THE ROYAL BOUNTY: JAMES II AND THE HUGUENOT REFUGEES

*Mary Hill Cole**

An historian studying the aid sometimes known as "the royal bounty" and given by English monarchs to French protestants has many periods and approaches from which to choose in defining the topic. Military aid from England under Elizabeth and Charles I relieved the Huguenots at La Rochelle; the domestic impact of Huguenot refugees in England can be traced from the early settlers whom Henry VIII naturalized in 1535 and the later refugees of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre fleeing France in the 1570s; and Dr. Théodore Mayerne, the personal physician to James I, represented but one of the professions which benefited from the occupational skills of the Huguenot refugees.[1] Whether the approach is from a military, social, or economic standpoint, the most fertile areas for an investigation of the Huguenots in England, at first glance, seem to be connected to protestant monarchs who sympathized with the persecuted French refugees. A common opposition to Catholicism at times resulted in an alliance between protestant rulers of England and the Huguenots under attack by French Catholics. Thus it is surprising to discover that a Catholic king of England extended financial and economic aid to his religious enemies during one of the most vicious periods of persecution in the Huguenots' history.

In 1685 Louis XIV of France ended the era of relative Huguenot toleration inaugurated by Henry IV and revoked the Edict of Nantes which protected the Huguenots from the Catholic government. As his *dragonnades* scoured the country in search of recalcitrant Huguenots and destroyed homes and families

**Mary Hill Cole received her B.A. (*Summa Cum Laude*) from James Madison University in 1979, and her M.A. from the University of Virginia in 1982. She is currently working toward her Ph.D. in English History at U.Va., where she is a graduate instructor in that field.*

1. Charles Bastide, *The Anglo-French Entente in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1914, reprinted 1971), pp. 78-80

in the name of a state religion, more and more Huguenots defied Louis' orders closing all French ports to flee their country for the more hospitable lands of England and the Dutch Republic.[2] While many of the prosperous refugees settled among their Dutch neighbors, the ones who crossed the Channel to England typically had little money or property and expected to practice whatever trade had supported them back in France.[3] As they settled in the London areas of Bethnal Green, Spitalfields, and Soho, the refugees opened new workshops for making glassware, hats, silk and silk stockings, paper, and lace of the same high quality which had made these French commodities a valuable export.[4] The strong sympathy of the English for the persecuted refugees resulted, from 1685 to 1688, in monetary aid raised by Parliament, church collections, and public subscriptions totalling £200,000.[5] The annual interest on this capital, £16,000, was entrusted to a lay committee for distribution to families of quality, physicians, merchants, artisans, and mechanics; in 1687 the committee's report stated that 13,000 refugees in London and 2,000 in various English ports had received a stipend or tools for their work. An ecclesiastical committee controlled by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London had almost £2,000 from the public treasury to support indigent Huguenot clergymen and their churches. For the estimated 50,000 to 80,000 refugees who came to England in the ten years after 1675, there were nine Huguenot churches in the London area holding services or being built with the king's approval.[6] The English monarch who sanctioned this generous outpouring of his subjects' money to alleviate the distress of the Huguenot refugees was the staunchly Catholic James II.

The arrogance and militant Catholicism of James II have made him a favorite target for the Whig historians. Such writers as the Victorian Thomas Babington Macaulay championed the protestant cause in their works and assumed "that the central theme in English history was the development of liberal institutions."[7] For the seventeenth century, Whig historians could point

2. Gilbert Burnet, *A History of his Own Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1833), 3:80-81.

3. Charles M. Weiss, *The History of the French Protestant Refugees*, translated Henry William Herbert (New York: Stringer & Townsend, 1854), 1:258.

4. Samuel Smiles, *The Huguenots: Their Settlements, Churches, and Industries in England and Ireland* (NewYork: Harper & Brothers, 1868), p. 250, pp. 255-257; George Elmore Reaman, *The Trail of the Huguenots in Europe, the United States, South Africa and Canada* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 71-78.

