, 6 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2723(b).

20. Aehrenthal-Ambrózy, 6 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2723(b).

21. Ambrózy-Aehrenthal, 6 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2723.

22. Directive from Aehrenthal to Rome, 16 December 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 3123. And in fact, San Giuliano repeated his orders to the Duke of Abruzzi to restrict his operations in the Adriatic. Jagow-Bethmann Hollweg, 6 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10874.

23. Mérey-Aehrenthal, 8 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2731.

24. In his memoirs, Giolitti stated that Italy refrained from landing troops because Austria-Hungary might have moved to occupy Durazzo. Giolitti, *Memoirs*, p. 283.

25. Mérey-Aehrenthal, 10 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2740.

26. Aehrenthal-Mérey, 12 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2746.

27. Ambrózy-Aehrenthal, 2 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2692.

28. Aehrenthal-Ambrózy, 5 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2713.

29. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Rome and Berlin, 10 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2738. The Italian inquiry into the question was made in London on October 11. Grey-Rodd, 11 October 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 282.

30. Notice of the Italian embassy in Vienna, 12 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III Nr. 2747.
31. Aehrenthal-Pallavicini, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2761. Kiderlen directed Marschall to support Pallavicini's efforts to achieve neutralization. Kiderlen-Marschall, 14 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10886.
32. Mérey-Aehrenthal, 8 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2730; Pallavicini-Aehrenthal, 9 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2732; Mérey-Aehrenthal, 10 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2739.
33. Pallavicini-Aehrenthal, 16 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2768.
34. Jagow-Bethmann Hollweg, 17 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10899.
35. Pallavicini-Aehrenthal, 7 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2726. Moreover, Said Pasha had discussed the question of an effective neutralization of the Adriatic and Red Seas with Marschall in Constantinople. Kiderlen-Jagow, 9 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10881.
36. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Rome, Berlin, and Constantinople, 18 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2782.
37. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 21 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2641; Szilassy-Aehrenthal, 26 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2649; Ugron-Aehrenthal, 26 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2650.
38. Some remarks of the Serbian prime minister indicate the tenuous nature of peace in the Balkans and the land hunger of most Balkan states: "We are prepared to fight either at the side of Austria and others to get Turkish territory or by the side of Turkey and others against Austria." Paget-Grey, 28 September 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 249.
39. Telegram from Aehrenthal to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Constantinople, and Bucharest, 29 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2666.
40. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Balkan capitals, 29 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2673.
41. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 28 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2661. Milovanović made similar remarks to the British and Russian envoys, but at the same time insisted that Austria intended to foment trouble in the Balkans. Paget-Grey, 28 September 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 249; Hartwig-Neratov, 1 October 1911, *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus; Dokumente aus den Archiven der zarischen und der provisorischen Regierung* (hereinafter cited *I.B.*), ed. by Otto Hoetzsch, 3d series, 4 vols., Berlin, 1930 et. seq., 1-2 (The hyphenated Arabic numeral indicates the part number. Dates are given according to the western calendar.), Nr. 506.
42. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 28 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2661.
43. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople and Bucharest, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2763; Askew, *Europe and Libya*, pp. 74-5. For a short but illuminating account of the position of Christians in Albania at the same time and under similar circumstances, see Andrew D. Kalmykow, *Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917*, ed. by Alexandra Kalmykow, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 224-26.
44. Aehrenthal-Ugron, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III Nr. 2759.
45. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople and Bucharest, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2763.