5. Weiss, *The History of the French Protestant Refugees*, 1:258.

6. *Ibid.*, 1:251, 258-259.

7. Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1970), p. 52; Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. v, which criticizes "the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present."

to Parliament's victory over Stuart absolutism and the ultimate triumph of 1688 that strengthened the role of Parliament and diminished, through constitutional restrictions, the power of the king. These Whig interpretations of James' reign emphasize his determination to lead England back to Catholicism and his sycophantic relationship with Louis XIV. James' policy of stubbornness at home and weakness abroad, these historians argue, explains his reluctant aid to the Huguenot refugees.

According to the Whig historians and Huguenot memorialists, this aid came from the unwilling hands of the Stuart king in response to public sentiment which demanded some relief for fellow protestants. James II, they write, hesitated to aid the rebellious subjects of the French king because he was "a hireling and vassal of" Louis XIV and did not wish to offend him by condoning the illegal flight of the Huguenots.[8] According to this interpretation, James II grovelled at the feet of the Sun King for whatever kind words and pensions he chose to bestow on his Stuart cousin. Upon calling his first Parliament in 1685, James sent an apology to Louis for having summoned a Parliament without his permission, as had been the usual procedure of Charles II. In effect, Louis had been paying Charles II (and expecting to pay James II) to govern England without calling Parliament or allowing discussion of French policies. In 1685 Louis XIV sent a draft for 500,000 livres to his ambassador, Barillon, to pay in installments to James if he ruled in accordance with French policies on the continent. More money would follow if the royal councillors, Rochester, Sunderland, and Godolphin, were correct in promising that James would ignore his defensive treaty with the Spanish Netherlands in the event of open French aggression.[9] Thus, the argument runs, James II depended on French money and good will to keep the English government sound and functioning, and he would not be eager to jeopardize his benefits for the sake of a small, powerless group of religious fanatics who refused to become good French Catholics.

Even more threatening to English protestants than James' subservience was the fear that James actually envied the strength and thoroughness with which Louis XIV attacked the Huguenots. If the king of France could make such a daring and blatant attack on his protestant subjects, the example might encourage James to use the English army against both non-conformists and Anglicans to induce conversions to Catholicism. Englishmen watching James staff the standing army with Catholic officers and work for the repeal of the Act of *Habeas Corpus* and the penal laws against Catholics might wonder how long the king would restrict himself to quiet intervention. To the Whig historians, James harboured an intense dislike of the Huguenot refugees who came upon his shores

8. Thomas Babington Macaulay, *The History of England from the Accession of James II* (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company, 1849), 1:358; Smiles, *The Huguenots*, p. 186; George Macaulay Trevelyan, *The English Revolution, 1688-1689* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 7-19.

9. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 1:360.

and wished that he had the military capability and Catholic support of his kingdom to convert his subjects at sword's point.[10] His ill treatment of nonconformists in England and Scotland proved that "James was following the desire of his heart, . . . and nothing but the quarrel of Bishops and King saved the Nonconformists from extirpation."[11] The temptation to imitate his French cousin's persecution of protestants accounted for James' unwillingness to aid the refugees.

However, according to historians of the Huguenot emigration, James II had to make a token gesture because of the overwhelming and emotional response of English protestants to the hardships suffered by their co-religionists. He allowed the English hostility toward Louis XIV to override his own inclinations, and "in deference to public opinion," James complied with his subjects' desires by granting relief to the refugees from the privy purse.[12] The most convincing modern biography of James II repeats this analysis but tempers it with the suggestion that James saw no danger in allowing the subscriptions to be collected.[13] He then tried to weaken the effect of the aid by restricting all money to those Huguenots who used the Anglican liturgy.[14] Thus a reluctant Catholic king succumbed to public pressure and against his conscience allowed his subjects to give the protestant refugees financial support.

In response to the conclusions of the Whig and Huguenot historians, modern scholars have investigated in more detail the precise relationship of James II with Louis XIV and the extent to which France influenced England's negotiations with continental powers. Before condemning James for being a French vassal, we need to examine the concessions supposedly made to Louis and his financial dealings with James II. If we accept the Whig interpretation, then these sums of money must have represented fiscal salvation to James, and the payments must have arrived in sufficient amounts to ensure his continued obedience. However, in 1685 Parliament granted James revenue for life, which assured him of funds to keep the government functioning even if Parliament was not in session, and James felt little financial pressure until shortly before the successful invasion of William III in 1688.[15] The fiscal solvency of England did not depend upon French support. The reason why James initially displayed an

10. *Ibid.*, 2:14.

11. George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England Under the Stuarts* (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1949), p. 356.

12. Weiss, *The History of the French Protestant Refugees*, 1:247; Smiles, *The Huguenots*, p. 186.

13. F. C. Turner, *James II* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), pp. 310-315. Maurice Ashley in his *James II* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1977), pp. 186-187, believes that James "launched a fund to help" the refugees on his own initiative.

14. J.R. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688 in England* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 112.

15. John Miller, *Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 250; Turner, *James II*, p. 270.

accommodating face to Louis XIV stemmed from his fears that the people would not accept him as king, as they had indicated during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, and that Parliament would prove rebellious by refusing him revenue for life. When neither of these events transpired, and especially after he had defeated and executed the Duke of Monmouth, James gained the confidence and power to turn away offers of money from Louis XIV.[16]

As a return on his money, Louis wanted to neutralize English involvement on the continent by disrupting her domestic situation. Never truly sanguine of James' success in leading England back to Catholicism, Louis realized that the value of his friendship with James lay in his ability to make English foreign policy complement French aggression in Europe: English troops and subsidies must not aid the current enemies of France.[17] Before measuring the performance of James against the requests of Louis, we should see how much money James received and whether the sum constituted a plausible bribe.

In fact, the amount was minimal. Barillon, the French ambassador to England, received all payments for James with the instructions that the money be given in small amounts only in the face of a crisis. Much of the money deposited with Barillon never reached the royal coffers, since Louis believed that the promise of money was as persuasive as the outright gift of it. In 1685 Louis paid off his old debt to Charles II by settling 470,000 livres on James II, and he later authorized 330,000 livres more for James to use in defending England against William of Orange. Although Barillon had close to two million livres in reserve, James received only about £125,000 from Louis XIV during a period of three years in which his own Parliament granted him almost £6,000,000.[18] That amount of money from France did not give Louis much leverage against a king who commanded over fifty times that sum from an antagonistic Parliament. French support was more verbal than monetary, and "it can at least be said for James that he was not now and never had been anybody's man but his own."[19]

Thus James II did receive a small sum of money from Louis XIV, but he refused to accept French military aid eagerly offered against William of Orange. In the summer of 1688 when William was assembling ships and supplies for his expedition to England, the Dutch threat to the Stuart monarchy seemed imminent. If William succeeded, he would hinder Louis from expanding French dominance in Europe because the arms and aid which William would command as king of England would reach the Dutch and German areas under French attack. Louis would lose a fitful ally and gain an implacable enemy if James lost his

16. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 179.

17. Stuart E. Prall, *The Bloodless Revolution* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972). p. 171; Robert H. George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II," *Journal of Modern History*, 3 (1931), p. 403.

18. George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II," pp. 411-412; David Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 158; Turner, *James II*, p. 274.

19. Prall, *The Bloodless Revolution*, p. 107.

struggle against William. Therefore, French money, ships, and troops were made available to James in defense of his kingdom. In September, Louis offered James £50,000 for the benefit of the English Navy and twelve to fifteen thousand (or more) troops to land at Portsmouth and fight alongside the English army.[20] Although James had declined similar overtures earlier that summer, Louis hoped that James' new appreciation of the danger he faced would entice him to accept French aid for the sake of his throne.[21] However, although James had at last responded to his subjects' rumblings of discontent by announcing a Parliament for November, he balked at accepting French troops. James had a streak of patriotism which convinced him that only a pyrrhic victory could come from his reliance on French soliders: a small force of foreign troops would raise heated protests from both the people and the army, and a large force could conquer England for Louis himself after having protected it for James.[22] Believing that English domestic turmoils deserved internal settlement, James declined French aid and tried to believe that the present unrest in England would not become an open rebellion.[23]