46. Aehrenthal-Ugron, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2759.
47. Like Conrad von Hoetzendorf, who also wrote about Serbia in disparaging terms, Gellinek was no friend of Serbia. For accounts of Conrad's attitude toward Serbia and the Turco-Italian War, and of his famous quarrel with Aehrenthal, which resulted in the chief of staff's temporary dismissal, see Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, II, especially pp. 157-290; Albertini, *Origins of the War*, pp. 349-52; Oskar Regele, *Feldmarschall Conrad. Auftrag und Erfuellung, 1906-1918*, Vienna, Verlag Herold, 1955; Solomon Wank, "Some Reflections on Conrad von Hoetzendorf and his Memoirs Based on Old and New Sources," in *Austrian History Yearbook*, I (1965), pp. 74-89; Alfred von Wittich, "Feldmarschall Conrad und die Aussenpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns," in *Berliner Monatshefte*, X (February, 1932), pp. 116-36.
48. Gellinek-Conrad, 6 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2849. Serbia voiced fears regarding a possible re-occupation of the Sanjak immediately after the Italian declaration of war. Hartwig-Neratov, 2 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 514.
49. Aehrenthal wrote Ugron that the rumors contained "not a single true word." Directive from Aehrenthal to Cetinje, 25 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2823. In reference to the Serbian "phantasy," Gellinek observed that "Serbian desires reflect themselves in the Serbian fears." Gellinek-Conrad, 6 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2849.
50. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 12 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2911; Ugron-Aehrenthal, 14 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2921; Gellinek-Conrad, 15 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2928; Gellinek-Conrad, 15 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2929; Gellinek-Conrad, 22 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2966.
51. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 1 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2857. In 1910, on the jubilee day of the 50th anniversary of his reign, Prince Nicholas of Montenegro became a king. One of his advisers then told him that it only remained to carve out a kingdom. William Miller, *The Balkans: Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro*, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1923, p. 518. In the summer of 1911, Nicholas supported an Albanian insurgency, mobilized troops on the Turkish frontier, and provoked a crisis. Edward C. Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*, University Park, Penn., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965, pp. 27-37.
52. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 4 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2701; Neratov-Obnorski, 2 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 508; Giolitti, *Memoirs*, p. 282.
53. Ugron-Aehrenthal, 4 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2701.
54. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 5 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2707.
55. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople, Rome, and the Balkan capitals, 6 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2717.
56. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 17 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2774. Unknown to either Giesl or Aehrenthal was the fact that only a few days before King Nicholas had informed the Russian chargé d'affaires that Montenegro would march into the Sanjak within a week, a step which certainly would not have been in keeping with Aehrenthal's wishes. Needless to say, Nicholas did not follow through on this project. Obnorski-Neratov, 14 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 626.
57. See, for example, Hartwig-Neratov, 8 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 562; Hartwig-Neratov, 22 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 697, from Belgrade.

58. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 17 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2774.
59. Directive from Aehrenthal to Cetinje, 25 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2823.
60. Directive from Aehrenthal to Cetinje, 25 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2823; Askew, *Europe and Libya*, p. 75.
61. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 1 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2857.
62. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 1 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2857.
63. Emphasis mine. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 1 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2857.
64. Giesl-Aehrenthal, 1 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2857.
65. Aehrenthal-Giesl, 11 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2903; Edward C. Thaden, "Montenegro: Russia's Troublesome Ally, 1910-1912," in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVIII (July, 1958), pp. 119-20.
66. The Russian chargé d'affaires first reported that the Turkish mobilization caused no concern in Athens. Tatishchev-Neratov, 2 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 513. Within a short while, however, he reported on the gravity of the situation. Tatishchev-Neratov, 12 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 599.
67. Braun-Aehrenthal, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2678. Similar pledges were made to Germany and Russia. Kiderlen-Lucius, 3 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXX, Nr. 10862; Tatishchev-Neratov, 3 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 523.
68. Braun-Aehrenthal, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2678.
69. Aehrenthal-Pallavicini, 11 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2742; Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople and Bucharest, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2763.
70. Telegram from Aehrenthal to great-power and Balkan capitals, 11 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2741.
71. Bulletin on a visit of the Greek ambassador, 18 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2780.
72. For an overview of Austro-Bulgarian relations, see Hans-Theodor Schmidt, "Oesterreich-Ungarn und Bulgarien, 1908-1913," in *Jahrbuecher fuer Kultur und Geschichte der Slawen*, XI (1935), pp. 502-609.
73. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 30 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2677.
74. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2686.
75. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 30 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2677.
76. Kiderlen-Marschall, 9 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12036; Urusov-Neratov, 9 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 569; Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 30 September 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2677; Askew, *Italy and Libya*, pp. 73-4.
77. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 13 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2750. For Gešov's own account of Bulgarian relations with Turkey leading up to the formation of the Balkan League, see Ivan Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, tr. by Constantin C. Mincoff, London, John Murray, 1915, pp. 1-10.
78. Kiderlen-Lucius, 14 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12037.
79. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 13 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2750.
80. Urusov-Neratov, 13 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 614.
81. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Sofia and Constantinople, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2758. Aehrenthal was not alone in urging caution at the Golden Horn. Neratov gave Charykov a similar commission. Neratov-Charykov, 9 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 566.
82. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople and Bucharest, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2763.