The relationship of James II with Louis XIV extended beyond that of a subservient ruler who accepted a nominal payment and refused military aid. In his dealings with the powers of Europe, James negotiated for English advantages without consideration for French foreign policy, and the enemies of France did not automatically become the enemies of England. In 1685 James renewed the defensive treaty with Spain, thereby creating a diplomatic tie which was potentially antagonistic to France.[24] When Louis was marshalling troops along his northern border in preparation for an attack on the Palatinate, James argued for peace and, in the event of war, for recognition of English neutrality which would benefit her trade;[25] and when Louis asked James to send ships for Danish use against Sweden, James quarrelled about finances and procrastinated long enough for the issue to die amidst diplomatic dispatches.[26] In his relationship with the Dutch, James ignored pressure from Louis to keep Anglo-Dutch cooperation at a minimum and negotiated in 1685 a defensive treaty with the United Provinces against French aggression.[27] Two years later, he renewed the treaty, despite the clear disapproval from France of an alliance designed to inhibit her expansion to

20. G.M.D. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1974), p. 153; Turner, *James II*, p. 425.

21. Turner, *James II*, p. 425.

22. Burnet, *A History of his Own Time*, 3:286-287; Turner, *James II*, pp. 425-427; Macaulay, *The History of England*, 1:368.

23. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 2:350-351.

24. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 184.

25. G.N. Clark, *The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 125.

26. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 183.

27. Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III*, p. 157.

the north and northeast.[28] James II took pains to conduct English foreign policy without bowing to French interests, and was so far from being a French puppet that he defied pressure from Louis XIV on several occasions and entered into diplomatic alliances inimical to a French hegemony in Europe.

The fact that James II did not sacrifice the interests of England to follow French commands provides a context for our interpretation of his reasons for aiding the Huguenot refugees. As king of England, James zealously upheld the dignity of his constitutional status, and in his financial and diplomatic relations with Louis XIV, "he seemed resolved not to be governed by French counsels, but to act in an equality with that haughty monarch in all things."[29] His sense of duty made it impossible for him to betray his country to the French; his honesty and patriotism gave James the strength of conscience to aid the refugees fleeing the religious persecution of Louis XIV.[30] The patriotism which moved the Catholic king of England to raise his daughters in the Anglican church guided him through the temptations of French support with more success than his brother, Charles II, had enjoyed.[31] James II saw benefits to England in aiding the Huguenots, and he did not allow the persuasion of Louis XIV or his own Catholicism to interfere with securing those advantages for England.

Indeed, the issue of religion did not determine the response of other European nations to the French attack on the Huguenots. Both Spain and Rome disapproved of the violence which accompanied the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the oppressive *dragonnades* which removed Huguenot children to Catholic religious houses, threw men into French galleys, and cast women and the poor into dark prisons.[32] Pope Innocent XI did not view Louis' actions as a victory for universal Catholicism, because he saw that the real danger to European Christianity lay not in the Huguenot camp but in the pagan Turkish armies moving westward into Europe.[33] The Pope feared that the religious divisions in France and England would weaken the Christian defense of Europe and encourage a Turkish victory. Although Louis XIV vowed to destroy the Huguenots even if "it should require that with one hand he should cut off the other," the Pope sanctioned neither his methods nor his timing.[34]

28. George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II," p. 412; Clark, *The Later Stuarts*, p. 125.

29. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 1:368; Burnet, *A History of his Own Time*, 3:12.

30. Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III*, p. 140.

31. Prall, *The Bloodless Revolution*, pp. 46-47.

32. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 2:13; Trevelyan, *England Under the Stuarts*, p. 365.

33. Clark, *The Later Stuarts*, p. 124.

34. Burnet, *A History of his Own Time*, 3:77.

Since the patriarch of the Catholic church did not support the persecution of the Huguenots, there is no reason why the king of England should have approved of the violent suppression simply because he was a Catholic. On the contrary, James II told the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors that he deplored the violent methods which his French cousin was using in the name of the Catholic church and considered such persecution "impolitic and un-Christian."[35] What lends credibility to this attitude is his confidence that he could bring the English peacefully back to the Pope by repealing the Test Act and by educating the public in the religious strengths of Catholicism. James believed that by the virtues of its doctrine Catholicism would naturally attract reasonable men if the legal restrictions on its practice were removed. The forced conversion of the Huguenots, from his view, deprived the Catholic church of the splendid victory to be gained from voluntary conversions, thereby reaffirming the superiority of Catholicism over its protestant rivals.[36] The dangerous precedent in France only made James' task harder because his subjects feared a repetition in England of the suppression abroad. James II disliked the methods used to enforce the Revocation of Nantes because they created a paranoia in England which impeded the establishment of Catholic toleration.[37] In hope of calming English anxieties about his religious policies, James II disassociated himself, as a Catholic monarch, from the repressive actions of the French king by authorizing aid for the Huguenot refugees who came to England. The French example was one which he would not follow.

In addition to this psychological balm, James II created more tangible rewards for aiding the refugees. The Huguenots were a special people, according to Samuel Smiles, who worked harder than Englishmen and wasted nothing, not even oxtails, which they found made a hearty soup.[38] Although we discount this panegyric, the Huguenot refugees did introduce new articles for export and stimulated English trade with the continent. To a king interested in improving the national balance of trade, the skills of the refugees promised an increase in trade and an enhanced reputation abroad for English goods.[39] James II certainly knew that any financial aid given to help the refugees establish their homes and businesses would be repaid in trade benefits.

Besides helping the Huguenot community become established in its new country, James II took care that his English subjects residing in France should

35. John Miller, *James II: A Study in Kingship* (East Sussex: Wayland Publishers, 1978), p. 144; Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 113.

36. Miller, *Popery and Politics in England*, p. 201. See also, Roy Alfred Sundstrom, "Aid and Assimilation: A Study of the economic support given French Protestants in England, 1680-1727," (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 1972).

37. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 2:13; Bastide, *The Anglo-French Entente*, p. 105; Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 112.

38. Smiles, *The Huguenots*, p. 254.

39. Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III*, p. 41; Turner, *James II*, p. 259.

not suffer under the new persecutions. Louis XIV claimed that all naturalized English protestants and their families in France were bound by the Revocation, and he dismissed the messages from James seeking the protection of English "caught up in the persecution of Huguenots."[40] However, most non-naturalized English subjects were allowed to leave France with their property, although without their French wives, due in part to the patriotic intervention of James II. The English ambassador in Paris since September 1685, William Trumbull, received orders from the king to assist all English and Scots who wished to leave France, but Trumbull was not secretly to convey any Huguenots to ships in the Channel or across the northern border.[41] James would not interfere with French domestic policy nor was he a true advocate of religious toleration; rather, he stood behind the English domiciled in France because they were his subjects and his responsibility. Responding to an appeal from Trumbull in June 1686, James II again exercised his royal leverage on behalf of his ambassador when Louis XIV continued to create difficulties for the English colony in Paris. The French king was refusing passage out of France to the English protestant servants in Trumbull's household. In response, James immediately ordered the entire party to return to England, and Louis was so surprised at this abrupt recall that he permitted Trumbull and all his servants to leave.[42] These incidents following the Revocation illustrate the dissatisfaction of James II with the religious persecution and diplomatic aggression of France, and he determined that his subjects must not see in the current French troubles those of England's future.