83. Telegram from Aehrenthal to Constantinople and Bucharest, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2763.
84. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2766.
85. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 15 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2765.
86. Herzfeld-Aehrenthal, 14 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2752; Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 17 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2778.
87. Urusov-Neratov, 18 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 657; Urusov-Neratov, 18 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 658.
88. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 17 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2779.
89. Neratov to Berlin, Vienna, London, and Paris, 15 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 633; Askew, *Europe and Libya*, p. 74.
90. Lucius to the Foreign Office, 16 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12038; Bulletin on a visit of the Russian ambassador, 16 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2771.
91. Bulletin on a visit of the Russian ambassador, 17 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2777.
92. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 18 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2784; Tschirschky-Kiderlen, 18 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12040.
93. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 19 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2787.
94. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 18 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2784.
95. Kiderlen-Tschirschky, 19 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12041; Kiderlen-Marschall, 20 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12042; Tschirschky-Kiderlen, 20 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12043; Telegram from Aehrenthal to great-power capitals, 19 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2785; Szoegyény-Aehrenthal, 21 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2798.
96. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 19 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2787; Giers-Neratov, 18 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 656.
97. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 21 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2804.
98. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 21 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2805. Neratov, for one, was confident of Russia's position in Bulgaria despite the apparent Austrian successes of late. Neratov-Izvol'ski, 19 October 1911, *Der Diplomatische Schrift-Wechsel Iswolskis, 1911-1914*, ed. by Friedrich Stieve, 2 vols., Berlin, 1926, I, Nr. 145.
99. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 21 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2805. The last sentence of the directive to Pallavicini read: "Tell the Turkish foreign minister that we consider the declaration of the Porte [assuring Sofia of Turkey's peaceful intentions] to be a pledge to the Great Powers." Aehrenthal-Pallavicini, 20 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2791.
100. Aehrenthal-Tarnowski, 22 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2808; Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 23 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2816.
101. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 23 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2816.
102. The English ambassador, having received no instructions, did not participate. Tarnowski-Aehrenthal, 29 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2846; Neklyudov-Neratov, 30 October 1911, *I.B.*, I-2, Nr. 755; Below-Saleske-Bethmann, 29 October 1911, *G.P.*, XXXIII, Nr. 12045.
103. Czernin-Aehrenthal, 2 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2687.
104. Aehrenthal-Czernin, 28 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2841;

Fuerstenberg-Aehrenthal, 3 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2864; Fuerstenberg-Aehrenthal, 4 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2868. There were other reasons for Rumania's special position. Rumania was almost regarded as a fourth partner in the Triple Alliance after 1883, and King Carol was a Hohenzollern.

105. For an account of the mediation efforts, see Askew, *Europe and Libya*, pp. 82-109.

106. Czernin-Aehrenthal, 1 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2679.

107. Czernin-Aehrenthal, 2 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2687.

108. Telegram from Aehrenthal to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, 21 October 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2801.

109. Telegram from Aehrenthal to great-power capitals, 6 November 1911, *Oe-U.*, III, Nr. 2874; Cartwright-Grey, 11 October 1911, *B.D.*, IX, Nr. 277.

110. The formal Treaty of Lausanne was signed on October 18.