Thus for political and religious reasons James II worked against the policies of Louis XIV issuing from the 1685 Revocation. Besides asserting his independence from French ties, this disapproval of religious persecution abroad might convince Englishmen that no similar attempt at mass conversion appealed to James and that they would never face the violence of an English *dragonnade.* With respect to Englishmen in France, patriotism and the responsibility of a monarch for his subjects' safety motivated James to protect Trumbull and other Englishmen from the penalties of the new religious laws of a militantly Catholic France. As a Catholic, James II preferred peaceful conversion to the true church, and he expressed his distaste for French policy to sympathetic ambassadors. Constrained by his respect for the institution of monarchy and a scepticism of the extent of French persecution, James hesitated to condemn Louis XIV openly.[43] The incident often cited to prove that James secretly admired Louis' firm hand is his reaction to Pastor Claude's book, *The complaints of the Protestants cruelly persecuted in the kingdom of France* (1686).[44] Responding to the

40. Miller, *James II,* p. 131.
41. Turner, *James II,* pp. 346-347.
42. Miller, *James II,* p. 145.
43. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688,* pp. 112-113.
44. Weiss, *The History of the French Protestant Refugees,* 1:260-261; Macaulay, *The History of England,* 2:13-15.

protest of French ambassador Barillon, James issued an order through his council for the book to be burnt in London. However, his religious motive for attacking Claude's book was not paramount: its vicious criticism of a fellow sovereign and its inflammatory stories, which only deepened the religious divisions among Englishmen, struck James as a real threat to peace and toleration in England.[45] In order to support the institution of monarchy and the tradition of obedience to the king, James acted in this instance with apparent hostility towards the Huguenots.

The accusation that James had to be forced by public sentiment into aiding the refugees stems not only from his own Catholicism and his anger at Claude's book, but also from the fact that he restricted aid exclusively to those Huguenots who started using the Anglican liturgy.[46] Since he could not prevent the subscriptions from being raised, the king determined to limit their benefit and to delay their payment as long as possible.[47] The usual explanation for this royal stipulation of 1686 holds that James circumvented the will of the people and Parliament with this condition so that the Huguenot community, crippled by poverty and suffering, would not threaten his plans for reviving a Catholic England.

However, there were definite political and legal considerations which urged James to bring the Huguenots into the Anglican church. The policy of restricting aid promised possible benefits for James and, from his view, for England. To a king who aimed at unifying his people as a Catholic nation, the most obvious threat from the Huguenots lay in the religious turmoil which their very presence in England created: they represented yet another group which had to be convinced of their religious errors. It was simply logical that James would urge their affiliation with the Church of England so that fewer religious factions or interests would exist to challenge Catholicism. In addition, James was enforcing the existing laws against religious non-conformity which were then troubling English dissenters. His concern for strengthening the monarchy also argued for the religious restriction. James grouped the Huguenots with the rebellious dissenters and Presbyterians who supported the Duke of Monmouth, because he discerned in them a common element of Whiggish antagonism to the sovereign. In James' opinion, forcing the Huguenots to become Anglicans, at least in appearance, would please the Tories on whom he strongly depended and would deny further support to his political opponents from the refugees.[48] Public sentiment would not move James II unless it coincided with his own rigid opinions.

Recent interpretations of late seventeenth-century England set forth by Miller, Jones, and Prall have increased our understanding of the complexities in

45. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, pp. 112-113.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Miller, *James II*, p. 144.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

the character and policies of James II. The virulent Whig view of James as a French hireling who secretly envied the absolutism of Louis XIV has been softened by studies of European diplomacy and English politics which emphasize the independent spirit and patriotism of this opinionated Stuart king. The newer view of James II illuminates some of the more logical and less obvious reasons why this Catholic monarch assisted the Huguenot refugees fleeing France after the 1685 Revocation. Allowing the subscriptions of aid and placing the restrictions upon it were decisions James II made from his political judgment and religious beliefs. Since he consistently ignored the overwhelming antipathy of most of his subjects to his religious, political, and military policies, he could have – had he so wished – dismissed public sympathy for the Huguenot refugees with equal unconcern. However, by aiding the refugees, James believed he could demonstrate his independence from Louis XIV, improve English trade, and reassure his fearful subjects that he would not bring religious war to England.